2R - The summits between the USA and the USSR, including Geneva, Reykjavik, Washington and Moscow
Learn how successive summits changed the superpower relationship, why SDI both encouraged and obstructed negotiation, and how Reagan's opening developed into Bush's more cautious cooperation.
Geneva and Reagan's willingness to negotiate
The Geneva summit of November 1985 brought Reagan and Gorbachev together after years of intense confrontation. Reagan's anti-communism and defence build-up did not rule out negotiation. He opposed Soviet power but also feared nuclear war, and believed that a stronger American position could support effective diplomacy. Gorbachev wanted a more predictable relationship that would assist domestic reform.
Personal discussion helped each leader test the other's intentions. The joint statement acknowledged continuing differences, committed both sides to further dialogue and envisaged reciprocal visits. They accepted that nuclear war could not be won and should not be fought, but did not conclude a major arms-reduction treaty at Geneva. Contemporary Geneva joint statement, 21 November 1985.
Its achievement was therefore a process and a changed atmosphere, rather than immediate disarmament. Regular contact could make proposals easier to explore and reduce the danger of interpreting every move through the assumption of hostility. It could also help negotiators continue working between summits. Trust mattered because a treaty would require each side to accept some exposure to the other's inspection and restraint.
This does not mean personality alone solved the conflict. Both leaders faced advisers, allies and domestic critics who worried about concessions. Reagan's ability to engage a Soviet leader mattered precisely because he retained anti-communist credibility, while Gorbachev's reform priorities encouraged him to accept risks in negotiation.
Reykjavik and the dispute over star wars
At Reykjavik in October 1986, discussion went far beyond modest limits towards exceptionally large nuclear reductions. The leaders explored halving strategic weapons and the possibility of eliminating broad categories of nuclear arms. Their common fear of nuclear war made radical proposals thinkable, but it did not eliminate disagreement about how to remain secure during and after reductions.
The central obstacle was Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative, popularly called star wars. Announced in 1983, SDI was a research programme seeking defence against ballistic missiles, including possible advanced technologies associated with space. It was not an already functioning, impenetrable shield. Reagan presented defence as a way to escape reliance on retaliation; Gorbachev feared that a successful American shield would undermine Soviet deterrence and require costly countermeasures.
Gorbachev linked major reductions to restrictions on missile-defence research and testing, particularly confinement to laboratories. Reagan would not accept limits he believed would cripple SDI. The meeting ended without the sweeping agreement under discussion. The American memorandum of their final session records the dispute as one of principle, not merely unfortunate wording. Contemporary final conversation, 12 October 1986, FRUS.
SDI thus had competing effects. The prospect of further technological competition increased the incentive to negotiate, but protecting the programme also blocked the proposed bargain. A claim that star wars simply ended the Cold War misses that obstruction. Equally, calling Reykjavik wholly useless ignores how far the leaders had moved towards reductions, providing a basis for later, narrower agreement. Hunt and Reynolds, scholarly account of the four summits.
Washington turned dialogue into verifiable reductions
The Washington summit in December 1987 produced the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF). It required elimination of US and Soviet ground-launched missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometres, including systems central to the European missile dispute. This was a move beyond ceilings on expansion: an entire defined class would be removed. Verification, including on-site inspections, made the obligation more credible by helping each side check compliance. Official treaty record, UN Treaty Series.
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