2E - The First Civil War: the strengths and weaknesses of the political and military leadership of the Parliamentary forces
Understand how Parliament converted wealth and alliances into military victory, and why the Solemn League and Covenant, the Self-Denying Ordinance and the New Model Army also reshaped politics. The sequence explains both Parliament's growing effectiveness and the new settlement problems created by its success.
Parliament's resources and early limitations
Parliament began with substantial resources, but its early armies did not automatically use them more effectively than the king's forces.
London provided a large population, credit and commercial wealth. Control of much of the east and south-east gave access to prosperous districts, and most of the navy supported Parliament. Ships protected supply routes, helped defend ports and restricted Royalist access to overseas arms. Parliament developed county assessments, excise duties and the sequestration of opponents' estates to finance war. Committees connected Westminster's decisions to local collection and recruitment. These arrangements made continued campaigning possible, though heavy demands also caused hardship and resistance.
The Earl of Essex commanded the principal army and helped protect London at Turnham Green in 1642. Other armies, including William Waller's and the Eastern Association under the Earl of Manchester, fought in different regions. This spread the war effort but complicated cooperation. Local soldiers might resist leaving their counties; commanders faced different political patrons and strategic priorities. Essex's defeat at Lostwithiel in 1644 and the failure to destroy Charles's army at Second Newbury exposed the cost of weak coordination.
Parliamentary leaders also disagreed about the object of fighting. Some favoured a negotiated peace with safeguards; others argued that Charles must be defeated decisively before a secure settlement was possible. These were changing groupings rather than two perfectly organised parties. Concern about victory coexisted with fear that an overpowerful army could disturb the social and constitutional order leaders hoped to preserve.
The Scottish alliance and the Solemn League and Covenant
Parliament sought Scottish military help in 1643 because Royalist successes made victory uncertain.
The Solemn League and Covenant linked a military alliance with religious reformation. English parliamentarians needed an experienced Scottish army; Scottish Covenanters wanted to secure their Presbyterian settlement and encourage a compatible religious order across the kingdoms. Presbyterian government used assemblies of ministers and elders rather than bishops. The agreement pledged the preservation of Scotland's reformed religion and reform in England and Ireland, including action against episcopacy.
The Scottish army under Alexander Leslie, Earl of Leven, entered England in early 1644. Its contribution helped create the combined force which won at Marston Moor. The alliance forced the Royalists to defend the north against a stronger enemy and gave Parliament military assistance when its own forces were struggling. The Committee of Both Kingdoms, established in 1644, also provided a mechanism for coordinating the allied war effort.
Religious language did not settle every dispute about implementation. Scottish leaders and English Presbyterians favoured a national Presbyterian Church. Independents defended greater freedom for gathered congregations, and some read the Covenant's reforming language without accepting that Scotland's precise system must govern all English worship. The alliance thus improved military prospects while making the future religious settlement a source of conflict. It is essential to distinguish this agreement of 1643 from the Scottish National Covenant of 1638.
The Self-Denying Ordinance and command reform
The disputes of late 1644 turned criticism of commanders into an attempt to separate parliamentary office from military command.
Cromwell criticised Manchester's reluctance to pursue Charles after Second Newbury. Manchester and other leaders doubted whether an outright victory over the king would preserve a workable monarchy. These disagreements involved conduct, strategy and the desired peace. Waller also drew attention to the limitations of armies whose men were tied to local service. Reformers argued that the war required coordinated forces capable of campaigning wherever needed.
An initial Self-Denying proposal encountered resistance in the Lords. The measure finally passed on 3 April 1645 required members of either House to give up military and civil commands within a specified period. Essex, Manchester and Waller lost their commands. The ordinance did not abolish Parliament, give all authority to Cromwell or automatically transform soldiers' equipment. It changed the relationship between political office and command, making room for a new leadership structure.
Continue this lesson.
You’re previewing NovaLearn without an account. Create a free account to read the rest.
Create free account