AQA 7042 · 2O · R12 - Political developments: the Reichstag Fire; parties and elections
Follow the Reichstag Fire, March election and Enabling Act to judge how German democracy ended by March 1933. Explain how emergency powers, violence and political cooperation removed effective checks while some constitutional institutions still existed.
From chancellorship to an emergency
When President Paul von Hindenburg appointed Adolf Hitler chancellor on 30 January 1933, Hitler headed a government but did not yet possess unlimited power. The Weimar Constitution remained in force, Hindenburg remained president, the Reichstag—Germany’s elected national parliament—still had a lawmaking role, and opposition parties still existed. Hitler’s cabinet was a coalition between the Nazi Party (NSDAP) and the conservative German National People’s Party (DNVP), while most cabinet ministers were not Nazis.
This starting point prevents a common mistake: appointment as chancellor was not the same as election as dictator. Hitler needed to weaken political opponents, win greater parliamentary strength and escape constitutional checks. At his request, Hindenburg dissolved the Reichstag on 1 February and called another election for 5 March. A decree on 4 February allowed restrictions on political meetings and the press, so the campaign was already unequal before the fire.
The decisive sequence then compressed into less than four weeks:
| Date | Development | Immediate political effect |
|---|---|---|
| 27 February | Fire seriously damaged the Reichstag building | Nazi leaders presented it as the opening of a Communist uprising |
| 28 February | Hindenburg issued the Reichstag Fire Decree | Civil liberties and legal safeguards were suspended; repression of opponents intensified |
| 5 March | Reichstag election | The NSDAP became the largest party but still failed to win an absolute majority of votes |
| 23–24 March | The Reichstag passed, and the state promulgated, the Enabling Act | The Cabinet could legislate without normal parliamentary control, including by departing from the constitution |
The order matters. The election did not create the emergency powers; it took place after they had begun to reshape who could campaign, speak, publish and organise. The later parliamentary vote therefore cannot be understood as if deputies were acting in the normal conditions of a secure democracy.
The fire, the decree and political repression
The Reichstag building burned on the evening of 27 February. Marinus van der Lubbe, a Dutch council communist found at the scene, was arrested and later convicted, but responsibility for starting and spreading the fire remains disputed among historians. The Nazis immediately claimed that the fire signalled a planned Communist revolt. There is no secure evidence for that alleged uprising, and the cautious historical claim is therefore about exploitation, not certain authorship: the Nazi-led government used the fire to justify powers it wanted against its opponents.
On 28 February Hindenburg issued the Decree of the Reich President for the Protection of People and State, usually called the Reichstag Fire Decree, under Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution. An emergency decree was an order made through the president’s constitutional emergency power rather than the ordinary parliamentary lawmaking process. Earlier Weimar governments had used Article 48, but this decree was exceptionally broad and had no stated end date.
Its first section suspended, “until further notice”, constitutional protections for personal liberty, expression and the press, assembly and association, private communications, homes and property. Its second section allowed the Reich government to intervene where it claimed a state government had failed to preserve public order. These powers changed politics through a chain:
A claimed Communist emergency → suspended rights and expanded police power → arrests and suppression of opposition activity → a less competitive election environment.
Communists were the first and largest target. KPD leaders and activists were arrested or forced into hiding, its press and organisation were obstructed, and its elected deputies were later prevented from taking their seats. Social Democrats, trade unionists and other critics also faced arrest, violence and publication restrictions. Police powers and Nazi paramilitary violence reinforced one another: a legal instrument created room for coercion, while coercion made formal political procedures easier to control.
This was not simply “the fire caused dictatorship”. A fire could not suspend constitutional rights by itself. Hindenburg issued the decree on the Cabinet’s proposal; ministers and police applied it; the Nazi movement supplied organised violence; and existing anti-Communist fears made the government’s emergency claim politically potent. The event was a trigger, but institutions and human choices converted it into a means of destroying democratic safeguards.
Parties and the election of 5 March
The election remained multiparty: voters could choose among competing organisations. It was not, however, free and fair. The government controlled important state resources, opposition newspapers and meetings had been restricted, Communist organisers were being arrested, and SA and SS intimidation affected political activity. A ballot can list several parties while the conditions needed for democratic choice—free speech, association, personal security and equal campaigning—are being removed.
The principal results show both Nazi strength and its limit:
| Party or grouping | Share of vote | What the result shows |
|---|---|---|
| NSDAP | 43.9% | The Nazis were clearly the largest party but did not win an absolute majority |
| DNVP | 8.0% | The conservative coalition partner gave the government a combined vote share above 50% |
| SPD | 18.3% | A substantial democratic-socialist opposition survived despite repression |
| KPD | 12.3% | Communist electoral support remained significant even as the party was being suppressed |
| Centre and BVP together | 13.9% | The Catholic parties retained enough parliamentary weight to matter in the Enabling Act vote |
The result therefore supports two different but compatible conclusions. First, the government coalition gained a working majority: NSDAP and DNVP together received 51.9% of the vote. Second, the Nazis alone had not received majority consent, even after a campaign conducted with the advantages and coercive powers of government. It is inaccurate to say simply that “Germany voted Hitler into dictatorship”. Hindenburg had appointed him chancellor, millions voted against the Nazis, and the dictatorial transfer of legislative power came later.
Party behaviour after the election also mattered. KPD deputies could not act as a parliamentary bloc because their mandates were nullified and members were arrested, hiding or in exile. The SPD remained the clearest parliamentary opponent. Centre and the smaller middle parties still had choices, but those choices were made amid intimidation, uncertainty and promises from the government. Dictatorship arose not only because Nazis coerced their enemies, but also because conservative allies and non-socialist parties enabled further constitutional change.
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