1G - The condition of Ireland and Anglo-Irish relations: the Easter Rising
Learn how rebellion, war and negotiation changed Britain's relationship with Ireland between 1914 and 1939. Follow the transition from delayed Home Rule to partition and an increasingly independent southern state, while explaining why none of these settlements ended all conflict.
The Rising and the response
The First World War interrupted an unresolved constitutional crisis. The 1914 Home Rule Act had passed, but its operation was suspended during the war. John Redmond's Irish Parliamentary Party supported the British war effort, hoping loyalty would secure Home Rule afterwards. Unionists, especially in the north-east, remained determined to resist government from Dublin. A promise of future self-government therefore faced both nationalist impatience and organised opposition.
On 24 April 1916, Easter Monday, rebels led by figures including Patrick Pearse and James Connolly occupied buildings in Dublin and proclaimed an Irish republic. The rebels included members of the Irish Volunteers and the Irish Citizen Army. They sought independence rather than the limited self-government offered by Home Rule. Confused planning and a countermand by Eoin MacNeill restricted participation; the rising did not begin as a united revolt of the whole Irish population.
British forces suppressed it within about a week. Many Dublin residents initially resented destruction and disruption. The government's response then helped change the political meaning of the defeat. Executions of leaders and extensive arrests encouraged sympathy for rebels and distrust of British rule. The National Archives identifies the courts-martial records and executions carried out in early May. Military victory did not produce a secure political settlement. National Archives: Easter Rising records
The response mattered alongside continuing uncertainty about Home Rule. In 1918, the attempt to extend conscription to Ireland increased nationalist opposition, even though compulsory recruitment was not implemented there. Sinn Féin benefited from the radicalisation of opinion and won most Irish seats in the December election outside the unionist north-east. The Rising had not itself been organised by Sinn Féin, despite the contemporary tendency to associate the two; its later political beneficiaries should not be confused with its organisers.
From electoral victory to war
Sinn Féin's elected members refused to take their Westminster seats and established Dáil Éireann, an Irish parliament, in Dublin in January 1919. They claimed authority for an independent republic. This challenged British rule through competing institutions as well as armed action: republican courts and local administration offered alternatives to the British system.
The Anglo-Irish War, also called the War of Independence, developed between 1919 and the July 1921 truce. The Irish Republican Army used ambushes, attacks on police and intelligence operations rather than attempting a conventional battlefield victory. Michael Collins helped organise intelligence and attacks on British agents. IRA activity varied by district; it was not an identical national campaign everywhere.
Britain used troops and reinforced the Royal Irish Constabulary with the Black and Tans and the Auxiliary Division. Reprisals, destruction and civilian deaths damaged claims that British forces were merely restoring lawful order. Republican killings and intimidation also affected civilians. Escalating coercion made it harder to reconcile the rival claims to authority and increased the political cost of continued rule.
The truce resulted from pressure on both sides. Britain could deploy greater military force, but had not translated that advantage into an acceptable, stable settlement. Republicans had demonstrated that British administration could be disrupted, but could not assume that guerrilla success would defeat the whole British state. Negotiation was therefore an outcome of constrained choices, not proof that one side had achieved every original aim. National Archives: Irish partition document collection
Guerrilla war
A conflict using mobile, irregular forces, surprise attacks and local support rather than relying mainly on large conventional armies. Its political effect can exceed the territory permanently controlled by its fighters.
Two settlements and partition
The Government of Ireland Act of 1920 and the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921 were different measures. The Act was a British parliamentary attempt to create separate Home Rule arrangements for six-county Northern Ireland and the rest of the island. Northern institutions began operating in 1921 under unionist leadership, with James Craig as prime minister. The southern Home Rule arrangement did not command republican acceptance and failed to become the intended solution.
