2R - Khrushchev and East-West relations: impact of risings in Poland and Hungary and Soviet intervention
Khrushchev sought to compete with the West while avoiding a superpower war. Learn why Poland and Hungary exposed the limits of Soviet reform in 1956, and why visits and summit diplomacy produced an uncertain improvement in relations before the Paris summit collapsed in 1960.
Coexistence and Soviet control
Khrushchev's foreign policy combined a desire for negotiation with a determination to preserve Soviet power. Nuclear weapons made a direct war with the United States potentially catastrophic. Competition through economic growth, diplomacy and influence abroad offered other ways of advancing communism. Lower international tension could also release resources for Soviet domestic development.
Peaceful coexistence
The idea that communist and capitalist states could exist alongside each other without an inevitable war, while continuing to compete politically, economically and ideologically.
This policy did not promise political freedom to Soviet satellites. Moscow regarded Eastern Europe as a strategic buffer and a demonstration of communist strength. A satellite could therefore face coercion even while Khrushchev discussed peace with Western leaders: the two policies addressed different relationships.
Khrushchev's February 1956 secret speech denounced Stalin's abuses, particularly the repression of Communist Party members. The speech helped encourage hopes for reform. Yet de-Stalinisation meant modifying Stalin's rule, not abandoning communist government or Soviet leadership. For an enquiry into Khrushchev's reform intentions, the speech is valuable because its author led the party and addressed its officials. Its selective criticism also matters: blaming Stalin helped restore the party's legitimacy and strengthen Khrushchev, so it cannot establish an intention to permit unrestricted change throughout the bloc. This is a contextual judgement about the speech's purpose, rather than a reason to discard it. Official account of the speech and its consequences.
Poland and negotiated limits
Polish unrest arose from economic grievances as well as demands for greater national independence. Workers protesting at Poznań in June 1956 faced repression by Polish forces. In October, the Polish party returned Władysław Gomułka to its leadership. He had previously suffered under Stalinism and could promise a more national form of communism.
Khrushchev initially feared that the leadership change would weaken Soviet control. A Soviet delegation arrived in Warsaw, and Soviet troop movements increased the pressure. Gomułka's position nevertheless differed from an attempt to overthrow the communist system. He assured Moscow that Poland would remain communist and within the Warsaw Pact. Soviet leaders accepted the new leadership without invading.
The settlement allowed some domestic variation, including a less rigid agricultural policy and accommodation with the Catholic Church. It did not make Poland a free multiparty democracy. Its significance lay in the bargain: Moscow tolerated a measure of national autonomy when its essential political and security interests remained protected. Wilson Center's examination of the 1956 crises.
Hungary and the use of force
Hungarian protest moved beyond the limits negotiated in Poland. Demonstrations began in Budapest on 23 October 1956, drawing together grievances about repression, living standards and Soviet domination. Imre Nagy became prime minister. Soviet forces initially intervened, but a ceasefire and withdrawal from Budapest raised hopes that negotiation might succeed.
The movement became a revolution with demands for a plural political system and the removal of Soviet troops. Nagy restored a multiparty framework and, on 1 November, announced Hungarian neutrality and withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact. By then Moscow had already reversed its earlier willingness to consider withdrawal. Soviet leaders feared both the destruction of communist rule in Hungary and the example this might set elsewhere. The announcement of neutrality made the threat to the Soviet security system still more explicit.
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