2F - The new balance of power: the position of France in relation to the European powers by 1697
Learn how to judge France's position after Ryswick by comparing territory, military capacity, finance and its rivals' resources, and explain why peace offered recovery without guaranteeing an end to war.
French power after Ryswick
France in 1697 was constrained by a stronger coalition but remained one of Europe's most powerful states.
Louis had entered the Nine Years War seeking security for recent acquisitions and influence along the Rhine. At Ryswick he returned important positions, including Luxembourg, and recognised William's kingship. He had not eliminated the Dutch Republic, broken English cooperation with it or forced the Emperor to accept every French demand. By these criteria, the war limited his ambitions.
Yet France was not reduced to its frontiers of 1661. It retained earlier gains, including Franche-Comté and Strasbourg, and possessed an extensive network of fortifications. These gains could help defend territory acquired over previous decades. A judgement based only on what Louis surrendered in 1697 overlooks what he still held.
France also retained a large population, productive agriculture and manufactures, trained officers and experienced troops. Its institutions could mobilise resources on a scale few individual rivals could match. Louis could still use military pressure and dynastic diplomacy. The principal change was that those resources now had to contend with opponents capable of cooperation over several campaigns.
Relative power
A state's capacity compared with that of its opponents. A state can remain strong in absolute terms while becoming less able to dominate because its rivals cooperate or improve their resources.
This distinction explains the new balance. France had not become weak simply because it failed to dictate all the terms of peace. Its ability to convert strength into expansion had diminished as Dutch-English cooperation, imperial resistance and multiple fronts raised the cost of success. Territorial size, diplomatic freedom and the capacity to sustain war must be assessed separately.
The costs of prolonged war
Years of war weakened the resources on which French military power depended.
Large armies required regular pay, food, weapons, transport and replacement soldiers. Fortifications protected frontiers but also needed garrisons and maintenance. Military success could therefore increase commitments: a captured town had to be occupied and supplied. War expenditure continued even when a campaign produced no decisive change of territory.
The crown raised revenue through established taxes, new demands, borrowing, sales of offices and financial intermediaries. These methods supplied money but could make future revenue less available. Loans and advances had to be repaid; selling an office might grant privileges or future income in exchange for immediate cash. A treasury that met this year's demands could still leave its successor with heavy obligations.
The capitation, introduced in 1695, attempted to draw contributions from a wider range of social ranks than older direct taxation. Its importance lay in the effort to broaden the tax base, not in an instant abolition of privilege. Collection, exemptions and bargains continued to limit how evenly burdens fell. Rural taxpayers and producers supplied much of the material on which the state depended.
Harvest failures and famine in 1693–1694 intensified these pressures. Bad weather was not caused by Louis's war, but war demands affected society's ability to endure it. When food became scarce, prices rose, people had less capacity to pay taxes, and army supply became harder. The BnF's study of contemporary royal prints documents the bread crisis and the royal image of relief.
Fénelon's critical letter to Louis XIV, conventionally dated around 1693, connects suffering and royal policy. It is valuable evidence of elite criticism, but its persuasive purpose and uncertainty about delivery prevent treating it as a neutral national survey or proof that Louis read it.
Comparing France with its rivals
The allies' ability to resist France depended on how their different strengths could be maintained and combined.
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