2S - Relations with and policies towards USA, particularly issue of Vietnam
Learn how Wilson tried to preserve international influence while financial pressures, war and decolonisation forced Britain to reconsider its commitments.
The USA and Vietnam
Wilson valued the American alliance for defence, intelligence, nuclear cooperation and financial support. Britain's vulnerability to sterling crises increased the importance of cooperation with Washington. The special relationship was therefore a network of practical interests as well as a diplomatic claim; it did not make the two countries equal in resources or guarantee agreement.
The escalation of American involvement in Vietnam from 1965 made that tension acute. Wilson generally supported the American position against communist expansion, yet refused to send British combat troops despite American requests. Britain already had major military commitments, particularly in Malaysia, and participation would have increased financial and political pressure. Labour's left and a growing anti-war movement opposed the conflict.
Wilson hoped to preserve access to President Lyndon Johnson while avoiding a British war. At times Britain dissociated itself from particular American bombing actions, but continued cooperation in other fields. Critics on the left thought this gave political support to a destructive war; American leaders could be frustrated by the refusal of military assistance. The policy must be judged against both pressures, rather than classifying Britain as either wholly independent or wholly obedient.
Britain also attempted mediation, drawing on its role as a co-chair of the Geneva process with the USSR. Wilson's efforts during Soviet premier Alexei Kosygin's visit in 1967 did not secure a settlement. Access to major powers offered a diplomatic role but could not make them accept Britain's preferred timing or terms. American records of discussions with Wilson show how a mediator's hopes could run into Washington's security and political concerns.
Europe and the second EEC application
Labour contained both supporters and opponents of European integration. Some feared that EEC membership would restrict socialist planning, damage Commonwealth trade or weaken national sovereignty. Others saw access to a large market and participation in European decisions as essential to modernisation. Wilson initially emphasised conditions under which entry might be acceptable rather than an unconditional commitment.
Britain's economic difficulties and the continuing development of the EEC strengthened the case for entry. The government applied in May 1967, seeking to improve trade opportunities and prevent Britain being marginalised in a developing European system. Membership was a possible route to influence and growth, not an immediate solution to sterling, productivity or investment problems. The Commons debate on the application records the government's case and the objections.
De Gaulle again blocked British entry later in 1967. He doubted Britain's economic suitability and its willingness to separate itself from American and wider international attachments. Sterling's weakness strengthened those doubts. Britain could change its assessment of Europe but could not force an existing member to agree to enlargement.
Failure left Britain outside the EEC and inside EFTA, without resolving the choice between its overlapping international relationships. It also weakened claims that Wilson's modernisation would secure a new position quickly. Continued cooperation, including the Anglo-French Concorde project, shows that relations with Europe were wider than the membership question. De Gaulle's departure in 1969 later opened possibilities, but successful accession belongs to the next period.
World affairs and the Cold War
Britain responded to world crises through NATO, the United Nations, diplomacy and selective material support. This preserved influence while limiting direct intervention. Wilson retained Britain's nuclear capability despite Labour arguments against the deterrent, showing continuity with Conservative strategic priorities alongside the rhetoric of domestic modernisation.
Relations with the USSR involved contact as well as disagreement. Kosygin's 1967 visit offered an opportunity for Vietnam diplomacy; the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1968 reflected cooperation to limit the spread of nuclear weapons. Neither meant that Britain accepted Soviet domination in Europe. The Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 undermined hopes of liberalisation there and reinforced concern over military power and the limits of détente.
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