The Treaty, signed on 6 December 1921 after negotiations with Irish representatives including Arthur Griffith and Michael Collins, provided for the Irish Free State with dominion status. That meant substantial self-government within the British imperial constitutional framework, comparable in status to Canada, rather than the republic proclaimed in 1916. The Treaty also required an oath pledging allegiance to the Free State constitution and faithfulness to the King, and retained British use of specified naval facilities. These terms provoked disagreement about whether it was an acceptable stage towards independence. Treaty article 1, National Archives, DO 118/51, full Treaty text, articles 4, 6–7 and 11–12, archived by CAIN
Northern Ireland could opt out of the Free State and did so. The Treaty provided for a Boundary Commission, raising nationalist hopes of territorial changes which might make the northern state less viable. Those hopes were disappointed; the 1925 settlement left the boundary unchanged. Partition was therefore not created by the Treaty alone: the 1920 Act established separate northern institutions, and the Treaty settlement consolidated a divided island.
| Measure | Main constitutional result | Why conflict persisted |
|---|---|---|
| Government of Ireland Act, 1920 | Separate northern and southern Home Rule structures within the United Kingdom | Republicans rejected the southern arrangement; nationalists opposed partition |
| Anglo-Irish Treaty, 1921 | Dominion Free State; northern opt-out; retained Crown and defence connections | Anti-Treaty republicans rejected compromises; the north remained outside the Free State |
A divided island in the 1920s
Treaty divisions produced the Irish Civil War of 1922–23. Pro-Treaty leaders argued that the settlement offered practical self-government and a foundation for further independence; opponents, associated with Éamon de Valera, regarded its Crown connections and other compromises as unacceptable. The Free State defeated the anti-Treaty forces, but the violence and executions left bitterness that shaped southern political loyalties. Independence did not automatically create agreement about the new state.
In Northern Ireland, unionists possessed a secure parliamentary majority. The six-county boundary included a substantial Catholic and nationalist minority, many of whom did not regard the state as legitimate. Sectarian violence around partition deepened insecurity. The Royal Ulster Constabulary and the Ulster Special Constabulary were closely associated in nationalist perceptions with unionist power. The 1922 Special Powers Act gave the northern government extensive security powers.
Local electoral boundaries, housing allocation and employment became important sources of grievance. Unionist leaders described security and unity as necessary for survival against republican threats. Nationalists experienced exclusion and suspected that public resources served partisan ends. These viewpoints explain why stability in the parliament did not mean confidence across the population.
Britain now had different relationships with two jurisdictions. Westminster retained ultimate authority in Northern Ireland while allowing substantial domestic government at Stormont; the Free State had its own responsible government under the Treaty. The constitutional change was large, but partition transferred rather than removed some of the conflict over sovereignty and identity.
Southern independence and reconciliation
During the 1930s, de Valera's Fianna Fáil government weakened remaining Treaty constraints. The Statute of Westminster of 1931 strengthened dominions' legislative independence. After taking office in 1932, de Valera removed the oath and reduced Crown connections. Disagreement over land-annuity payments to Britain triggered an economic war of tariffs and retaliation. Southern farmers depended heavily on the British market, so asserting sovereignty carried economic costs.
The 1937 constitution named the state Éire in Irish and Ireland in English, created a presidency and expressed a claim concerning the whole island. It did not immediately remove every external Crown connection or achieve unity. In 1938, agreements with Neville Chamberlain's government settled major financial and trade disputes and returned the Treaty ports to Irish control. Defence independence became more substantial, and the settlement made neutrality in the approaching war more practicable. Documents on Irish Foreign Policy: return of the Treaty ports, 27 September 1938
Test this original practice interpretation: Anglo-Irish relations improved steadily after the Treaty. The growing ability to settle disputes supports a claim of eventual improvement, especially in 1938. Yet civil war, unresolved partition and the tariff conflict contradict the word steadily. A stronger judgement distinguishes increasing southern sovereignty from changing diplomatic relations: sovereignty advanced while relations could deteriorate and later recover.
By 1939, Britain no longer governed the south as it had in 1914. Northern Ireland remained within the United Kingdom, and partition continued to complicate sovereignty, security and relations between communities.