2R - The Second Cold War: the reasons for renewed hostilities and developments, including the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
Learn why détente deteriorated, how Afghanistan, changing leadership and Poland intensified hostility, and why the shooting down of a civilian aircraft exposed the dangers of mistrust.
Why détente lost political support
The Second Cold War describes renewed confrontation, especially from the late 1970s to the mid-1980s. It grew from several connected disputes. Arms agreements had not stopped technological competition, and neither side accepted that cooperation required abandoning its wider interests. Washington often expected détente to encourage Soviet restraint in regional conflicts. Moscow could regard support for friendly revolutionary governments as compatible with avoiding direct superpower war. These differing expectations made each side read the other's conduct as bad faith.
Cuban and Soviet support in Angola and Ethiopia strengthened American fears of expanding communist influence. Soviet SS-20 deployments and NATO's planned missile response raised concerns about Europe's security. Carter's emphasis on human rights also brought criticism of Soviet treatment of dissidents into diplomatic relations. Détente remained possible in selected areas, but its domestic defenders found it harder to argue that the concessions produced reciprocal restraint. Office of the Historian, Angola and détente, NATO, the missile dispute.
Chronology rules out a simple explanation that Reagan created renewed hostility. NATO's dual-track decision and the invasion of Afghanistan occurred in 1979, before he became president in January 1981. SALT II had also attracted opposition before the invasion. Reagan made confrontation more forceful and ideological, but inherited a deteriorating relationship.
Separate a long-term strain, a decisive trigger and an intensifying policy. The same event need not play all three roles in explaining renewed hostility.
Afghanistan as a decisive rupture
Afghanistan's communist PDPA government, established in 1978, faced armed resistance and deep internal divisions. Radical reforms, repression and conflict among its leaders destabilised the regime. Soviet leaders feared the loss of a friendly state on their southern border and distrusted Hafizullah Amin, who had displaced and eliminated his rival Taraki. Their decision was a response to a local crisis as well as a Cold War calculation.
In December 1979, Soviet forces entered Afghanistan, killed Amin and installed Babrak Karmal. They expected military intervention to secure a reliable government, but controlling Kabul did not mean defeating resistance across a mountainous country. The mujahideen, varied armed groups opposing the communist regime and Soviet presence, could draw on local support and outside assistance. Office of the Historian, invasion and US response.
Carter read the intervention as a serious threat beyond Afghanistan. In January 1980 the Carter Doctrine declared that attempts by outside forces to control the Persian Gulf would be resisted, including by military force. Washington suspended consideration of SALT II, imposed restrictions on trade, supported an Olympic boycott and expanded assistance to Afghan resistance through Pakistan. These measures linked a regional invasion to economic, diplomatic and military confrontation. Carter's State of the Union, 23 January 1980.
Soviet concerns about a vulnerable frontier explain the choice without justifying it or proving American fears correct. Conversely, describing the invasion only as a plan to seize Gulf oil ignores the Afghan regime crisis that preceded it. A developed explanation distinguishes the leaders' aims, their opponents' perceptions and the actual consequences.
Reagan, Thatcher and John Paul II
New personalities affected confrontation through different kinds of power. Ronald Reagan regarded the USSR as an ideological opponent and criticised détente for permitting Soviet gains. He increased American military pressure, backed anti-communist movements and used moral language to challenge the legitimacy of Soviet rule. His March 1983 announcement of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) sought research into defence against ballistic missiles. To Soviet leaders, a potential shield could threaten their ability to retaliate, even though Reagan presented it as a route to greater security. Reagan's defence address, 23 March 1983.
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