2K - The international response to German, Italian and Japanese aggression: the Rhineland Crisis
Learn how governments responded to aggression in the Rhineland, Austria, Spain, Albania and China, and how the aggressors' growing cooperation interacted with continuing differences between their interests.
The Rhineland and the cost of resistance
German remilitarisation of the Rhineland on 7 March 1936 challenged a security arrangement, rather than changing the region's nationality. Versailles had prohibited German troops and fortifications in a zone on the Rhine and east of it; Germany had accepted that demilitarisation again at Locarno. Hitler used the Franco-Soviet treaty as a justification, claiming that it undermined Locarno, but sending troops remained a German breach of its commitments.
France wanted the Rhineland kept demilitarised because it provided security against a German offensive and made a French advance easier if Germany threatened France's eastern allies. Yet French leaders were unwilling to act militarily without British support. They feared a general war, faced political and financial difficulties and received military advice which treated a major confrontation as requiring extensive preparations. These constraints mattered even though German forces were still developing and the initial move involved risk.
Many British leaders viewed German troops entering German territory as a less compelling cause for war than invasion of another state. They were open to renegotiating what they considered an unequal restriction and preferred talks to military action. The continuing Abyssinian crisis also divided Britain, France and Italy, one of the Locarno guarantors. Condemnation was therefore not followed by an enforced German withdrawal. The US Holocaust Memorial Museum's account records the treaty breach and absence of intervention.
The consequences extended beyond one successful gamble. Germany could fortify the west, making France less able to assist eastern allies through the threat of an attack. Hitler gained domestic prestige and confidence that foreign protests might not become action. A counterfactual claim that resistance certainly would have prevented all later war is stronger than the evidence allows, but the lack of resistance clearly improved Germany's strategic position.
Anschluss and the loss of Italian protection
Austria's annexation in March 1938 showed how a changed alliance position could remove an obstacle to German expansion. In 1934 Mussolini had defended Austrian independence against possible German intervention. By 1938 his relations with Britain and France had deteriorated, while cooperation with Germany had grown. He accepted the union, leaving Austria without the same external protection.
In February 1938 Hitler pressured Chancellor Kurt von Schuschnigg at Berchtesgaden to make concessions, including giving the Austrian Nazi Arthur Seyss-Inquart control of internal security. Schuschnigg then announced a plebiscite on Austrian independence. Hitler demanded its cancellation and Schuschnigg's resignation on 11 March. German troops entered on 12 March; incorporation into Germany followed on 13 March.
Anschluss means union or joining, but the word must not conceal the combination of pressure, troop entry and annexation. There was substantial popular support for union among Austrians, alongside opponents and people immediately subjected to Nazi persecution. The April plebiscite occurred after the takeover, under intimidation and exclusions; its overwhelming announced result is not a measure of a free choice before invasion. The museum's account of Anschluss explains that coercive sequence.
Britain protested but did not intervene. France was experiencing a government crisis and would not act alone. Neither provided Austria with effective resistance. The union increased Germany's population, resources and strategic reach, and placed Czechoslovakia under pressure from an additional frontier. Its wider importance was therefore both diplomatic and geographical: a state whose independence Italy had once protected was now incorporated into Germany.
Spain: intervention and non-intervention
The Spanish Civil War began in July 1936 when a military rebellion failed to overthrow the Republican government quickly, leaving Spain divided. The conflict had Spanish causes, including struggles over land, religion, reform and political power. Foreign involvement transformed its resources and international significance; it should not be presented as a war invented by Germany or Italy.
Hitler and Mussolini aided the Nationalists, increasingly led by Francisco Franco. Aircraft helped transport troops from Spanish Morocco; Germany supplied the Condor Legion, while Italy sent substantial forces and equipment. Both wanted to weaken left-wing influence and gain a friendly regime, but also sought military experience and strategic advantages. The bombing of Guernica in April 1937 demonstrated the destructive consequences of foreign air power.
The Soviet Union supplied arms and advisers to the Republic, seeking to resist fascist expansion and extend communist influence. International Brigades brought volunteers from many countries, including people whose governments did not support intervention. The Republican coalition itself contained socialists, communists, anarchists and others with conflicting priorities. It was not simply a Soviet army against a German one.
Britain and France promoted non-intervention to prevent the civil war becoming a European conflict. An international committee attempted to restrict supplies and foreign participation. French policy was affected by domestic division and dependence on cooperation with Britain. Germany, Italy and the Soviet Union formally participated in the agreement while supplying their preferred sides; its enforcement was uneven and ineffective. Restrictions on legal purchases hurt the Republic while the Nationalists continued receiving major outside support.
The parliamentary debate in July 1937 shows contemporaries disputing both the policy's effectiveness and its unequal effects. Non-intervention helped Britain and France avoid immediate war with the intervening powers, but failed to keep foreign forces and weapons out of Spain. Franco's victory in 1939 strengthened the position of Germany and Italy and deepened Soviet mistrust of western willingness to resist fascism. It did not automatically make Spain a belligerent in the later world war.
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