2R - US containment in action in Asia: the reconstruction of Japan and US-Japanese relations
Learn why Japan became an American ally, how policy towards China, Taiwan and Korea changed, and why NSC-68 marked a shift towards more costly and militarised containment.
Reconstructing Japan as an ally
Japan's defeat in 1945 initially made preventing renewed militarism the central American occupation priority. General Douglas MacArthur, as Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, directed reforms including demilitarisation, land redistribution and changes to political institutions. The constitution that came into force in 1947 strengthened parliamentary government, extended rights and renounced war. The emperor remained, with a greatly reduced constitutional role. Occupation was dominated by the USA rather than divided into zones comparable to Germany.
By 1947–48, concern about economic weakness and communism encouraged a reverse course. Economic recovery became more important, some earlier attempts to break up large business groups were moderated, and restrictions on militant labour activity increased. American officials feared that an unstable Japan might become politically vulnerable. A prosperous Japan could instead supply industrial strength, bases and trade within a non-communist regional system. The change joined a Japanese interest in recovery to American containment priorities, without making every Japanese policy a simple American instruction.
The Korean War accelerated recovery through procurement orders and Japan's role as a supply base. The San Francisco peace treaty and US-Japanese security treaty were signed in September 1951; the occupation ended when the peace treaty took effect in April 1952. The security arrangement allowed American forces to remain. Japan thus regained sovereignty while relying heavily on the USA for defence. Former enemies had become partners because the strategic problem had changed from defeating Japanese militarism to containing communist power. The official account of occupation traces this changing emphasis.
Support for Jiang Jieshi did not prevent defeat
The USA supported Nationalist leader Jiang Jieshi, also known as Chiang Kai-shek, as a wartime ally and opponent of communism. After Japan's surrender it helped move Nationalist troops into former occupied areas and supplied assistance. General Marshall also attempted to negotiate a settlement with Mao Zedong's communists. That attempt failed; the civil war resumed on a large scale in 1946.
Nationalist military failures, corruption, inflation and declining popular support weakened the government. Communist organisation and support in rural areas helped Mao's forces. American assistance did not give Washington complete control over either movement and could not automatically overcome the Nationalists' internal weaknesses. Treating the communist victory as simply a Soviet conquest would overlook these Chinese causes. The Office of the Historian's account places US support alongside those domestic problems.
Mao proclaimed the People's Republic of China (PRC) on 1 October 1949. Jiang's government withdrew to Taiwan and continued as the Republic of China. The USA retained recognition of that government and opposed giving the PRC China's UN representation. Yet American military protection of Taiwan was not immediately a settled commitment: in January 1950 Truman stated that the USA would not intervene in a Chinese attack there.
The Korean invasion changed the calculation. On 27 June 1950, Truman ordered the Seventh Fleet into the Taiwan Strait, preventing a communist attack and restraining Nationalist attacks on the mainland. Taiwan became part of an increasingly firm containment system. This was a policy shift, not proof that protection had been guaranteed continuously since 1949.
The defensive perimeter distinguished priorities
Containment did not initially mean an identical military guarantee to every non-communist government. In his 12 January 1950 speech, Secretary of State Dean Acheson described an American Pacific defence line running through the Aleutians, Japan, the Ryukyu Islands and the Philippines. South Korea and Taiwan lay outside this stated defensive perimeter. Naval and air power could more readily defend an island chain, while continental commitments risked extensive land warfare.
The speech should not be reduced to an invitation to attack Korea. Acheson also referred to resistance by the peoples concerned and to the responsibilities of the UN. An omission from the perimeter indicated a limited direct commitment, but did not prove that the USA would never intervene. North Korean and Soviet decisions also depended on military preparations, expectations of rapid victory and their own ambitions.
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