1A - Relations between Outremer and wider Christendom, the Latin West and the Byzantine Empire

1A - Relations between Outremer and wider Christendom, the Latin West and the Byzantine Empire

Outremer sought money, soldiers and allies as Muslim power grew between 1149 and 1187. Its Christian connections remained extensive, but shared religion did not give its rulers control over the priorities of western kings or Byzantine emperors.

Western aid and competing priorities

The Latin states belonged to a wider Christian world through pilgrimage, family relationships, the Church and the military orders. Western pilgrims brought money, and some visitors fought alongside local armies. The Templars and Hospitallers drew income and recruits from estates across western Europe. Italian merchants connected the ports of Outremer to Mediterranean trade. These continuing links mattered even when no large crusade arrived: money could maintain garrisons and shipping could carry supplies.

Support nevertheless depended on choices made outside Outremer. Henry II of England and Louis VII of France raised money for the Holy Land through taxation in 1166. Such aid shows continuing commitment after the Second Crusade's failure. It also shows that a ruler could support the Holy Land without personally leaving his kingdom. The defence tax adopted in Jerusalem in 1183 closely resembled this western system, illustrating an exchange of administrative ideas as well as resources. Bernard Hamilton, The dying king.

Amalric sent an embassy led by the archbishop of Tyre to seek western help in 1169. It failed to secure the major intervention he needed. The papal schism beginning in 1159 divided western rulers over rival popes, while kings and princes had wars and dynastic interests nearer home. Philip of Flanders came east in 1177, but his presence did not give Jerusalem an army available for any policy its king chose; his campaigning focused on the northern states. The crucial weakness was therefore the uncertain scale, timing and use of assistance. Hamilton, The international status of the kingdom, The victor of Mont Gisard.

Dynastic ties and Byzantine protection

The Byzantine Empire offered an ally closer to Outremer than the western kingdoms. Emperor Manuel I could bring armies, naval strength and diplomatic influence to the eastern Mediterranean. He also sought recognition of imperial authority. His intervention in 1158–59 forced Raynald of Antioch to submit and strengthened Byzantine influence in the principality. Protection and subordination were closely connected: a Latin ruler could gain security by acknowledging an emperor whose claims reduced his freedom of action.

Marriage helped turn diplomatic cooperation into lasting relationships. Baldwin III married Manuel's niece Theodora in 1158. Amalric married Maria Comnena, another member of the imperial family, in 1167. These marriages gave the kings of Jerusalem personal links to Constantinople and made joint action more plausible. They did not erase disputes about authority, nor did they turn Jerusalem into an ordinary Byzantine province. Amalric's visit to Constantinople in 1171 further strengthened the relationship through his acknowledgement of Manuel's superior status.

This cooperation also complicates an explanation based entirely on religious hostility. Latin and Greek churches differed over doctrine and authority, and Latin rulers had established their own ecclesiastical hierarchy in Outremer. Yet these differences did not prevent dynastic marriages or military alliances. Indigenous Greek, Armenian and Syriac Christians also had their own institutions and relationships; wider Christendom consisted of communities whose political interests and religious traditions differed. A common Christian identity could encourage cooperation, but the terms had to be negotiated.

Byzantine protection increased Outremer's diplomatic and military options under Manuel I. Its value depended on accepting some imperial authority and on the emperor's continuing capacity to intervene.

The failed joint expedition

Egypt gave Amalric and Manuel a shared strategic objective. If the resources of Egypt supported the ruler of Syria, the Latin states would face stronger pressure from both directions. In 1169, after Shirkuh and then Saladin gained power in Cairo, a joint attack offered a chance to reverse that change. Amalric supplied the land army and the Byzantines brought a fleet to besiege Damietta, a port in the Nile delta.

The siege failed. The expedition depended on separate forces arriving, maintaining supplies and agreeing how to conduct the operation. Delay and shortages weakened the Byzantines, while poor coordination prevented the allies from converting their combined strength into a decisive result. They eventually withdrew without capturing the city. Possessing a fleet and an army was insufficient when their commanders could not sustain an effective common campaign.

Accounts of the failure reflect the perspectives of their writers. Byzantine and Latin explanations could blame the other partner, but accusation does not establish deliberate betrayal. Michael Köhler's study of alliances treats the expedition within a wider pattern of negotiation and shifting interests. The renewal of contacts in 1171 is evidence that the failure damaged confidence without immediately ending the alliance. Distinguish an unsuccessful operation from the complete collapse of a diplomatic relationship. Köhler, Alliances and Treaties.

Support after Manuel's death

The death of Manuel in September 1180 weakened a relationship that had relied heavily on his power and policy. His son Alexios II was a child, and the regency faced political struggles. The massacre of Latins in Constantinople in 1182, associated with the upheaval bringing Andronikos Komnenos to power, deepened insecurity and hostility. Jerusalem could no longer assume that Constantinople would provide the protection associated with Manuel. This was a change in imperial leadership and political conditions, rather than proof that Christian cooperation had always been impossible. Andrew Stone's study of Alexios II.

Outremer consequently continued to seek major western intervention. Patriarch Heraclius and leaders of the military orders went west in 1184–85, appealing to Pope Lucius III and rulers including Frederick Barbarossa and Henry II. No western king came to lead an army in response before the crisis of 1187. The mission's failure mattered because Saladin was increasing his control of Syria while Jerusalem faced its own succession disputes. Local leaders had to manage an immediate danger with assistance that remained uncertain. Hamilton, The heirs of the leper king.

Across the period, distinguish continuing Christian connections from dependable strategic protection. Pilgrimage, trade, religious institutions and financial contributions survived changes of ruler. The larger military alliances were more vulnerable to western commitments, the partners' different objectives and Byzantine instability. Outremer's external relationships were therefore substantial but could not compensate reliably for a growing imbalance of power in the Near East.