AQA 7042 · 2O · R11 - Hindenburg, Papen, Schleicher and the 'backstairs intrigue' leading to Hitler’s appointment as chancellor
Explain how Hindenburg's authority, Papen's bargaining and Schleicher's failure brought Hitler to the chancellorship on 30 January 1933. Weigh their roles against Nazi electoral strength, distinguishing political leverage from the power to make the appointment.
Votes and presidential power
The key starting point is a distinction between winning the most seats and being appointed chancellor. Under the Weimar Constitution, the Reich President appointed the chancellor. The Reichstag could withdraw confidence from a government, but by 1932 a succession of presidential cabinets had governed without secure parliamentary majorities, relying on President Paul von Hindenburg’s support, emergency decrees and repeated dissolutions of the Reichstag. This made access to Hindenburg increasingly important.
The Nazi election results created political weight, not an automatic transfer of office:
| Reichstag election | Nazi vote | Nazi seats | What it meant |
|---|---|---|---|
| 31 July 1932 | 37.3% | 230 of 608 | Largest party, but well short of a majority |
| 6 November 1932 | 33.1% | 196 of 584 | Still largest, but with fewer votes and 34 fewer seats |
After the July election, Hitler demanded the chancellorship rather than a subordinate place in Franz von Papen’s government. On 13 August, Hindenburg offered Nazi participation but rejected Hitler’s demand for control of the government. Hitler would not accept the lesser role. This earlier refusal is crucial evidence: Hindenburg retained a choice, and Hitler’s July result did not compel him to appoint the Nazi leader.
The November result also cuts against a story of unstoppable electoral momentum. The Nazis remained the largest party, so conservative politicians could not easily ignore their mass following, but the party had lost more than two million votes. The later appointment therefore needs an explanation based on political decisions and bargaining, not simply a graph of rising Nazi support.
Papen’s failure and bargain
Papen first became chancellor on 1 June 1932, after Schleicher helped bring down Heinrich Brüning and promoted Papen as a manageable conservative. Papen had almost no independent support in the Reichstag. His was a presidential cabinet: its survival depended much more on Hindenburg’s backing than on a parliamentary coalition. Hitler’s refusal to serve under Papen after the July election left the government exposed, and the November election did not supply Papen with a workable majority. Papen resigned on 17 November; Hindenburg appointed Schleicher as chancellor on 3 December.
Papen’s lack of a parliamentary base made him a failed chancellor, but it did not remove his personal access to Hindenburg. He also blamed Schleicher, once his ally, for replacing him. Papen now tried to return to government by negotiating with the political force he had failed to tame from the chancellery.
Backstairs intrigue
Private political bargaining among Papen, Hitler and people with access to Hindenburg, conducted outside transparent Reichstag coalition-making. The phrase does not prove that every conservative or business leader joined one conspiracy, or that the outcome was fixed in advance.
On 4 January 1933, Papen and Hitler met secretly at banker Kurt von Schröder’s house in Cologne. Schröder’s later sworn account says that they discussed a government combining Nazis with conservative nationalists and reached agreement in principle, while leaving details for further talks. It is retrospective evidence given after the war, so its account of motives needs testing against other records. The meeting did not itself appoint Hitler. Its importance was that it reopened a route to power just when Hitler’s party had lost electoral momentum and Papen wanted revenge and a return to office.
Papen gradually accepted Hitler as chancellor and imagined that he could exercise real control as vice-chancellor in a cabinet dominated numerically by conservatives. His importance therefore came from brokerage: he connected Hitler’s demand for the top office to Hindenburg’s presidential power and made the arrangement look safe to sceptical conservatives. That was a grave miscalculation, not evidence that Papen commanded Hitler.
Schleicher’s failed alternative
Schleicher entered office on 3 December 1932 with greater military and political experience than Papen, but not with a secure Reichstag majority. He tried to broaden the government’s support by appealing to organised labour and to Nazis associated with Gregor Strasser, whom he hoped might cooperate independently of Hitler. Hitler blocked this route, and Strasser resigned his Nazi offices on 8 December after a leadership conflict.
This strategy is often called a Querfront, or cross-front, intended to connect forces from different parts of the political spectrum. Treat that label cautiously: contacts with different groups do not establish that a coherent, agreed coalition existed. Schleicher explored a broader base and contact with Strasser, but failed to detach sufficient Nazi support or assemble a workable coalition.
By January, Schleicher was boxed in. He lacked reliable parliamentary backing, lost influence within Hindenburg’s circle and faced Papen’s negotiations behind his back. Schleicher then asked Hindenburg for authority to dissolve the Reichstag and keep governing; the associated postponement of elections raised serious constitutional objections. Hindenburg refused even the dissolution order on which Schleicher said his government depended. On 28 January, Schleicher resigned.
Schleicher’s failure mattered in two different ways. First, it removed the sitting alternative to a Hitler-Papen cabinet. Second, his resort to emergency government made Papen’s proposed coalition appear to Hindenburg as a way to combine Nazi mass support with conservative ministers. Yet Schleicher should not be turned into a lost democratic saviour: his own solution also sought government above or around a hostile Reichstag.
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