2R - Confrontation between the superpowers: US attitudes to Cuba and developments leading to the missile crisis
The Cuban Missile Crisis grew from a local revolution, American attempts to remove Castro and Soviet decisions about security and nuclear power. Learn how the confrontation developed, how the thirteen days of October 1962 were resolved, and why its apparent winners and longer-term consequences require a qualified judgement.
Cuba and American hostility
Fidel Castro's revolution overthrew Fulgencio Batista in January 1959. Cuba had close economic ties with the United States, and American governments had treated the Caribbean as an area of particular strategic importance. Castro's land and property policies challenged US interests, while his rejection of American influence made the revolution a political challenge as well.
Relations worsened through nationalisation, trade restrictions and Cuba's growing ties with the USSR. Each side's response encouraged the next: American economic pressure gave Castro reasons to seek Soviet markets and protection; Soviet support intensified American fears of a communist foothold near Florida. Washington broke diplomatic relations in January 1961. This was a process of radicalisation and alignment, rather than evidence that every event of 1959 was directed from Moscow.
In April 1961 Kennedy approved the Bay of Pigs invasion by CIA-trained Cuban exiles, inheriting the operation planned under Eisenhower. The expected anti-Castro uprising did not occur, and Cuban forces defeated the invaders. The failure strengthened Castro's position and his fear of another attack. Operation Mongoose, adopted later in 1961, continued covert efforts to undermine his regime. Official account of the invasion and Mongoose.
The decision to deploy missiles
Khrushchev agreed to place Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba in 1962. Protecting Castro was an important motive: a nuclear-backed ally would be harder for the United States to overthrow. Castro also wanted to defend Cuban sovereignty and resist further American intervention. His role matters because Cuba was not merely a convenient location selected by two superpowers.
The deployment also offered Khrushchev a way to improve the strategic balance. The United States possessed more effective long-range nuclear forces and had Jupiter missiles in Turkey, close to the USSR. Soviet missiles in Cuba could threaten much of the United States without waiting for a much larger Soviet intercontinental force. Prestige and confidence in Kennedy's willingness to compromise also influenced the gamble. These motives can reinforce each other; no single motive need explain the whole decision.
Secrecy made the gamble especially dangerous. Kennedy had publicly warned against offensive missiles in Cuba, and Soviet reassurances had concealed their deployment. A U-2 reconnaissance flight photographed missile sites on 14 October; Kennedy learned of the findings on 16 October. Their discovery created an immediate confrontation over strategic danger, deception and the President's credibility. Official account of deployment and discovery.
Kennedy and the quarantine
Kennedy's advisers considered options ranging from accepting the missiles to bombing the sites and invading Cuba. An air strike might miss some weapons or kill Soviet personnel, inviting retaliation in Cuba, Berlin or elsewhere. An invasion could escalate still further. Doing nothing, however, threatened American confidence in Kennedy and his earlier warnings.
Kennedy chose a naval quarantine to prevent further offensive military supplies from reaching Cuba. The term distinguished the measure from a formal wartime blockade and helped secure support from the Organization of American States. It applied military pressure while allowing time for negotiation. It did not immediately remove missiles already on the island, so it was a means of creating leverage rather than a complete solution.
Kennedy announced the discovery and response on television on 22 October. In a letter to Khrushchev that day, he emphasised both American determination and the danger of misunderstanding in a nuclear age. For an enquiry into Kennedy's management of the crisis, the letter is valuable because it was a direct attempt to influence the opposing leader. Its warnings were purposeful signals: they show the position Kennedy wanted Khrushchev to understand, not an impartial assessment of who had caused the crisis. The private diplomatic audience gives it a different role from the televised speech, although both were designed to shape behaviour. Kennedy's 22 October letter, FRUS document 44.
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