2G - The conduct of the war: American political leadership, the revolutionary armies and George Washington as military leader
Learn how the revolutionaries sustained their war effort and how Britain's campaigns failed to produce lasting political control. Follow the interaction of Congress, Washington, other American commanders and foreign allies, using major campaigns to weigh explanations of victory.
Political leadership and supply
Congress had to turn an alliance of colonies, and then states, into a continuing war effort. It appointed commanders, sought foreign aid, borrowed money, issued paper currency and requested men and supplies. State governments organised recruitment and taxation; local institutions collected resources and policed loyalty. These activities explain how resistance survived beyond the first outbreak of enthusiasm. Military success depended on governments able to feed and replace soldiers.
Cooperation was uneven. States defended their own priorities, recruitment quotas were difficult to fulfil, and Congress lacked a reliable independent national tax base. Paper money lost value as issues increased and confidence declined. A soldier promised wages could find them inadequate or unpaid; a farmer could prefer a buyer offering more dependable payment. Administrative failure therefore affected morale, supply and the strength available for battle.
Political leaders adapted. Longer Continental enlistments from 1777 helped reduce the annual loss of experienced soldiers. Robert Morris, Superintendent of Finance from 1781, sought credit, improved financial management and helped obtain resources for the Yorktown campaign. Foreign loans connected American finance with diplomatic success. Morris's wartime financial work.
Congress also supplied legitimacy. Washington served under civilian authority and repeatedly sought support rather than claiming a personal right to rule. This relationship could be frustrating, but it helped keep the army attached to a political cause shared across states. Without that connection, military preservation might have become a commander's private project rather than a means of independence.
American political leadership should therefore be judged by what it enabled under severe constraints. It never created a smooth or adequately funded war machine. It did maintain enough coordination and diplomacy for the armies to keep fighting and eventually exploit a decisive opportunity.
Washington's recovery in 1776
Washington's leadership was important partly because he learned from defeat. In 1776 the British under William Howe used superior forces and naval mobility to defeat the Americans around New York. Washington initially tried to defend positions vulnerable to flanking and encirclement. His withdrawal from Long Island preserved troops, but the later loss of Fort Washington and the retreat through New Jersey showed that he was not an infallible tactician.
The central problem became keeping an army in existence as enlistments approached expiry and confidence fell. Retreat avoided destruction but could not alone renew commitment. On 26 December 1776, after crossing the Delaware, Washington attacked the Hessian garrison at Trenton. The victory and the success at Princeton on 3 January 1777 demonstrated that isolated British forces could be defeated. These operations encouraged continued service and improved the Americans' position in New Jersey. The Trenton-Princeton campaign.
The lesson from this sequence is more precise than saying Washington always avoided battle. He sought to preserve his main force, but accepted calculated risks when success could restore morale or improve the strategic position. His judgement involved balancing the danger of defeat against the danger of doing nothing.
Britain's failure to destroy the army was therefore partly an American achievement. British caution, delays and dispersal mattered, but Washington's withdrawals and counterattacks turned opportunities for Britain into continued resistance. Neither explanation works well without the other.
The divided campaigns of 1777
In 1777 Britain pursued objectives that were not effectively combined. Burgoyne advanced from Canada towards Albany, seeking control of the Lake Champlain–Hudson route and the isolation of New England. St. Leger's force approached through the Mohawk Valley. Howe instead mounted a campaign against Philadelphia, hoping that defeating Washington and taking the seat of Congress would seriously weaken the rebellion. The ministry permitted plans whose assumptions about cooperation proved inadequate.
Burgoyne captured Ticonderoga but became increasingly vulnerable as he moved inland. American forces obstructed routes, challenged supply expeditions and gathered around strong defensive positions. St. Leger withdrew after his failure at Fort Stanwix; Howe was unavailable in the north. Horatio Gates commanded the army facing Burgoyne, while Benedict Arnold played an important battlefield role. Burgoyne surrendered on 17 October 1777. Washington did not command the American victory at Saratoga. The northern campaign.
Meanwhile Howe defeated Washington at Brandywine in September, occupied Philadelphia and repelled the American attack at Germantown in October. Those were real British successes. They did not end the rebellion: Congress relocated and the Continental Army survived. Taking the political capital could not substitute for eliminating the political and military networks behind it.
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