1A - Preaching and preparing for the Third Crusade: motives of Pope Gregory VIII
Learn how papal preaching turned the crisis of 1187 into a new crusade, why Henry II, Richard I, Philip II and Frederick Barbarossa responded, and how finance and European rivalries shaped their preparations.
Gregory VIII and penitential preaching
Pope Gregory VIII called for renewed crusading after the disaster at Hattin, issuing Audita tremendi on 29 October 1187. News travelled unevenly: the appeal developed in response to the collapse in the East and should not be treated as a reaction to a fully understood account of Jerusalem’s capture alone. Gregory died in December, so Clement III and other churchmen carried the effort forward.
Gregory explained defeat in terms of Christian sin and the need for repentance. This offered a response to a difficult religious problem: if the cause was holy, why had its defenders lost? Failure could be attributed to unworthy conduct rather than to the abandonment of Christianity by God. Prayer, fasting, reform of behaviour and a new expedition belonged to the same programme.
Penitential crusading
Undertaking an armed pilgrimage as an act of repentance, under church authority and with promised spiritual benefits. It joined warfare to the believer’s concern for salvation.
The promise of remission of sins, protection for crusaders and their property, and the duty to recover holy places helped turn distant news into a personal obligation. Preaching also pressed Christian rulers to settle their quarrels. A king who defended his lands but ignored Jerusalem risked appearing to neglect a duty shared by Christendom.
The papacy wanted to restore Christian access and rule in the Holy Land and to direct a united religious response. That strengthened its leadership role, but its authority did not provide ships, cash or direct command over royal armies. Gregory supplied a compelling framework for mobilisation; secular cooperation determined how much of it could be achieved.
Henry II and Richard I
Henry II had already supported the Holy Land financially before 1187. He took the cross in early 1188, but his position as ruler of England and extensive French lands made departure difficult. Leaving Europe while Philip II threatened those lands would expose his interests. Henry’s conflicts with his sons, particularly Richard, further complicated a joint expedition. He died in July 1189 without going east.
Henry’s most concrete contribution to preparation was financial. The Saladin tithe of 1188 required a tenth of specified income and movable property, with exemptions including knights’ military equipment. Parish clergy, royal officials and representatives of the military orders participated in collection; sworn local assessment could expose underpayment. Religious obligation was therefore supported by administrative machinery.
The ordinance of the tithe shows how kingship and church authority cooperated. Excommunication could reinforce payment, while officials and local knowledge made assessment possible. Crusading depended on people who would never travel: taxpayers and administrators helped turn a vow into an army.
Richard took the cross in 1187 and inherited the kingship in 1189. Crusading suited his commitment to warfare, honour and religious duty. As king he could mobilise resources more effectively, selling rights and offices and drawing on the revenues of his territories. He also had to secure government during his absence and make arrangements with Philip. Royal resources made a large expedition possible, but they did not free Richard from European politics.
The contrast is instructive. Henry’s failure to depart does not prove that his vow was insincere; political constraints prevented its fulfilment. Richard’s determination does not prove that he acted without worldly considerations. Faith, reputation, relations with his father, royal authority and military preparation interacted. Motive concerns why someone acted; successful preparation concerns whether he possessed the means and freedom to act.
Philip II and royal cooperation
Philip II’s participation combined the religious obligation of a Christian king with concern for his position against the Angevin rulers. Henry and Richard controlled large territories within the kingdom of France, so Philip could not ignore the opportunities and dangers created by their absence. Neither side wanted to leave its rival unrestricted in Europe.
Taking the cross alongside Henry in early 1188 created an outward commitment to peace, but renewed warfare delayed preparations. Richard’s accession eventually allowed Philip and Richard to depart together in 1190. They travelled towards the Mediterranean and wintered in Sicily before continuing by sea in 1191. Agreement over departure made participation possible; it did not erase competition over status, territories or strategy.
Philip’s resources and military leadership were important at Acre. His later early departure should not be read backwards as proof that every preparatory action was fraudulent. He did go to the East, contributed to the campaign, and left forces there after returning. Yet the rivalry that shaped preparation remained capable of damaging cooperation.
A convincing argument compares actions rather than ranking kings by an assumed quantity of faith. Richard devoted more time to the eastern campaign; Philip had stronger reasons to exploit developments in France; Henry organised finance but never departed. All responded to a shared religious appeal through different political circumstances.
Frederick and the means of crusading
Frederick Barbarossa, the Holy Roman Emperor, took the cross at Mainz in March 1188 and began his expedition in 1189. Though elderly and formerly in conflict with the papacy, he could present participation as fulfilment of a Christian emperor’s duty. His status promised a powerful contribution and an opportunity for honour. Reconciliation with papal authority made cooperation more practicable than during his earlier quarrels.
He prepared an overland army, made arrangements for supplies and passage, and left his son Henry VI to govern his European interests. Crossing Hungary, Byzantine territory and Anatolia brought different problems from a sea expedition. Negotiated access and food were essential, but distrust could turn a transit agreement into conflict. Byzantine emperor Isaac II feared the intentions of a large German army near his lands, while the Germans resented delays and obstacles.
Frederick’s death in the river Saleph in June 1190 undermined his expedition. It demonstrates the importance of personal leadership in an army assembled around an emperor: preparations and large numbers did not guarantee that a force would remain coherent after losing him. It also reminds us that hazards of travel could alter the balance before the main campaign in Palestine.
Across the three royal expeditions, mobilisation was stronger than coordination. Papal preaching gave a common purpose; rulers supplied finance and organisation; competing interests and different routes prevented a single stable command. The Third Crusade’s preparation thus reveals both the expanding capacity of the Latin West and continuing limits on its unity.
The account of Frederick’s expedition and the tithe ordinance show why preparation involved both individual authority and collective resources.