2S - Conservative governments and reasons for political dominance: Churchill, Eden, Macmillan and Home as political leaders
Learn why the Conservatives won three elections between 1951 and 1959, how four leaders governed, and why their advantages weakened by 1964.
Winning and retaining office
The Conservative victory in 1951 began thirteen years in government, but did not show that most voters had rejected everything Labour had created. Labour received more votes than the Conservative alliance while the Conservative and allied National Liberal candidates secured a Commons majority of seventeen. Under first past the post, the distribution of votes among constituencies determines seats; a national vote total does not directly choose the government. Labour's large majorities in some seats could not compensate for narrow defeats elsewhere. Parliament's election data lets us distinguish votes from seats.
Labour had governed since 1945 through reconstruction, rationing and financial crises. Its small 1950 majority made governing exhausting. Rearmament during the Korean War increased pressure on spending, and resignations over NHS charges in 1951 exposed division. The Conservatives presented themselves as capable of providing greater freedom and prosperity while protecting popular services. Churchill's wartime reputation helped reassure voters, but organisation, electoral geography and the government's difficulties also mattered.
Victory became more secure in 1955, when Eden increased the majority to sixty, and in 1959, when Macmillan won a majority of one hundred. Rising household purchasing power made continuity attractive. Conservative campaigning associated consumption and home ownership with successful government; voters could experience improvement without sharing every Conservative belief. Labour divisions helped the government, but would be insufficient to explain repeated victories without these positive attractions.
Four Conservative leaders
Each leader combined inherited advantages with different strengths and weaknesses. Churchill, 1951–1955, supplied authority and reassurance. He increasingly concentrated on international affairs, allowing ministers such as R. A. Butler and Harold Macmillan considerable responsibility for domestic policy. Age and illness limited his activity, but cabinet delegation also allowed continuity rather than making every decision depend on him.
Eden, 1955–1957, arrived with long experience as foreign secretary and a stronger electoral majority. That experience did not guarantee sound judgement as prime minister. His determination to remove Nasser during Suez led him into secret collaboration with France and Israel. Military action without American support damaged credibility and exposed dependence on external finance. Ill health contributed to his resignation in January 1957. A foreign-policy failure became a leadership crisis, rather than immediately ending Conservative government.
Macmillan, 1957–1963, restored confidence after Suez through a calm public manner, management of the party and association with affluence. He accepted state intervention and attempted to manage economic demand. His broad authority helped contain disagreements, but could look complacent as difficulties accumulated. His extensive cabinet dismissals in July 1962—the so-called Night of the Long Knives—advertised anxiety as well as decisiveness.
Alec Douglas-Home, 1963–1964, inherited a weakened government after Macmillan resigned. He renounced his hereditary peerage to enter the Commons. His aristocratic background and selection through informal party consultation strengthened criticism of an unaccountable governing elite. Wilson's language of technology made the contrast damaging. Home was nevertheless an experienced politician who narrowed Labour's lead; the very close 1964 result cautions against explaining defeat through a caricature of him alone. Official biographies establish the succession and dates.
Domestic policy and consensus
The Conservatives moderated the threat of reversal by preserving the NHS, social insurance and most major nationalised industries. They denationalised iron and steel and parts of road haulage, showing that they retained a preference for private enterprise. Yet dismantling the entire welfare settlement would have risked electoral defeat and disruption. The combination appealed to voters who wanted security alongside more choice.
Post-war consensus
A broad overlap in the main parties' acceptance of welfare provision, a mixed economy and a government responsibility for high employment. It did not mean identical policies or the absence of conflict.
Continue this lesson.
You’re previewing NovaLearn without an account. Create a free account to read the rest.
Create free account