2Q - The Watergate Affair and its aftermath: the role of Congress
Learn how a burglary developed into a constitutional crisis, why congressional and judicial scrutiny forced Nixon’s resignation, and how Watergate shaped his legacy and the balance of federal power.
Burglary and cover-up
Watergate began publicly with the arrest of five men inside the Democratic National Committee headquarters on 17 June 1972. They were attempting an operation involving political espionage, and links emerged to the Committee to Re-elect the President. The original burglary was serious, but the subsequent use of power to obstruct investigation made the affair a threat to constitutional government.
The White House attempted to distance itself from the crime while participants arranged payments and sought to restrict inquiries. Nixon’s recorded conversation with Haldeman on 23 June 1972 discussed using the CIA to discourage the FBI’s investigation. This later became the “smoking gun”: evidence that he had participated in obstruction soon after the burglary. It does not prove that he personally ordered the original break-in. Those are different historical claims.
Watergate also revealed a wider political culture. The administration treated critics as enemies, used surveillance and allowed the “Plumbers” to commit an earlier burglary against Daniel Ellsberg’s psychiatrist. Ellsberg had disclosed the Pentagon Papers, which exposed the history of official decision-making in Vietnam. Connecting these events shows that Watergate was more than an isolated campaign mishap: secrecy and perceived presidential entitlement created conditions for unlawful action.
Nixon nevertheless won a landslide against George McGovern in November 1972. The victory cannot establish his innocence, nor can his later downfall be read back as something all voters already understood. The full evidence developed after the election. Investigative reporting, notably by Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein at the Washington Post, helped keep the issue alive, but reporters worked alongside judicial investigations and later congressional inquiries.
Congress and public accountability
Congress transformed the scandal into a public examination of executive conduct. The Senate’s Watergate committee, chaired by Sam Ervin, began televised hearings in May 1973. Former White House counsel John Dean testified about presidential involvement in the cover-up. In July, Alexander Butterfield disclosed the existence of an automatic White House recording system. This changed the inquiry: investigators could seek contemporaneous recordings rather than rely only on conflicting memories.
The Senate hearings exposed evidence but did not themselves remove the president. The House of Representatives had the constitutional responsibility to decide whether to impeach, meaning formally to charge the president. The Senate would then conduct a trial; removal required a two-thirds vote of senators present. An investigation, impeachment and removal are distinct stages.
Impeachment
A formal accusation by the House of Representatives against a federal office-holder. It is not itself removal; conviction in the subsequent Senate trial can remove the person from office.
In July 1974 the House Judiciary Committee approved three proposed articles: obstruction of justice, abuse of power and contempt of Congress. Their breadth mattered. They addressed interference with legal investigation, misuse of presidential authority and refusal to comply with congressional demands. Nixon faced a challenge to how he had exercised the office, not simply embarrassment over associates’ behaviour.
Congress’s leverage grew because public evidence undermined support even among Republicans. Party allegiance did not disappear immediately, but it became harder to defend the president as the factual basis of his denials collapsed. This is an example of checks and balances operating through politics as well as written constitutional powers. Without evidence, sustained inquiry and the possibility of cross-party action, formal powers might have remained ineffective.
Tapes, courts and resignation
The tapes set presidential secrecy against the demands of criminal justice. Nixon claimed executive privilege, the protection of confidential presidential communications. Some confidentiality can serve legitimate decision-making, but an absolute privilege would allow a president to withhold evidence of wrongdoing indefinitely.
On 20 October 1973 Nixon ordered the dismissal of special prosecutor Archibald Cox after Cox insisted on obtaining tapes. Attorney-General Elliot Richardson and deputy William Ruckelshaus refused and left office; solicitor-general Robert Bork carried out the dismissal. The “Saturday Night Massacre” strengthened suspicion that Nixon was attempting to stop investigation, even though his defenders presented it as a dispute over presidential authority.
In United States v. Nixon on 24 July 1974, the Supreme Court rejected an unlimited presidential claim of privilege and required production of the tapes sought for the criminal case. On 5 August the public release of the 23 June 1972 recording contradicted Nixon’s account of his early knowledge of the cover-up. Republican leaders then made clear that support was insufficient to prevent impeachment and conviction. Nixon announced his resignation on 8 August; it took effect at noon on 9 August, when Gerald Ford became president. National Archives chronology.
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