AQA 7042 · 2N · R20 - Stalin and international relations: co-operation with Germany
This lesson follows Soviet foreign policy from co-operation with Germany through collective security to the Nazi-Soviet Pact. You will connect entry into the League of Nations, the French and Czechoslovak pacts, Spain, Western appeasement and Japanese aggression rather than treating them as separate episodes. The central enquiry is whether Stalin’s changes of partner represented inconsistency or a continuing attempt to protect the Soviet state.
German co-operation before Hitler
Stalin did not create the German relationship from nothing. He inherited a policy begun while Lenin was still alive, when Soviet Russia and defeated Germany were both partly isolated from the post-war European order. Their governments were ideologically different, but each could gain by co-operating against that isolation.
The Treaty of Rapallo, signed on 16 April 1922, restored diplomatic relations, waived financial claims arising from the war and established a basis for trade. The Treaty of Berlin of 24 April 1926 reaffirmed Rapallo and promised neutrality if either state was attacked by a third power. Under Stalin, these agreements remained useful because Germany could supply industrial expertise and markets while the USSR gained a partner outside the Western alliance system.
Public treaties reveal only part of the relationship. German personnel trained and tested military equipment on Soviet territory, helping Germany evade the disarmament restrictions of Versailles; Soviet forces gained access to German techniques and expertise. This was calculated co-operation, not trust or ideological friendship.
Hitler’s accession in January 1933 changed the balance. Nazi anti-communism, the destruction of the German Communist Party and German rearmament made Germany a direct threat. Secret military co-operation ended, although trade and diplomatic relations continued. The important change was therefore from a useful Weimar partnership to guarded dealings with a hostile Nazi state, not from complete friendship to complete separation.
The turn to collective security
By 1934 the Soviet leadership faced possible danger in both Europe and Asia: Nazi Germany in the west and Japanese expansion from Manchuria in the east. Collective security meant that states would deter aggression by promising a joint response rather than relying only on separate bilateral deals. Foreign Commissar Maxim Litvinov became its main public advocate, but the policy served Stalin’s state-security priorities.
Collective security
An arrangement in which participating states promise a joint response to aggression against a member, aiming to deter an attacker through the prospect of collective resistance.
The USSR entered the League of Nations on 18 September 1934 and received a permanent seat on its Council. Membership mattered because it reduced diplomatic isolation and gave Soviet proposals a recognised forum. It did not create an army or force other members to resist aggression, so its value depended on states turning declarations into action.
The next step was a pair of mutual-assistance agreements:
| Agreement | Intended security effect | Built-in weakness |
|---|---|---|
| Franco-Soviet Pact, 2 May 1935 | Warned Germany that aggression against either partner might bring assistance from the other within the League system | Its procedures were cautious, and no detailed joint operational plan made assistance automatic |
| Soviet-Czechoslovak Pact, 16 May 1935 | Extended the anti-aggression network to the state most exposed to German pressure | Soviet assistance to Czechoslovakia depended on France also acting; access for Soviet forces through Poland or Romania was unresolved |
The pacts were therefore significant signals but incomplete guarantees. They show a real attempt to make resistance to aggression collective, yet Stalin and Litvinov still regarded Soviet armed strength as the final safeguard. Policy combined co-operation with self-help rather than replacing one with the other.
Spain tests the policy
The Spanish Civil War began in July 1936 when military rebels attacked the elected Republic. Britain and France favoured non-intervention because they feared that the conflict could become a general European war. Germany and Italy nevertheless gave major help to Franco’s Nationalists. The USSR also signed the Non-Intervention Agreement, then supplied the Republic with military advisers, tanks, aircraft and other war material when the imbalance became clear.
Soviet intervention had several connected purposes. It opposed the spread of fascist power, supported the Popular Front strategy of co-operation between communists and other anti-fascists, and demonstrated that the USSR would not leave the Republic entirely isolated. It also offered experience of modern warfare and increased Soviet influence within the Republican coalition.
Yet intervention remained constrained. Stalin did not turn Spain into a direct great-power war with Germany and Italy, and Soviet aid could not overcome the Republic’s political divisions, the practical effects of non-intervention or the scale and continuity of Axis help. Franco’s victory in March 1939 showed that Soviet assistance alone could not make collective resistance effective when the Western powers remained outside the conflict.
Spain therefore cuts both ways in the enquiry. It is evidence of genuine anti-fascist action, but also of Stalin’s caution about bearing the main risks while Britain and France avoided them. It deepened suspicion on all sides without producing a dependable anti-German coalition.
Appeasement and pressure on two fronts
The Munich Agreement of 29–30 September 1938 allowed Germany to take the Sudetenland from Czechoslovakia. Britain, France, Germany and Italy made the settlement; neither Czechoslovakia nor the USSR took part in the negotiations. France accepted the settlement rather than activating the mutual-assistance chain on which Soviet help depended. To Stalin, Munich suggested that Western governments might direct German expansion eastwards or at least refuse to resist it. That was Stalin’s interpretation, not proof of a single Western conspiracy, but the exclusion of the USSR and abandonment of Czechoslovakia badly weakened collective security.
At the same time, Japanese aggression made the danger more than European:
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