2T - Foreign and international policies: détente with the West
Learn why the USSR pursued détente, why that policy remained fragile, and explain how intervention in Afghanistan and renewed superpower confrontation increased the pressures on the Soviet system.
Why détente developed
Détente was a relaxation of Cold War tensions through negotiation, agreements and greater contact. It did not remove ideological rivalry. For Brezhnev, reducing the risk of nuclear war and gaining recognition as an equal superpower were compatible with defending Soviet influence abroad. Strategic parity made negotiation attractive: neither side could expect an easy victory, while an unrestricted arms race was costly.
Domestic needs also mattered. The USSR sought Western technology, grain and trade to support economic development and consumption. More stable international relations could make these exchanges easier. The split with China, including armed border clashes in 1969, gave Moscow a further reason to avoid confrontation with both China and the United States simultaneously. American rapprochement with China increased the value of a working Soviet-American relationship.
Western governments had their own reasons to negotiate. The United States faced the costs of Vietnam and the nuclear balance; West Germany's Ostpolitik sought practical arrangements with Eastern Europe and acknowledgement of existing realities. The 1970 Moscow Treaty and 1971 Four Power Agreement on Berlin reduced particular European disputes.
Détente therefore arose from overlapping interests rather than trust or Soviet ideological surrender. Each side could accept rules that protected its own security while continuing to compete elsewhere. This explains both its real achievements and the ease with which different expectations later produced accusations of bad faith.
Détente
A reduction in international tension through negotiation and cooperation, while the underlying rivalry and competing interests continue.
Agreements and their limits
Brezhnev and President Nixon signed the SALT I agreements in Moscow in May 1972. The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty restricted defensive systems, while the interim agreement limited certain strategic missile launchers. Restraining defences helped preserve mutual deterrence: if one side believed it could attack and then block retaliation, the balance could become less stable. SALT I did not abolish nuclear weapons or prevent all qualitative development, including additional warheads carried by a missile.
The 1975 Helsinki Final Act linked European security, economic cooperation and human contacts with commitments concerning rights and freedoms. Soviet leaders welcomed the recognition of European frontiers and the diplomatic prestige. Human-rights commitments later gave critics a standard against which to judge Soviet conduct. The agreement was politically important but was not an enforceable treaty creating a Western police power inside the USSR.
SALT II was signed by Brezhnev and President Carter in June 1979. Its difficulties pre-dated Afghanistan: opponents disputed verification, the military balance and Soviet behaviour. After the invasion, Carter asked the Senate to suspend consideration, and the treaty never entered into force. The Office of the Historian chronology distinguishes signature from ratification and notes that both governments nevertheless observed limits for a time.
Competition in Angola and other regions, repression of dissent and disagreements over human rights exposed incompatible ideas of détente. Moscow did not accept that superpower negotiation required it to abandon every revolutionary ally. Washington increasingly judged such involvement as evidence that détente was being exploited. The policy had reduced specific risks without establishing agreement on all acceptable conduct.
The decision to invade Afghanistan
Afghanistan was a neighbouring state outside the Warsaw Pact. After the Communist PDPA seized power in April 1978, radical reforms, repression and factional conflict generated growing resistance. The Soviet leadership supported the regime but initially resisted repeated requests for a large military intervention. This earlier reluctance shows that invasion was a decision made under changing conditions, not an automatic response whenever an ally faced trouble.
In 1979 Hafizullah Amin displaced Nur Muhammad Taraki, who was subsequently killed. Moscow distrusted Amin and feared that the regime might collapse or become politically unreliable. Instability close to Soviet Central Asia and the possible loss of a friendly government were major security concerns. Soviet leaders also viewed events through an ideological expectation that a Communist regime should not be allowed to fall out of the socialist camp.
Continue this lesson.
You’re previewing NovaLearn without an account. Create a free account to read the rest.
Create free account