2G.2 KT2 - The Spanish Civil War, 1936-39

The Enquiry Frame

This lesson covers the exact Pearson Edexcel Paper 2 key topic The Spanish Civil War, 1936-39. It is a depth topic, so chronology and judgement both matter. You need to know what happened, but also how the balance between the two sides changed over time.

The working judgement is this: Nationalist victory was not inevitable in July 1936, but by 1938 Franco had converted the rebels' initial advantages into a coherent military and political system, while Republican survival was weakened by military disruption, internal division and the unequal effects of non-intervention. Foreign intervention mattered greatly, but it worked through Spanish conditions: German and Italian help was most effective because Franco could use it through a disciplined army and a centralising command structure.

Use this chronology as the spine of the lesson:

For Paper 2, this topic can support AO1 essays on causation and consequence and AO2 source questions. In source work, always ask whether a source comes from a Republican, Nationalist, foreign diplomatic, church, military, journalistic or survivor perspective. The Civil War produced propaganda from every side, and source value often lies in what a source reveals about fear, priorities and assumptions, not only in whether every factual claim is neutral.

Outbreak and Balance, July-August 1936

The military rising began in Spanish Morocco on 17 July 1936 and spread to the mainland on 18 July. Its planners, especially General Emilio Mola, hoped for a rapid seizure of power. General Jose Sanjurjo was expected to provide symbolic senior leadership, but he died in a plane crash on 20 July. General Francisco Franco flew from the Canary Islands to take command of the Army of Africa, while other rebel commanders included Mola in the north and Gonzalo Queipo de Llano in Seville.

The coup failed in the most important sense: it did not take the whole country. It succeeded where rebel officers, conservative forces and local right-wing networks could impose martial law quickly. It failed in major urban and industrial centres where workers' organisations, loyal police, loyal officers and Republican supporters resisted. In Barcelona, anarchist and socialist workers helped defeat the rising. In Madrid, the capital remained Republican. The Republic survived, but the normal state was badly damaged. Many officers had rebelled or were distrusted; arms were distributed to unions and militias; revolutionary committees took power in some localities. That meant the Republic held legitimacy and resources, but not a stable army at the start.

The rival coalitions were broad rather than tidy.

The geographical division of Spain shaped the whole war. The Nationalists held much of north-western and central conservative Spain, including Galicia, Old Castile and Navarre, and important southern positions around Seville, Cadiz and Cordoba, as well as Spanish Morocco. The Republic held the capital, much of the Mediterranean east, Catalonia, Valencia, much of La Mancha and the industrial north: the Basque Country, Santander and Asturias. This was not just a map. It determined food, coal, industry, ports, railways, recruitment and morale.

At first glance the Republic seemed to have major advantages: the capital, the gold reserves, much of the fleet, important cities and industry. Yet the Nationalists had one vital military advantage: the Army of Africa, including the Spanish Foreign Legion and Moroccan Regulares. These were among Spain's most experienced and ruthless troops. The problem for Franco was that they were in Morocco, separated from mainland Spain by the Strait of Gibraltar. The Republic's navy could have made that obstacle decisive.

Foreign intervention changed the early balance. Germany and Italy supplied aircraft that helped carry Franco's Moroccan troops to southern Spain. That airlift did not win the war by itself, but it prevented the Nationalist rising in the south from being strangled before it could expand. Britain and France, fearing that the Spanish conflict might trigger a wider European war, moved towards non-intervention. France briefly considered help for the Republic, but domestic and British pressure pushed it back. The significance was unequal: the elected Republic was denied normal access to legal arms markets, while Germany and Italy quickly ignored the spirit of non-intervention in favour of Franco.

By the end of August 1936, the situation was clear. Spain was not experiencing a short coup but a civil war. The Nationalists had linked their northern and southern zones after taking Merida and Badajoz in mid-August. The capture of Badajoz was militarily useful and politically terrifying because it was followed by mass killings. Republican Madrid still held, Barcelona was in revolutionary Republican hands, and the industrial north around the Basque Country, Santander and Asturias remained outside Nationalist control. Both sides had enough strength to continue, but neither had enough to finish the war quickly.

Nationalist Advance and Republican Resistance

The course of the war is best understood as a series of Nationalist advances interrupted by Republican resistance and counter-offensives. Franco did not win through one sudden breakthrough. He won through stages: linking rebel territories in 1936, failing to take Madrid, conquering the north in 1937, splitting Republican Spain in 1938, then destroying Catalonia and entering Madrid in 1939.

The first major Nationalist advance came from the south. The Army of Africa crossed to Andalusia and moved north through Extremadura. The capture of Badajoz on 14 August 1936 linked the Nationalist south with the northern rebel zone. This was strategically crucial: Franco could now move men and supplies through a larger connected territory. It also showed the character of Nationalist war. Terror followed conquest, intended to punish enemies and prevent resistance in the rear.

Franco then faced a choice. He could press directly towards Madrid, or divert to Toledo to relieve Nationalist defenders besieged in the Alcazar. In September 1936 he chose Toledo. Militarily this gave Madrid more time to prepare; politically it was a triumph of symbolism. The relief of the Alcazar presented Franco as the saviour of heroic Nationalist Spain. On 1 October 1936, he was proclaimed Generalisimo and Head of State by the Nationalist leadership. This was a turning point because Nationalist command increasingly centred on one man.

