1E - Foreign affairs and wars: wars against Turkey and Sweden
Learn how Russia's search for secure sea outlets shaped war against the Ottoman Empire and Sweden before 1707. Compare what Peter wanted, what military operations achieved and why early success remained vulnerable.
Sea outlets and strategic choices
Russia's foreign policy combined security, territorial power, trade and dynastic prestige. Southern lands faced raids associated with the Crimean Khanate, an Ottoman ally. In the north-west, Sweden controlled important Baltic territories and the approaches to the Gulf of Finland. Overcoming either obstacle required fighting powerful neighbours rather than merely building a Russian merchant fleet.
| Route | Potential advantage | Main obstacle |
|---|---|---|
| Arkhangelsk and the White Sea | An existing route for trade with western Europe | Ice, distance and difficult connections with the main population centres |
| Don and Sea of Azov towards the Black Sea | A southern naval position and greater security | Ottoman fortresses and control of the passage through the Kerch Strait |
| Neva and Gulf of Finland towards the Baltic | A shorter maritime connection with northern European trade | Swedish military power and territorial control |
The Baltic also froze in winter, so a simple search for a completely ice-free port cannot explain every northern decision. Its value lay in its location and connections as well as navigation. Likewise, occupying Azov would not automatically open unrestricted Black Sea trade. Geography distinguishes a foothold from access to the wider sea.
Peter initially continued Russia's involvement in the anti-Ottoman struggle inherited from Sophia's government. His later turn towards Sweden reflected the international opportunities and limits he encountered. The objectives had a common maritime element, but the shift was strategic: he changed the enemy and theatre where Russia might obtain a more useful outlet.
Azov and the Ottoman war
Peter attacked the Ottoman fortress of Azov, near the mouth of the Don, in 1695. Russian land forces could besiege it, but could not stop its resupply by sea. Weak coordination and technical difficulties added to the problem. The failure demonstrated a specific missing capability: an army alone could not isolate a coastal fortress supported by ships.
Peter responded by organising ship construction at Voronezh and elsewhere for the next campaign. In 1696 naval support helped close the supply route while Russian forces renewed the siege. Azov surrendered. The sequence shows practical learning: Peter did not simply repeat the attack with more confidence, but added the means to address the reason the earlier siege had failed.
The victory encouraged further naval construction and the development of a base at Taganrog. It raised Peter's prestige and gave Russia a position on the Sea of Azov. However, the Ottomans still controlled the Kerch Strait, so Russia had not gained free passage into the Black Sea. A successful operation therefore achieved only part of the wider objective.
The Great Embassy failed to secure the wider anti-Ottoman cooperation Peter sought. Russia then concluded the Treaty of Constantinople in 1700, retaining Azov and obtaining a truce that allowed Peter to concentrate on the north. Peace was an enabling condition for the Swedish war: trying to face both enemies simultaneously would place greater pressure on limited resources. The southern achievement remained provisional, a foothold rather than the destruction of Ottoman power.
Sweden and the defeat at Narva
The Great Northern War began in 1700. Peter allied with Denmark and Augustus II, Elector of Saxony and king of Poland, against Sweden. The allies had their own territorial interests, but together appeared capable of exploiting the youth of Sweden's king, Charles XII. They underestimated his speed and military effectiveness.
Charles forced Denmark out of the war and then confronted Russia at Narva in 1700. The Russian army was numerically strong but lacked the organisation, experience and dependable command needed to match the Swedish force. The defeat exposed weaknesses and cost Russia much of its artillery. It cannot be explained simply as Russian cowardice, nor as proof that reform had already been completed and failed.
Peter's response was to continue rebuilding: obtain new guns, improve training, raise troops and develop supply. Charles then concentrated much of his effort on Poland and Saxony. This gave Russia time to recover. The causal explanation must therefore combine Russian action with the opponent's decisions. Peter's reforms mattered, but would have faced a harsher test had the main Swedish army immediately pursued a decisive campaign deep into Russia.
Narva's significance was consequently double. It was a severe failure against Peter's immediate objective of Baltic conquest, yet it intensified reform without ending Russia's participation. Calling it the automatic cause of eventual Russian victory would be too simple: the response, resources and opportunities after a defeat determine whether it becomes a turning point.
Baltic gains and the position in 1707
Russian forces exploited Sweden's concentration elsewhere to make gains in the eastern Baltic. Capturing Nöteborg in 1702 and Nyenschantz in 1703 helped secure the Neva route. Peter founded St Petersburg in 1703, while Russian capture of Narva and Dorpat in 1704 extended the reversal of the earlier setback. These were military and strategic achievements, not merely symbolic gestures.
Fortresses, shipbuilding and settlement linked conquest to a more durable presence. A port and Baltic fleet could support further operations and trade. Yet the new position remained exposed: Swedish forces could still threaten it, and no final peace settlement had recognised Russia's gains. Occupation was different from internationally secured possession.
Russia's alliance was also fragile. Charles's pressure on Augustus culminated in the Treaty of Altranstädt in 1706, which removed Augustus from the anti-Swedish coalition and required him to give up the Polish crown. Peter therefore approached 1707 with significant local gains but a weakened allied position and the danger of a renewed Swedish attack.
A comparison with the Ottoman war clarifies the judgement. In the south, Peter held Azov under a truce but lacked the wider Black Sea outlet. In the north, he had obtained an actual Baltic foothold and begun infrastructure, but had not defeated Sweden decisively or secured peace. By 1707 foreign policy had achieved more than survival after Narva, but less than a settled transformation of Russia's international position. Domestic burdens of taxation and recruitment were already part of the cost.