1A - The course of the Third Crusade: leadership and internal rivalries of the Crusaders
Learn how the Third Crusade recovered coastal positions but failed to recover Jerusalem, and weigh the roles of leadership, rivalries, supply and Saladin’s resistance in that outcome.
Different routes to the East
The Third Crusade did not arrive as a single army under one commander. Guy of Lusignan began besieging Acre in 1189 while western expeditions were still travelling. Frederick Barbarossa’s overland army faced difficulties of supply and relations with Byzantium, fought its way through Anatolia, and lost its leader when he drowned in June 1190. Only part of this army subsequently reached the main campaign.
Philip II and Richard I departed in 1190 but wintered in Sicily. Disputes there drew attention to European interests as well as crusading. Philip reached Acre in April 1191. Richard’s voyage was delayed further by storms and conflict with Isaac Komnenos, the ruler of Cyprus, whom he defeated in May. Richard arrived at Acre in June.
Cyprus was a diversion from the main campaign but a useful acquisition. Its position east of the central Mediterranean offered supplies and a relatively secure base near the Holy Land. It became a lasting Latin possession, ultimately ruled by the Lusignans. A delay could therefore produce a strategic gain even while it postponed cooperation at Acre.
The loss of Frederick had a different effect: it reduced the force available and removed a prestigious leader who might have influenced coordination. Avoid treating all delays as equivalent. Each must be connected to its consequences for manpower, supplies or command. The Itinerarium’s account of Cyprus celebrates Richard, so its favourable portrayal should be separated from the independently significant fact that conquest provided a new base.
Acre and divided leadership
Acre became a contest involving three positions: the Muslim garrison inside the city, the crusaders besieging it, and Saladin’s army attacking or obstructing the besiegers from outside. This made supply and reinforcement crucial. Sea access enabled the crusaders to continue despite losses from disease and warfare. The arrival of royal forces increased pressure until the city surrendered on 12 July 1191.
Richard and Philip cooperated sufficiently to secure a major victory, but the coalition remained divided. Philip supported Conrad of Montferrat’s claim to the kingship of Jerusalem, while Richard initially supported Guy. Their European rivalry acquired an eastern setting. A dispute involving Duke Leopold of Austria’s banner after Acre’s fall also reflected tensions over honour and status.
Philip returned west after the capture of Acre, leaving a French contingent. Illness and his European responsibilities mattered, as did strained relations with Richard. Richard became the leading commander, but his command was not equivalent to unrestricted control over every crusader. Local barons, military orders and western contingents had their own experience and priorities.
The surrender terms included payments, prisoners and return of the True Cross. When their fulfilment was delayed, Richard ordered the killing of many Muslim prisoners in August. This was a calculated and violent decision, associated with his wish to move the army and avoid an unresolved hostage problem. It intensified hostility and cannot be reconciled with a simple picture of chivalrous friendship between the two commanders.
Acre shows why rivalry was damaging without being a complete explanation of failure. Competitors could still cooperate against a common target, while successful capture of one port did not settle the kingdom’s disputed leadership or solve the problem of Jerusalem.
Arsuf and the Jerusalem problem
Richard advanced south from Acre along the coast, keeping contact with ships carrying supplies. Infantry helped protect the army from harassment while mounted troops retained the capacity to counterattack. At Arsuf on 7 September 1191 the crusaders defeated Saladin’s attacking forces. Richard could continue to Jaffa, a base closer to Jerusalem, but Saladin’s army was not destroyed as the Frankish army had been at Hattin.
Jerusalem lay inland, away from the fleet. An advance towards it stretched supply lines and required reliable access to water. Bad weather could complicate movement and provisioning as much as heat did. Saladin could obstruct the surrounding countryside and remain a threat after a successful assault. Capturing the city and retaining it after western crusaders went home were different objectives.
The army approached Jerusalem in the winter of 1191–92 and again in June 1192, but did not assault it. Some crusaders pressed for the religious goal they had come to achieve. Others, including advisers familiar with local conditions, doubted whether a depleted garrison could defend it afterwards. Proposals to attack Egypt reflected the belief that weakening Saladin’s resource base might make Jerusalem more secure; disagreement over priorities made such a strategy difficult.
Richard’s withdrawals can be interpreted as excessive caution or as recognition of a genuine strategic problem. To test either argument, relate it to supply, the continued existence of Saladin’s army and the temporary character of western reinforcements. It is not enough to point to Richard’s military courage or to say that Jerusalem was holy. Neither fact establishes whether the city could be held.
Jaffa, truce and outcome
In summer 1192 Saladin attacked Jaffa, but Richard returned by sea and restored the crusaders’ position. This was another effective military response, yet both leaders faced limits. Richard was ill and received news that Philip and his brother John threatened his interests at home. Saladin’s forces were tired, supplies and money were under pressure, and another indefinite campaign could weaken his coalition.
The September 1192 agreement left Jerusalem under Muslim rule, permitted Christian pilgrimage, and recognised Frankish possession of a coastal strip. Ascalon’s fortifications were to be demolished, reducing the threat to routes towards Egypt. The truce ended immediate campaigning without deciding that either side had abandoned its ultimate religious claims.
The military outcome needs two measures. Against the declared aim of recovering Jerusalem, the crusade failed. Against the crisis following Hattin, the recovery of Acre and coastal positions was a substantial achievement. Leadership helped preserve the army and win battles; rivalry diminished cooperation; geography, supply, finite manpower and Saladin’s resistance limited what those victories could secure.
A balanced causal judgement can therefore distinguish avoidable difficulties from structural ones. Better agreement might have improved coordination, but it would not have removed Jerusalem’s inland position or the need to defend it after the main armies departed. Equally, supply cannot explain every political decision. Several causes worked together, with their importance changing between Acre, the inland advances and the final negotiations.
The Itinerarium’s account of the truce defends Richard’s decision. Its argument can be tested against the military and political constraints rather than accepted because it praises him.