1E - Foreign affairs: intervention in Poland
Between 1725 and 1762 Russia intervened decisively in European affairs, yet military power did not always bring lasting territorial gains. Poland, the Crimea and the Seven Years War reveal how supply, allies and changes of ruler shaped the results of war.
A great power with vulnerable borders
Russia inherited both advantages and unfinished objectives from Peter the Great. The Baltic settlement of 1721 gave it territory, ports and a place in European diplomacy. A standing army, taxation and an officer corps trained in European methods allowed later rulers to intervene beyond Russia's frontiers. These were durable parts of the Petrine legacy: the structures created under Peter continued to work even when the ruler changed.
The southern frontier remained less secure. The Crimean Khanate, ruled by a Tatar khan under Ottoman suzerainty, lay between Russia and the Black Sea. Raids, frontier competition and the desire for maritime access encouraged Russian intervention. An army could march into the Crimea without being able to remain there: distance, water, food and disease made holding territory harder than winning a battle.
To the west, the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth was a neighbouring state with an elected monarchy and powerful nobles. Russia wanted influence over its ruler and policies, rather than a strong hostile power between Russia and central Europe. Maintaining influence in Poland and containing the Ottoman Empire were therefore different objectives. Assess success against each objective, rather than assuming every war aimed at annexation.
Suzerainty
A relationship in which a superior power exercises authority over another ruler while allowing some internal autonomy. The Crimean khans were not ordinary Ottoman provincial governors.
Intervention in the Polish succession
The death of Augustus II in 1733 created an opportunity for Russia under Empress Anna to determine Poland's next king. Stanisław Leszczyński had strong support among Polish electors and backing from France; his daughter was married to Louis XV. Russia and Austria instead supported Augustus III of Saxony. A French-backed king could weaken Russian influence and disturb the balance on Russia's western frontier.
Russian forces entered Poland and helped establish Augustus III against Leszczyński. Leszczyński withdrew to Danzig, where a Russian siege, led by Münnich, forced the city's surrender in 1734. French assistance failed to reverse the result. The wider War of the Polish Succession also involved fighting elsewhere in Europe; Russia's crucial intervention was in the Commonwealth itself. Augustus III's position was subsequently recognised in the peace settlement.
The significance lay principally in political influence. Russia demonstrated that it could use military force to shape a neighbouring state's succession, despite a rival candidate's substantial Polish support. It did not annex the Commonwealth in this war. The result also showed that Polish political divisions could provide openings for external intervention; division alone did not determine the outcome, because Russian armed intervention supplied the decisive pressure.
Why the Crimea remained beyond reach
The Russo-Turkish War of 1735–1739 showed the gap between Russia's growing military capability and its ability to secure the south. Münnich's army broke through the defences at Perekop and entered the Crimea in 1736. Russian forces also captured Azov, and later campaigns penetrated the peninsula. These achievements demonstrated that the khanate could be attacked. They did not make it governable by Russia.
Disease and shortages caused severe losses and repeated withdrawal. The army's supply system struggled across the steppe, where water and provisions were difficult to obtain. Destroying settlements could weaken an opponent while also leaving an invading army less able to sustain itself. These problems explain why impressive penetration did not become permanent occupation.
Diplomacy compounded the logistical limits. Austria joined Russia against the Ottomans but suffered defeats and made peace in 1739. Russia faced the prospect of continuing without its ally and also had to consider danger from Sweden. The 1739 settlement, commonly discussed as the Peace of Belgrade, left Russia with Azov on restrictive terms: its fortifications were to be dismantled and Russia could not maintain a fleet on the Black Sea. The Crimea remained outside Russian control.
Thus it is too sweeping to say that Russia achieved nothing: its army demonstrated an increased ability to attack the south and retained a limited foothold at Azov. Nevertheless, the principal strategic goals of secure Crimean control and effective naval access had not been achieved. Later Catherine-era gains must not be projected backwards into Anna's reign.
Elizabeth's war against Prussia
Russia entered the Seven Years War against Frederick II's Prussia under Elizabeth. Prussia's growing military strength threatened Russia's influence in central and eastern Europe. Elizabeth's government joined Austria and France in the coalition against it. The war therefore involved preserving a favourable European balance as well as demonstrating Russian power.
The Russian army won at Gross-Jägersdorf in 1757, occupied East Prussia in 1758 and, with Austrian assistance, defeated Frederick at Kunersdorf in 1759. Russian forces briefly entered Berlin in 1760. These successes showed that Russia could confront one of Europe's most formidable armies. However, heavy casualties, uncertain supply and disagreements between coalition partners prevented the immediate destruction of Prussia. A battle victory was an opportunity, not an automatic final settlement.
The death of Elizabeth at the beginning of 1762 transformed the outcome. Her successor Peter III admired Frederick and rapidly made peace, returning Russia's conquests. He then moved towards cooperation with Prussia. His intervention explains why military success produced so little durable territorial reward. It also angered officers who believed their sacrifices had been thrown away. Catherine, after overthrowing Peter, abandoned his active pro-Prussian commitment but did not restart the war to recover those conquests.
The army had established Russia's great-power importance. The monarchy's personal control of policy nevertheless made that success vulnerable to a ruler's preferences. This links foreign affairs to the instability of the palace-coup period: succession mattered to both diplomacy and domestic authority.
Military capacity and lasting achievement
A convincing judgement distinguishes power, influence and territorial settlement. Russia achieved its immediate succession objective in Poland; it demonstrated strength but failed to secure the Crimea; and it fought effectively against Prussia before a change of ruler surrendered its conquests. These are different outcomes, not three examples of either complete failure or uninterrupted success.
Consider the argument that Russia became stronger despite failing to retain many gains. The Polish intervention and Kunersdorf support it because they show Russia shaping another state's government and defeating a major power. The argument needs qualification: soldiers' losses and the southern supply problems exposed limits, while Peter III's reversal showed that institutions did not guarantee consistent objectives. Russia was more capable of influencing Europe by 1762 than in 1725, but its ability to turn campaigns into lasting results remained uneven.
Compare the objective with the final outcome. Winning battles, influencing a ruler and acquiring secure territory are related measures of success, but they are not interchangeable.