8A.9 - Military intervention and strategic interests

Strategic interests and stated aims

A public justification describes what a government says an intervention is for; it does not necessarily reveal every interest influencing the decision.

An intervening power may seek to prevent terrorist attacks, support an ally, preserve regional influence or secure important trade routes. Protecting civilians can be a genuine aim at the same time. These motives are not mutually exclusive, but the weighting affects choices: a government might act strongly against an adversary while maintaining support for an ally accused of similar abuses. That selectivity weakens a claim that rights alone explain the geographical pattern of intervention.

Distinguish motive, justification, authorisation and outcome. A rights speech is evidence of the stated justification. Alliance documents or internal policy records can illuminate interests. A UN resolution or other legal argument addresses authority. Changes in security, services and rights concern outcomes. None substitutes for the others. Resource access should be investigated using evidence, rather than assuming every war near oil was fought only for oil.

The US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 combined security arguments concerning weapons of mass destruction with arguments concerning Saddam Hussein's rule. The UK Iraq Inquiry, published 6 July 2016, concluded that diplomatic options had not been exhausted and military action was not a last resort; it also criticised the certainty attached to intelligence and planning for the aftermath. This official retrospective challenges the decision-making case for the war. It does not make every participant's motives identical, and it is evidence about UK involvement rather than an all-purpose verdict on every later event. Inquiry executive summary, printed pp6 and 47.

Weapons, training and recipient conduct

Military support changes what a recipient can do, so its rights consequences depend on both the material supplied and the recipient's behaviour.

Training can improve logistics, civilian protection, discipline or compliance with international humanitarian law. Weapons and maintenance can increase defensive capacity. However, equipment can also be used in civilian areas, and training may strengthen an organisation that represses opposition. A donor can therefore support a state whose rights record conflicts with its own stated standards. Alliance commitments, regional security and commercial arms sales may help explain why support continues.

The US Government Accountability Office's 15 June 2022 review reported at least 54.6 billion US dollars of US Department of Defense-administered military support to Saudi Arabia and the UAE in fiscal years 2015–2021. Most consisted of articles and services, including training, purchased through Foreign Military Sales. This is not a figure for donated development aid, nor for weapons all used in Yemen. The report noted extensive reported civilian harm in Yemen and weaknesses in investigating possible unauthorised use of transferred equipment. It said the departments had not fully determined how much US support contributed to civilian harm. GAO report.