The Battle for Madrid began in November 1936. The Republican government moved to Valencia, but Madrid did not collapse. General Jose Miaja and Vicente Rojo helped organise the defence; workers, militia units, regularising Republican forces and the first International Brigades helped stiffen resistance. Soviet tanks and aircraft also mattered. Madrid became a symbol: "No pasaran" expressed the idea that stopping Franco at the capital was not only a military task but a defence of the Republic and anti-fascism. The Nationalists reached the outskirts and fought in the University City area, but they did not take the capital. This failure made the war longer and more international.

In early 1937 Franco tried to isolate Madrid rather than storm it frontally. The battles of Jarama in February and Guadalajara in March were part of that effort. Jarama threatened the Madrid-Valencia road but did not cut Madrid off. Guadalajara was especially important because Italian forces fighting for Franco were beaten by Republican troops. It proved that foreign help did not make Nationalist victory automatic, and it boosted Republican morale. Yet the Republic could not convert these defensive successes into a strategic victory.

Franco then turned north. The northern campaign of 1937 was one of the war's decisive stages. The Republican north was isolated from the main Republican zone and contained valuable coal, iron, shipbuilding and industry. The Basque Country also had a distinctive political position: many Basque nationalists were Catholic and socially conservative, but they opposed Franco because they wanted autonomy. The bombing of Guernica on 26 April 1937 by German and Italian aircraft supporting the Nationalist offensive became an international symbol of civilian vulnerability to air power. Bilbao fell on 19 June 1937; Santander fell in August; Asturias fell in October. By the end of the northern campaign the Republic had lost major resources and the Nationalists had gained industry, ports and a stronger war economy.

The Republic tried to relieve pressure through offensives at Brunete in July 1937 and Belchite in August-September. These offensives showed courage and some improvement in Republican military organisation, but they did not reverse the strategic trend. They consumed troops and equipment without preventing the loss of the north.

In winter 1937-38, the Republic captured Teruel, but Franco retook it in February 1938. He then launched the Aragon offensive. By 15 April 1938, Nationalist forces reached the Mediterranean near Vinaros, splitting Republican territory in two. This was devastating because Catalonia was cut off from the central-southern Republican zone around Madrid and Valencia.

The Republic's last great effort was the Battle of the Ebro, from July to November 1938. Republican forces crossed the Ebro River to reunite territory, restore morale and show Britain and France that the Republic was still a fighting force. The offensive surprised the Nationalists, but Franco chose attrition. With superior artillery, air support and reserves, the Nationalists wore down the Republic's best remaining troops. When the fighting ended in November, the Republic had not regained the strategic initiative.

The final stage was rapid. Franco attacked Catalonia in December 1938. Barcelona fell on 26 January 1939, and hundreds of thousands of soldiers and civilians fled towards France. Britain and France recognised Franco's government in late February. Inside the remaining Republican zone, Colonel Segismundo Casado led a coup in Madrid in March 1939 against Juan Negrin's policy of continued resistance. Casado hoped to negotiate with Franco, but Franco insisted on unconditional surrender. Nationalist troops entered Madrid on 28 March 1939, and Franco declared victory on 1 April.

The key judgement on the course of the war is that the Republic repeatedly showed resilience, but mostly in defensive or costly counter-offensive form. Franco's forces gained ground in stages, and each stage made the next easier: linking territory, surviving Madrid, taking northern resources, splitting the Republic, exhausting it at the Ebro and then taking Catalonia.

Division, Atrocity and Political War

The Spanish Civil War was fought by armies, but it was also a political war over what Spain should become. That explains why internal division and atrocity are not side issues. They shaped military effectiveness, foreign perceptions, morale and post-war memory.

The Republican coalition contained liberals, socialists, communists, anarchists, trade unionists and regional nationalists. These groups agreed that Franco had to be defeated, but they did not agree on the meaning of the war. For anarchists and some revolutionary socialists, especially in Catalonia and Aragon, the war opened the possibility of social revolution: collectivised land, workers' control, anti-clerical action and local committees. For moderate republicans and many socialists, the priority was to defend the legal Republic and rebuild a disciplined state. For communists, whose influence grew with Soviet aid, the priority was "win the war first" through a centralised army, order in the rear and Popular Front discipline.

This disagreement mattered militarily. Militias were brave but often unevenly trained, locally loyal and resistant to central command. The Republic had to build a new Popular Army while fighting a war. That took time. Political mistrust also damaged command: officers could be suspected of disloyalty, anarchist units distrusted communist control, and regional priorities did not always match central strategy. The Republic improved over time, especially under commanders such as Vicente Rojo, but it never fully escaped the costs of having to build a state and an army at the same time.

The sharpest internal Republican crisis came in the Barcelona May Days of 1937. Fighting broke out between anarchist/POUM forces and forces aligned with the Catalan government and communists after a conflict over control of the telephone exchange. The deeper issue was whether the revolution in Catalonia should continue alongside the war, or be subordinated to centralised anti-fascist discipline. The violence weakened the anti-Franco cause and contributed to the fall of Largo Caballero's government. Juan Negrin became prime minister in May 1937, and communist influence within the Republican war effort increased. The POUM was suppressed and its leader Andreu Nin was murdered after abduction. This showed how Republican unity could fracture under pressure.