AQA 7042 · 2O · R04 - Political instability and extremism; risings on the left and right, including the Kapp Putsch
This lesson traces how challenges from the revolutionary left and nationalist right tested the Weimar Republic between 1919 and 1924. You will connect the Kapp Putsch, the invasion of the Ruhr, the Munich Putsch and recurring coalition problems, then judge what the Republic's survival by 1924 did—and did not—prove. The central enquiry is whether failed uprisings showed growing republican strength or exposed weaknesses that had merely been contained.
Measuring political instability
Political labels need care. In early Weimar Germany, the left ranged from the Social Democratic Party (SPD), which defended parliamentary government, to revolutionaries in the Communist Party (KPD) who wanted political power to rest in workers' councils. The right ranged from conservatives willing to work within parliament to radical nationalists, paramilitaries and the early Nazi movement, which rejected the Republic. “Left” and “right” therefore do not automatically mean “extremist”.
Political extremism
The rejection of the constitutional democratic order in favour of an alternative system, combined in this lesson with willingness to use coercion or political violence to secure it.
A putsch is an attempt by a relatively small organised group to seize state power suddenly, usually by controlling key leaders, buildings, communications and armed institutions. A rising can be broader and draw on local or mass mobilisation. Neither label tells us in advance whether an attempt had substantial support or a realistic chance of lasting success.
Four tests make “instability” more precise:
| Test | Question to ask |
|---|---|
| Coercive reach | Could challengers control territory, communications or state buildings? |
| Support | Did they mobilise workers, voters, elites, police or soldiers beyond a narrow core? |
| Institutional loyalty | Would the army, police, civil service and regional governments obey the Republic? |
| Durability | Could elected governments make decisions and survive long enough to carry them out? |
Germany began this period with several destabilising conditions: defeat in war, resentment of Versailles, weapons and paramilitary organisations left by demobilisation, economic distress, and deep disagreement about whether the 1918–19 revolution had gone too far or not far enough. These conditions created opportunities, not predetermined outcomes. Political actors still had to organise, choose violence or compromise, and win support.
Risings on the left
Left-wing challenges were recurrent, but they were not one continuous, centrally directed revolution. Their aims, local support and relationship to government action differed.
| Date and place | Development | What it reveals |
|---|---|---|
| 5–12 January 1919, Berlin | After the dismissal of the USPD police president Emil Eichhorn, supporters of the USPD and KPD and the Revolutionary Shop Stewards occupied parts of Berlin. A revolutionary committee declared the government removed, but the rising lacked a clear plan and was suppressed by government forces and Freikorps. Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht were murdered after their capture. | The state defeated an improvised challenge, but its reliance on right-wing paramilitaries deepened the split between the SPD-led government and the revolutionary left. |
| 7 April–3 May 1919, Munich | A council republic was proclaimed after prolonged Bavarian upheaval. Its authority scarcely extended beyond Munich; government and Freikorps forces defeated it after violent fighting. | A regional power vacuum could sustain a rising for weeks, yet limited geographical reach and armed isolation prevented national takeover. |
| March–April 1920, Ruhr and central Germany | The general strike against Kapp developed into armed attempts by some workers to press for wider social revolution. The Red Ruhr Army reached about 50,000 armed members but had neither a single command nor a common programme. The government sent the Reichswehr and Freikorps—including men from formations associated with the right-wing coup—to suppress it. | Organised workers could mobilise on a mass scale, but defending the Republic from Kapp and seeking a council revolution were different aims. The government's uneven choice of coercive allies damaged trust. |
| March 1921, central Germany | The KPD tried to expand conflict between police and armed workers into a wider general rising. Most workers outside the strongest districts did not join, and the action was defeated. | Revolutionary organisation did not equal mass working-class consent. |
| October 1923, Saxony, Thuringia and Hamburg | The KPD entered left coalition governments in Saxony and Thuringia while armed “Proletarian Hundreds” were organised. The Reich government intervened in Saxony; plans for a broader revolution were abandoned, leaving an isolated rising in Hamburg on 23–25 October. | Severe national crisis reopened revolutionary possibilities, but limited readiness and decisive state action prevented coordinated revolt. |
The pattern is one of repeated local danger but declining national reach. The January rising and Ruhr mobilisation produced serious violence, and the Republic's methods of suppression stored up hostility. Yet the failures of 1921 and October 1923 also show that the KPD could not simply command the wider working class into revolution.
Kapp and the nationalist right
The Kapp Putsch grew from the unresolved place of the old military and the Freikorps inside the new political order. Versailles required the army to be reduced to 100,000 men and volunteer formations to be dissolved. On 29 February 1920, Defence Minister Gustav Noske ordered the dissolution of the Marinebrigade Ehrhardt and Freikorps Loewenfeld. General Walther von Lüttwitz refused to accept the order.
The attempted seizure of power followed a short but revealing chain:
- 13 March: roughly 6,000 men of the Ehrhardt brigade occupied Berlin's government district under Lüttwitz. Wolfgang Kapp declared a new government, while President Friedrich Ebert, Chancellor Gustav Bauer and most ministers left the capital.
- The Reichswehr did not defend the elected government: its leadership would not order soldiers to fire on the putschist troops. That refusal exposed a serious gap between the Republic's constitutional authority and its command of armed force.
- The putschists could seize buildings but not obedience: civil servants withheld cooperation, while trade unions and political organisations mobilised a general strike. About 12 million workers stopped work; administration, transport, communications and essential services were paralysed.
- 17 March: unable to govern, Kapp and the principal organisers fled. Physical occupation of the capital had lasted only four days because coercive appearance had not produced institutional or popular consent.
The most convincing explanation for Kapp's immediate failure is therefore the interaction of two forces: organised civilian resistance denied the putsch resources, while bureaucratic non-cooperation denied it a functioning state. The government's escape bought time, but the army's refusal was evidence of weakness rather than a republican success.
Right-wing extremism also extended beyond coups. Nationalist networks used assassination against republican politicians: former finance minister Matthias Erzberger was killed in 1921, and Foreign Minister Walther Rathenau was murdered by members of Organisation Consul on 24 June 1922. Large demonstrations defended the Republic after Rathenau's murder, but uneven enforcement of the Law for the Protection of the Republic and leniency toward right-wing offenders raised doubts about the loyalty of parts of the judiciary.
Kapp's failure thus supports two defensible readings. It demonstrated that workers, unions and officials could defend constitutional government. It also exposed an army unwilling to protect that government, a state willing to reuse anti-republican Freikorps against the left, and a continuing culture of violence on the nationalist right.
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