2K - The outbreak of war in Europe: appeasement
Learn why Britain and France pursued appeasement, how the Czech and Polish crises changed their policy, and how German and Soviet decisions turned a territorial confrontation into war in September 1939.
Appeasement and the choice of concessions
British and French policy in the 1930s sought to avoid another general war while deciding which challenges to the settlement they should resist. Appeasement involved negotiated concessions intended to satisfy grievances and reduce conflict. Its effectiveness depended on whether the other government had limited demands and would accept a stable settlement.
The memory of 1914–18 shaped public opinion and leaders' judgements. A new war threatened mass casualties, economic damage and aerial bombing of civilians. Some British policymakers also regarded parts of Versailles as unfair and believed that revising military restrictions or allowing some German national claims could remove causes of conflict.
Strategic constraints strengthened the case for negotiation. Britain faced risks in Europe, the Mediterranean and East Asia; its empire and Dominions did not provide an unconditional commitment to any continental war. France depended heavily on British cooperation, worried about military preparedness and experienced political division. Both governments mistrusted the Soviet Union. The USA was unwilling to guarantee European security. It was therefore difficult to create a convincing coalition against Germany.
Appeasement coexisted with rearmament. Chamberlain, prime minister from May 1937, hoped diplomacy could reach a settlement while British defences improved. Buying time was a possible benefit, particularly for air defence. But time also allowed Germany to build forces and acquire resources, so postponing war did not necessarily improve the overall balance in every respect. The Imperial War Museums account of appeasement sets out these contemporary constraints.
A historical judgement should distinguish the reasons for adopting a policy from its consequences. Fear of war and doubts about readiness help explain concessions; they do not prove that the concessions restrained Hitler. Conversely, knowing that war eventually occurred does not mean that every policymaker in 1938 already possessed certainty about German plans and the best alternative.
The Czech crisis and Munich
Czechoslovakia was both a state with national tensions and an important strategic obstacle to German expansion. Its Sudeten borderlands contained many German speakers, but also fortifications, industry and routes controlling the country's defence. Hitler encouraged demands by Konrad Henlein's Sudeten German movement and used the minority issue to create a crisis.
Chamberlain met Hitler at Berchtesgaden on 15 September 1938 and accepted the principle of transferring mainly German-speaking areas, subject to agreement. Britain and France pressured the Czech government to accept concessions. At Godesberg on 22–23 September Hitler demanded more immediate occupation and harsher conditions. Czechoslovakia mobilised, and Europe appeared close to war. The escalation of demands undermined the assumption that a modest negotiated concession would finish the dispute.
At Munich on 29–30 September, Chamberlain, French premier Édouard Daladier, Hitler and Mussolini agreed that Germany would occupy the Sudetenland. Czechoslovakia was not a participant in the negotiations; the Soviet Union was also excluded. The Czech government accepted under pressure from its western partners and the threat of attack. Occupation began on 1 October. The RAF Museum's account of Munich identifies the participants and Czechoslovakia's exclusion.
The agreement prevented an immediate war but weakened the remaining Czech state by removing defences, territory and resources. Polish and Hungarian territorial demands added to the fragmentation. Chamberlain also signed a separate Anglo-German declaration with Hitler expressing a desire to resolve differences by consultation. That declaration was distinct from the four-power agreement transferring territory; neither guaranteed that Hitler's ambitions would stop.
Worked reasoning: Munich achieved peace in the immediate crisis, which explains its relief-filled reception. If the criterion is durable security, however, the loss of Czech fortifications and the expansion of German power are serious adverse consequences. A defender may argue that Britain gained preparation time; a critic may answer that Germany gained both time and strategic assets. Both arguments need evidence about what changed, rather than merely calling the policy cowardly or wise.
Prague and the Polish guarantee
The occupation of Czech lands in March 1939 changed British perceptions because it could not plausibly be presented as the union of German-speaking territory. Hitler pressured the Czech leadership; German forces occupied Bohemia and Moravia on 15 March, establishing a protectorate. Slovakia became a formally independent state closely dependent on Germany. The state whose survival Munich was supposed to preserve had been dismantled.
Britain and France now had stronger reason to see Hitler as seeking domination rather than a limited revision. Germany also gained Czech armaments and industrial capacity. Chamberlain moved towards deterrence while continuing efforts to avoid war. On 31 March Britain guaranteed Polish independence against a threat Poland judged necessary to resist; France supported the commitment. The guarantee was not a promise to preserve every existing border against any possible negotiated change.
Germany demanded Danzig, a predominantly German-speaking Free City under League supervision, and extraterritorial communications across the Polish Corridor to East Prussia. Polish foreign minister Józef Beck feared that concessions would begin a process of dependence, especially after the fate of Czechoslovakia. Poland therefore resisted demands which Hitler presented as reasonable corrections but which carried wider implications for sovereignty.
The guarantee aimed to persuade Hitler that another invasion would produce a general war. Yet Britain and France could not rapidly deliver decisive military help to Poland, and deterrence depended on Hitler believing their warning. He had seen previous threats and promises followed by concessions. On 25 August Britain and Poland signed a formal mutual-assistance agreement, strengthening the political commitment but not solving the geographical problem of assisting Poland directly.
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