1D - Divisions within the Political Nation and the emergence of Whigs and Tories and their impact
Whig and Tory identities emerged from struggles over religion, succession and royal power, but their positions changed after 1688. Learn how competing elite networks shaped Parliament and elections, and why the growth of parties could increase both parliamentary influence and political conflict.
From Exclusion to party identities
The Exclusion Crisis gave earlier Court–Country divisions a sharper focus. Whigs favoured preventing the Catholic Duke of York from succeeding and were generally more willing to defend Protestant dissenters against Anglican persecution. Tories defended hereditary succession, the Church of England and obedience to the Crown. The names began as hostile labels, reminding us that contemporaries associated their opponents with disorder or disloyalty.
Neither identity represented an entirely uniform programme. Not all Whigs favoured Monmouth, and many Tories were sincerely anti-Catholic. For a Tory, a Catholic King's hereditary right might remain binding while his Catholic religious policy was unacceptable. This tension helps explain why the divisions of 1679–81 did not prevent some former opponents of Exclusion from joining the challenge to James in 1688.
The memory of the Civil Wars made disagreement particularly dangerous. Whigs could describe royal power as a threat to Protestant liberties, while Tories could describe opposition organisation as the first step towards rebellion. These accusations were effective because they addressed experiences and fears familiar to the Political Nation. Ideas did more than decorate factional struggle: they supplied reasons for loyalty, limits to cooperation and arguments for mobilisation.
Early political parties
Networks sharing recurring political principles and cooperating in Parliament, elections and public debate. Whigs and Tories had recognisable identities but lacked the fixed organisation and discipline of modern parties.
Political networks and public mobilisation
Party activity linked Westminster to counties, towns and print culture. Great families influenced boroughs, local officers helped organise electoral interests, and church connections could mobilise Anglican support. Whig networks often drew strength from dissenting and commercial communities, but social boundaries overlapped. Landowners could be Whigs, merchants could be Tories, and family loyalty or local rivalry could matter as much as a national label.
Petitions, pamphlets, newspapers, ceremonies and crowds extended political conflict beyond those entitled to vote. The Exclusion elections showed the value of sustained organisation. After 1688 more frequent elections helped maintain these networks between parliamentary sessions. Elections could be contested intensely, yet some seats were arranged among local patrons without a poll. The unequal county and borough franchises prevented a single representative national electorate.
The Political Nation was therefore broader in activity than a list of MPs, but still socially restricted. Women and non-electors could influence households, patronage and public demonstrations without enjoying equal formal political rights. Greater mobilisation should not be confused with universal enfranchisement.
The causal connection is important: national disputes gave local contests meaning; local networks then supplied MPs and pressure which affected national government. Party growth did not happen exclusively inside Parliament, and parliamentary votes did not simply mirror the opinions of all inhabitants.
Reaction, Revolution and divided loyalty
The Tory reaction after 1681 reduced Whig influence through proceedings against leaders, changes to municipal government and attacks on opposition networks. James's accession in 1685 appeared to reward the defence of hereditary right. His predominantly Tory Parliament initially supported him, while Monmouth's failed rebellion discredited armed opposition.
James then weakened his alliance by threatening Anglican institutions and using prerogative to favour Catholics. Support for monarchy did not mean that Tories would accept every exercise of power. His treatment of the bishops made it harder to reconcile obedience with defence of the Church. Resistance to James crossed earlier party lines: the coalition of 1688 was effective partly because it included people previously loyal to the Crown.
The new settlement reopened divisions. Whigs could justify replacement through James's violation of lawful government. Many Tories accepted the new rulers pragmatically while remaining uncomfortable with the alteration of hereditary succession. Nonjurors refused the new oath; a smaller Jacobite opposition sought restoration of James. These categories did not map perfectly onto party labels. It is wrong to call every Tory a Jacobite or every critic of William an enemy of the Revolution.
Party differences under William
After 1689, Whigs generally supported William's European war, Protestant toleration and the financial institutions which helped fund the state. Tories placed particular weight on the Church, landowning interests and the dangers of high taxation, public debt and a standing army. These were tendencies, not rules which predicted every vote.
The Court–Country distinction survived alongside party identities. A Whig in opposition might attack Court patronage, while a Whig minister relied on it to secure supply. A Tory could serve the King but also criticise military expenditure. This explains why party label and support for the administration sometimes diverged. Government changed a politician's immediate responsibilities and access to influence without necessarily erasing his principles.
William initially used ministers from different alignments. During the mid-1690s the Whig Junto became important because its leading figures could support war finance and manage parliamentary business. Yet Country concerns remained, and opposition grew after the peace of 1697. Parliament reduced the army and challenged royal expenditure and ministers. The King could change personnel, but he could not simply make party competition disappear.
Party identity affected religious questions particularly strongly. Whigs tended to defend the legal space opened for dissenters, while Tories feared that concessions might weaken the established Church. The Protestant settlement which united opposition to James did not remove disagreements over the kind of Protestant state they wished to maintain.
Parties and the sharing of power
Parties increased the need to manage Parliament. A minister who could deliver a coherent group of votes became valuable to the Crown, while organised opponents could obstruct policy and expose failures. Elections allowed the Political Nation to change the composition of the Commons. These developments made government more dependent on sustained cooperation than a model of rule through personal favourites suggests.
They also generated costs. Competition could intensify intolerance, exaggerate threats and turn disputes over policy into accusations of treason or religious betrayal. Patronage remained central. The ability to organise Parliamentary support did not mean parties represented all inhabitants or that ministers were collectively responsible to a democratically elected majority.
Consider the original practice argument: “Party conflict weakened the monarchy after 1688.” It is convincing where it points to organised opposition and the need to secure votes for taxation and military policy. It needs qualification because party ministers also strengthened the King's capacity to fight wars and administer government. The same organisation could constrain royal choices while enabling a more powerful state. The impact depends on whether we are measuring the monarch's independent discretion or the resources available to the government he headed.
Whigs and Tories made recurring political disagreement more organised. Their growth increased parliamentary bargaining, while government continued to depend on monarchy, elite influence and patronage.