2S - Foreign affairs: attitudes to Europe
Learn how Blair sought influence through Europe, the United States and intervention, and weigh the achievements and costs of Britain's international role by 2007.
Europe and conditional integration
Blair wanted Britain to exercise constructive leadership in Europe rather than appear continually obstructive. His government accepted the Social Agreement from which Major had obtained an opt-out, linking European participation to stronger employment protection. The Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 incorporated that agreement into the treaty framework. Britain supported enlargement and efforts to improve European competitiveness.
However, constructive engagement was not unconditional integration. Britain retained sterling and remained outside the euro when monetary union began in 1999. Brown's five economic tests, announced in 1997, asked whether entry would suit Britain's economic structures, adjustment capacity, investment, financial services and employment. The 2003 assessment did not establish that entry was in the national interest; sustainable convergence and flexibility remained key concerns. A positive decision would also require political approval and a referendum. Treasury's 2003 statement of its assessment.
Blair's desire for influence, Brown's economic caution, Eurosceptic opinion and press criticism limited the government's freedom. A government could support the EU while rejecting a particular transfer of monetary authority. That distinction helps explain both continuity with Major's opt-out and change in Britain's more cooperative tone.
Blair hoped to act as a bridge between Europe and America. The St Malo initiative with France in 1998 supported a stronger European capacity to act in security matters where NATO as a whole was not engaged. Cooperation over trade and institutions continued, but disagreements over Iraq later divided Britain from France and Germany. Britain did not simply choose one permanent side on every issue; its European leadership ambitions were constrained when its Atlantic security policy conflicted with important partners.
The special relationship
Britain's special relationship with the United States rested on intelligence, defence, nuclear cooperation, economic links and diplomatic habits as well as personal friendships. Blair developed a close relationship with Bill Clinton, aided by similar language about modernising centre-left politics and cooperation over Northern Ireland and Kosovo.
The relationship continued when Republican George W. Bush became president. Blair's support after the attacks of 11 September 2001 reflected both solidarity and a judgement that British security depended on close cooperation with America. He believed that engagement could give Britain influence over American decisions. Critics argued that public commitment made it harder for him to withhold support and that influence was less substantial than he claimed.
The difference between access and influence is crucial. Frequent meetings demonstrate access to the US president, but do not prove that Britain changed a major decision. To judge influence, identify a British objective, an American position and evidence that the latter altered because of British intervention. Britain's attempts to secure a fuller UN route before the invasion of Iraq demonstrate an effort to influence policy; the outcome shows its limits.
Blair's support for Washington should not be reduced to personal obedience or explained solely by alliance necessity. His own belief in intervention and in the connection between security and international responsibility helped shape the decision. Equally, shared beliefs did not make the two states equal in power. American military and economic capacity gave it far greater freedom of action.
Liberal intervention before 2001
Blair argued that national borders could not always shield governments from international action when they caused large-scale suffering. His 1999 Chicago speech set out a doctrine of international community linking moral concern, security and interdependence. Liberal intervention claimed that force could sometimes protect people and improve international order, rather than serving only immediate territorial defence.
In Kosovo in 1999, Britain participated in NATO air action against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia after conflict, displacement and failed diplomacy. Blair pressed for a determined response to the treatment of Kosovo Albanians. Serbian forces withdrew and an international security presence followed. Supporters saw a successful prevention of further persecution; critics questioned the lack of explicit new UN Security Council authorisation for the bombing and its risks and civilian consequences. Moral aims did not remove the need to evaluate means and law. NATO's account of the transition to the Kosovo air campaign.
British intervention in Sierra Leone in 2000 began with protection and evacuation as rebel forces threatened Freetown. It expanded into stabilisation and support for the government and international peace effort. British military action and training helped change the balance against rebel forces, but Sierra Leonean actors, regional forces and the UN also contributed. The conflict's end was not the achievement of Britain alone. Official stabilisation case study.
These cases encouraged confidence that limited force could produce beneficial results. They also created a danger in reasoning: success in one setting did not show that another country, conflict or post-war settlement would respond in the same way. The legitimacy, local support, military scale and reconstruction demands had to be examined anew.
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