AQA 7042 · 2N · R04 - The October⁄November 1917 revolution: causes, course and extent of revolution
This lesson examines why the Provisional Government could be overthrown in October/November 1917, how the seizure of power unfolded and how far the revolution initially reached. It then follows Bolshevik leadership from insurrection to government through Sovnarkom, the first decrees and actions taken by December. The central enquiry is whether the Bolsheviks established authority mainly by answering popular demands, by controlling key institutions and armed force, or by combining both.
Why revolution became possible
Russia still used the Julian calendar in 1917, thirteen days behind the Gregorian calendar used in western Europe. This is why the same event is called both the October and November Revolution. In this lesson, the Russian date is given first: 24–26 October (6–8 November) for the decisive events in Petrograd.
The Bolsheviks did not create every grievance that weakened the Provisional Government. Their opportunity came from the interaction of problems which the government had inherited or failed to resolve:
| Pressure by autumn 1917 | How it weakened the government | How it helped the Bolsheviks |
|---|---|---|
| Continued war | The failed summer offensive deepened desertion, casualties and war-weariness. The government could not offer a rapid end to the conflict. | Bolshevik demands for immediate peace offered a clear alternative to continued “revolutionary defence”. |
| Land hunger | Peasants were already seizing estates, while the government postponed a final land settlement until the Constituent Assembly. | The promise of land transferred authority away from ministers and towards peasants and local committees. |
| Urban hardship | Inflation, disrupted food supplies and industrial conflict eroded confidence among workers and soldiers in the capital. | “Bread” and workers’ control connected daily hardship to a demand for a different government. |
| The Kornilov affair | Kerensky’s conflict with General Kornilov in August exposed division and made another right-wing threat seem possible. | Bolshevik activists helped mobilise resistance; armed Red Guards and the party’s anti-Kornilov stance increased its standing on the left. |
| Changing soviet politics | Moderate socialists lost support because they had cooperated with the government without delivering peace or land. | By September, Bolsheviks had majorities in the Petrograd and Moscow soviets, concentrating support in the two capitals and important garrisons. |
These pressures were enabling conditions, not a timetable for an inevitable uprising. The Bolsheviks still needed a political decision, an organisation capable of acting and opponents unable to assemble dependable force. Lenin supplied persistent pressure for an early armed insurrection; the Petrograd Soviet’s Military Revolutionary Committee supplied the mechanism; and Kerensky’s weak government supplied the opportunity.
From decision to seizure of power
Leadership mattered at different levels. Lenin gave strategic and political leadership: after returning secretly to Petrograd, he persuaded the Bolshevik Central Committee on 10 October (23 October) to place armed insurrection on its agenda despite opposition from Lev Kamenev and Grigory Zinoviev. He feared that delay would allow the government to recover or the coming Congress of Soviets to produce a compromise.
Trotsky, as chairman of the Petrograd Soviet, helped connect the uprising to the authority of the soviet. The Soviet had created its Military Revolutionary Committee (MRC) ostensibly to defend Petrograd and its garrison against counter-revolution or removal to the front. During 21–23 October (3–5 November), MRC commissars challenged the government’s military command and secured the allegiance or neutrality of most of the Petrograd garrison. This gave the revolutionaries access to organised armed force while presenting their actions as defence of the soviet.
Operational leadership was broader than two individuals. MRC organisers, Red Guards from factories, pro-soviet soldiers and sailors from the Baltic Fleet carried out the seizure. Their success depended less on a mass street battle than on the Provisional Government’s inability to make the capital’s garrison obey it.
The course of the revolution reveals that power was being taken before the best-known scene at the Winter Palace:
- 24 October (6 November): Kerensky’s government closed Bolshevik printing presses and tried to secure strategic points. The MRC treated this as an attack on the revolution and sent forces to bridges, railway stations, the post and telegraph offices and other key sites.
- Night of 24–25 October (6–7 November): pro-soviet forces occupied most strategic points, often meeting little resistance. Lenin reached the Smolny Institute, the headquarters of the Petrograd Soviet and MRC.
- Morning of 25 October (7 November): the MRC declared the Provisional Government overthrown even though its ministers were still inside the Winter Palace. Kerensky had left Petrograd to seek loyal troops.
- Evening of 25 October: the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets opened. The seizure was therefore presented to delegates as an accomplished fact, not simply proposed for their approval.
- Early 26 October (8 November): forces entered the Winter Palace and arrested most remaining ministers. Resistance in Petrograd had been limited, although describing the whole revolution as bloodless would be misleading.
This sequence separates strategic direction, operational organisation and mass participation. Lenin helped make the decision; Trotsky and the Soviet gave the MRC political cover; many activists, soldiers and sailors executed it; and the government’s isolation made their action effective. A “great leader alone” explanation misses both the institution that coordinated force and the weakness of the state it displaced.
How extensive was the revolution?
“Extent” needs more than a count of occupied buildings. It can be tested by geographical reach, depth of participation, resistance, institutional control and durability. Those criteria produce a qualified answer.
| Dimension | Evidence of reach | Evidence of limitation |
|---|---|---|
| Petrograd | The MRC controlled the main garrison, communications, transport points and central government; the ministers were arrested. | A disciplined minority did much of the active work, while much of the city remained passive. Ease of seizure does not by itself prove universal support. |
| Moscow | A Bolshevik-majority Moscow Soviet formed its own MRC on 25 October, and pro-soviet forces gained the second capital by 2 November (15 November). | Resistance was far stronger than in Petrograd. Brian D. Taylor's scholarly account estimates more than 1,000 deaths during a week of fighting, showing that “bloodless revolution” cannot be applied nationally. |
| Wider former empire | News, MRC representatives, local soviets and sympathetic garrisons helped spread claims of soviet power beyond the capitals. | Transfer of authority varied by locality. Rural districts, army commands, rival socialist bodies and national movements did not all accept orders from Petrograd; effective central control remained incomplete. |
| Political legitimacy | The Second Congress of Soviets declared that authority had passed to the soviets, giving the new regime an all-Russian institutional claim. | Most Menshevik and right Socialist Revolutionary delegates walked out in protest. Their departure let the Bolsheviks dominate the remaining proceedings but weakened the claim to a united socialist transfer of power. |
The events were therefore both narrower and wider than the capture of the Winter Palace. They were narrower because immediate armed control was concentrated in strategic urban centres and was contested even in Moscow. They were wider because the overthrow created a new claim to sovereignty and opened the way for land redistribution, workers’ intervention in industry and national self-determination—changes that drew on movements already developing from below.
Continue this lesson.
You’re previewing NovaLearn without an account. Create a free account to read the rest.
Create free account