1E - Foreign affairs and wars: wars with Sweden and Turkey
Peter's victories made Russia a major Baltic power, but his defeat against the Ottoman Empire exposed the limits of that success. This lesson explains how the wars with Sweden and Turkey developed from 1707, how they drew Russia into European conflicts, and why territorial gains alone are an incomplete measure of achievement.
Poltava and the turn in the war
The Swedish invasion threatened the survival of Peter's Baltic programme before it produced his greatest victory. Charles XII had defeated Russia at Narva in 1700 and forced Peter's ally Augustus II out of the Polish throne. From 1707 Charles advanced eastwards, intending to defeat Russia decisively rather than merely recover individual Baltic forts.
Peter avoided giving Charles the early decisive battle he wanted. Russian withdrawals and the destruction or removal of supplies made Swedish progress increasingly difficult. Charles turned towards Ukraine in 1708, where the Cossack hetman Ivan Mazepa later joined him, hoping to escape Russian control. The defeat of a Swedish reinforcement force at Lesnaya during this phase of the campaign deprived Charles of important supplies. Mazepa's defection did not bring the united support or abundant resources on which Swedish hopes depended.
The severe winter of 1708–1709 weakened the invading army further. At Poltava in 1709, Swedish troops confronted a larger, better-prepared Russian force supported by artillery and defensive works. Russian resistance disrupted the Swedish attack; the main Swedish army was defeated, and much of the remaining force surrendered afterwards. Charles and Mazepa escaped to Ottoman territory. The Presidential Library's account of Poltava records the battle and their flight.
Victory had several causes. Peter's army had improved through recruitment, training, equipment and experience since Narva. At the same time, Swedish losses, disrupted supply and Charles's decisions made the enemy more vulnerable. Explaining Poltava through Peter's genius alone would omit the logistical conditions that made the battlefield result possible.
Poltava changed the strategic balance. Russia could take the offensive, Augustus recovered the Polish throne and the anti-Swedish alliance revived. The Great Russian Encyclopaedia's battle account identifies these wider consequences. Yet a destroyed field army did not instantly transfer all Sweden's territories or force an acceptable peace. Fortresses, fleets, allies and diplomacy still mattered.
Baltic victory and the settlement at Nystad
Russia had to convert the victory at Poltava into control of territory and a durable peace. Riga and Reval, now Tallinn, fell in 1710. Russian operations in Finland and the growth of the Baltic fleet increased pressure on Sweden. The naval victory at Gangut, also called Hanko, in 1714 and the victory at Grengam in 1720 demonstrated an ability to operate beyond coastal fortresses. The Russian archives' Gangut publication provides contemporary naval documents; the Presidential Library's account connects these victories with the later peace.
Naval power mattered because Sweden could otherwise move troops and supplies by sea and defend its own coastline despite losses on land. Raids and the prospect of further damage helped make continued war costly. Maintaining ships, crews and ports also required Russia to keep supplying a war that had already lasted many years.
The Treaty of Nystad in 1721 ended the Great Northern War. Sweden ceded Estonia, Livonia, Ingria and part of Karelia to Russia. Russia returned most of occupied Finland and paid compensation. The treaty's territorial articles, reproduced in the Latvian Museum's text, show a negotiated settlement rather than the annexation of everything Russia had occupied.
These gains secured St Petersburg's Baltic setting and gave Russia important ports, trade connections and a stronger position in northern Europe. Sweden ceased to dominate the eastern Baltic as it had before the war. Peter's adoption of the imperial title in 1721 expressed the enhanced status that victory helped establish.
There were qualifications. Access to Baltic trade did not instantly create prosperity throughout Russia. War had consumed taxes, recruits and labour, while defending the new territory and fleet required continuing expenditure. Nystad also preserved established privileges and religious arrangements in the ceded provinces. Incorporating territory could involve accommodation with local elites rather than imposing every Russian practice uniformly.
The twelve-year interval between Poltava and Nystad is useful evidence when assessing the relationship between battle and policy. Poltava made a favourable settlement possible; sustained military pressure and negotiation made it real.
Pruth and the Ottoman setback
The Ottoman war shows that victory against Sweden did not remove Russia's strategic vulnerabilities. Charles XII's refuge in Ottoman territory connected the northern war with southern diplomacy. Ottoman concern about Russian power and disputes on the frontier also mattered; the declaration of war in 1710 cannot be explained as Charles personally commanding Ottoman policy.
