2P - Foreign affairs: deterioration of relations with USSR and border conflict of 1969
Explain how the Soviet threat helped China move towards the United States, why the opening remained incomplete, and how external gains contrasted with China's condition at Mao's death.
Soviet rivalry and border conflict
By the late 1960s, the former Sino-Soviet partnership had become a bitter rivalry. Ideological disputes over revisionism and world revolution reinforced disagreement over leadership of the Communist world. Soviet troops on China's northern borders and the USSR's close relationship with Mongolia gave the conflict a direct security dimension. The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 increased Chinese concern that Moscow might also use force against another Communist state whose policies it opposed.
In March 1969 Chinese and Soviet forces fought at Zhenbao Island, called Damansky by the USSR, on the Ussuri River. Further fighting occurred on the western border in Xinjiang in August. These were territorial clashes within a wider political confrontation. They brought a risk of escalation against a nuclear-armed power, rather than merely another round of hostile speeches. Both sides increased military preparations; China sought protection through dispersal, shelters and strategic defence projects.
The conflict had consequences for diplomacy. China had long opposed both American imperialism and Soviet revisionism, but simultaneous hostility to two superpowers increased its vulnerability. A more cooperative relationship with Washington could offset Soviet pressure without requiring China to accept American ideology. This was a shift in the relative priority of threats. Ideological hostility persisted while immediate security encouraged pragmatic adjustment.
Reasons for the American opening
China and the United States had separate reasons to improve relations. For Mao and Zhou Enlai, contact with Washington could reduce isolation, strengthen their position against the USSR and advance international recognition of the PRC. It might also open opportunities for trade and technology. The possibility of dealing with a former enemy reflected strategic calculation rather than an abandonment of CCP rule.
President Richard Nixon and his adviser Henry Kissinger wanted a better position in the Cold War. Relations with Beijing could put pressure on Moscow and contribute to an American strategy for ending involvement in Vietnam. Nixon also recognised that excluding such a large state indefinitely was unrealistic. His established anti-Communist reputation made an opening politically easier to defend to American conservatives.
Common interests did not erase differences. China supported revolutionary movements and claimed Taiwan; the United States maintained connections with the authorities on Taiwan and had fought Communist forces in Asia. A successful opening required both governments to find language and procedures that allowed cooperation while retaining incompatible positions. The US Office of the Historian's account identifies the Soviet rivalry as an important setting for this rapprochement.
Rapprochement
An improvement in relations between states after a period of hostility. It can begin before full diplomatic recognition or agreement on every disputed issue.
Ping-pong, Kissinger and Nixon
The opening developed through several different channels. In April 1971 China invited American table-tennis players to visit. Ping-pong diplomacy supplied a public, non-threatening signal that contact was possible. It did not negotiate the major strategic questions by itself. Secret exchanges and intermediary states had also helped establish intentions, allowing leaders to explore cooperation before making binding public commitments.
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