2P - Mao's legacy: the power struggle after Mao’s death
Learn why Mao's death did not immediately give Deng power, how the Gang of Four and Hua Guofeng were displaced, and how new leadership methods combined reform with continuity in Communist rule.
Succession and the Gang of Four
Mao's death in September 1976 removed the authority that had repeatedly decided disputes within the leadership. Hua Guofeng, who had become Premier after Zhou Enlai's death and Mao's designated successor, possessed formal office and Mao's endorsement. The Gang of Four controlled important propaganda and cultural networks, but lacked equally dependable support in the army and senior party establishment. Deng remained out of office after his dismissal in April.
On 6 October 1976 Hua, supported by senior figures including Ye Jianying and security chief Wang Dongxing, arranged the arrest of Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan and Wang Hongwen. Military and security support was decisive: political influence through the media did not enable the radicals to resist a coordinated action at the centre. The arrests ended the grouping most closely associated with defending the Cultural Revolution's radical course.
Hua benefited immediately and became CCP Chairman. Deng had not organised the arrests and did not instantly succeed Mao. The later trial of the Gang of Four in 1980–1981 publicised charges against them and supplied an official explanation of the decade's crimes. Their responsibility was substantial, but attributing every wrong to four people would obscure Mao's decisions, institutional weakness and participation by many others.
Hua and Deng compete
Hua sought to consolidate authority while retaining Mao's prestige. His position became associated with the Two Whatevers: preserving Mao's policy decisions and following his instructions. This supported Hua's claim as the chosen successor, but made it difficult to reassess the policies and purges that many surviving officials wanted to reverse. Hua nevertheless supported recovery and an ambitious modernisation programme; he should not be portrayed as wishing to keep every institution in Cultural Revolution disorder.
Deng was restored to his posts in July 1977. He had a stronger network of experienced party and military colleagues and offered an alternative route to legitimacy: preserve the revolution while judging policies by their practical effects. Rehabilitation of officials injured by purges strengthened the constituencies that favoured this approach. Debate in 1978 about practice as the criterion of truth challenged the idea that a policy was correct simply because Mao had endorsed it.
The Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee in December 1978 was a decisive political turning point. It shifted priority towards economic construction and strengthened Deng's supporters. It did not make Deng President or abolish all Hua's offices on one day. Hua lost the premiership in 1980 and the party chairmanship in 1981. Deng's predominance developed through influence over personnel, policy and the military rather than through holding every highest civilian title.
Paramount leader
The person with decisive influence over national policy, even when another person holds the highest formal party or state office. The term describes Deng's position; it was not his official job title.
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