Peter advanced into Moldavia in 1711, hoping for cooperation from its ruler, Dimitrie Cantemir, and wider support against the Ottomans. Those expectations did not provide sufficient supplies and military assistance. Russian forces were trapped near the River Pruth by a stronger Ottoman force in a difficult supply situation. Continuing the campaign threatened Peter's army and his own survival.
The resulting Pruth agreement of 1711 required Russia to return Azov and demolish the fortifications at Taganrog and other southern positions. The Azov fleet was dismantled. Further negotiations, culminating in the settlement at Adrianople in 1713, confirmed the loss of Peter's southern foothold. The Russian archives' guide to the campaign records identifies documents on the withdrawal, destroyed fortifications and fleet; the Azov library's historical account distinguishes the 1711 and 1713 settlements.
This reversed the gains made at Azov in the 1690s. Peter had not secured the hoped-for southern route towards the Black Sea. It also qualifies the claim that military reform guaranteed success: even a reformed army could be endangered by poor supply, overoptimistic expectations of allies and operations far from its resources.
The outcome was a serious defeat, but not the destruction of the Petrine state. Negotiation allowed the Russian army and ruler to withdraw, while the main Baltic acquisitions remained. Giving up southern positions helped Peter continue the war against Sweden. A sound judgement can therefore distinguish the failure of the southern objective from the preservation of his overall position.
Russia in European coalitions
Russia's new position developed through alliances and rivalries as well as conquest. The Great Northern War involved Sweden, Russia, Denmark and the Polish-Saxon ruler Augustus II; Prussia and Hanover later entered the struggle against Sweden. Restoring Augustus after Poltava increased Russian influence in Poland, but his interests did not simply become identical to Peter's.
Allies wanted different territories and different balances of power. Denmark sought to weaken Sweden; Prussia and Hanover pursued gains in northern Germany. Russian troops operating far to the west could help defeat Sweden while making partners anxious about the scale and permanence of Russian influence. An alliance against one enemy did not eliminate competition among its members.
British interests demonstrate this complication. Britain depended on Baltic naval stores and wanted to protect shipping. George I, who became British king in 1714, was also ruler of Hanover, so his dynastic interests overlapped with northern German disputes. British naval expeditions to the Baltic in 1715–1716 connected commercial protection, diplomacy and the changing anti-Swedish coalition. This account draws on the public summary of John D. Grainger's chapter on the Norris expeditions, rather than an unseen extract.
The simultaneous War of the Spanish Succession, 1701–1714, concerned a different central dispute: the Spanish inheritance and the European balance around France and the Habsburgs. Russia's main military struggle was the Great Northern War. The two conflicts affected the same diplomatic world, but they should not be merged into a single war in which Peter fought every Western power.
As Russian power grew, European governments had to consider it when negotiating northern affairs. That was evidence of greater international importance. Their suspicion of Russian expansion was also a limit: Peter could not assume that defeating Sweden would make all other states welcome his ambitions. Diplomacy involved managing the consequences of success, not simply collecting admiration.
Judging foreign policy by 1725
Peter's foreign policy should be judged against objectives, permanence and cost. Territorial expansion is one criterion; secure access to trade, international influence and the ability to sustain commitments are others.
| Criterion | Evidence supporting success | Qualification |
|---|---|---|
| Baltic access | Nystad secured ports and territory around the eastern Baltic | A prolonged and costly war was necessary |
| Southern access | Earlier possession of Azov showed the ambition | Pruth and the 1713 settlement reversed it |
| Military capacity | Poltava and naval victories demonstrated stronger forces | The Pruth campaign exposed logistical limits |
| European standing | Allies and rivals treated Russia as a major northern power | Coalition interests diverged and expansion caused suspicion |
An original practice claim that Peter's foreign policy was an uninterrupted success after Poltava is therefore too strong. Nystad supports the argument that the northern war achieved its main purpose, but Pruth supplies a direct counter-example within the same period. A better conclusion is that Peter secured a lasting transformation in Russia's Baltic position while accepting a substantial southern reverse.
The relationship between domestic and foreign policy also matters. Victories depended on soldiers, taxes, officials, industry and ships. Those demands encouraged administrative reform and intensified social burdens. Conversely, the enhanced prestige of the state helped justify those burdens. Foreign success and domestic coercion were connected outcomes of the same programme.
By 1725 Russia had gained a durable Baltic position and greater European influence. Peter's achievement was uneven across regions and depended on sustained resources, alliances and negotiated limits as well as battlefield victory.