1F Theme 1 - The changing political environment, 1917-80

The Enquiry Frame

This topic is a breadth theme. It is not asking for a biography of every president
from Wilson to Carter. It is asking how the political environment changed:
the assumptions voters held, the powers presidents used, the domestic effect of
war and the arguments that divided liberals and conservatives.

The specification has three strands:

A good essay will avoid a simple "America became more liberal" story. There was
real change: the federal government became far more active after 1933, the
presidency became more institutional and media-centred after 1945, and war made
foreign policy a permanent domestic issue. But there were also strong
continuities: suspicion of big government, anti-communism, faith in capitalism,
racial and regional divisions, and the ability of conservatives to turn
liberal reform into a political target.

Use these dates as your anchor points:

Normalcy, Republicanism and Limits, 1917-33

The first part of the topic begins with reaction. The United States entered the
First World War in April 1917, mobilised the economy, restricted dissent through
wartime laws and accepted a larger federal role than many Americans were used to.
The war ended in November 1918, but its domestic effects did not disappear. The
Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, strikes in 1919, anarchist bombings and fear of
radical immigrants fed the First Red Scare. Attorney General A. Mitchell
Palmer's raids in 1919-20 showed how anti-radical politics could merge concern
about public order, anti-immigrant feeling and attacks on the left.

This helps explain the rise of Republicanism to 1933. Republicanism here
means the dominance of the Republican Party and its political assumptions, not
the general idea of a republic. In 1920 Warren Harding offered a "return to
normalcy". The phrase worked because many voters wanted release from Wilsonian
wartime mobilisation, moral crusading and internationalism. Harding, Coolidge and
Hoover did not all govern identically, but the 1920s Republican settlement had
recognisable features:

The "normalcy" mood also explains the commitment to isolationism, 1917-41,
but be careful with the word. The United States did not become economically
isolated. It sought markets, loans, debt repayments and naval agreements. The
Washington Naval Conference of 1921-22, the Dawes Plan of 1924 and the
Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 all show continued international engagement.
Isolationism meant avoiding permanent political and military commitments,
especially the type of collective security Wilson had associated with the League
of Nations. The Senate's refusal to ratify the Treaty of Versailles and League
membership in 1919-20 was therefore both a foreign-policy decision and a domestic
political statement: Congress, not the president, would decide how far America
was tied to world conflict.

The weakness of Republicanism was exposed after 1929. The Depression was not
caused by one president, but it destroyed the credibility of the existing
political language. Hoover did not simply "do nothing": he backed the Federal
Farm Board, public works, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation in 1932 and
other limited federal measures. Yet these policies still relied heavily on
voluntarism, loans, local relief and confidence. By 1932, with bank failures,
foreclosures, huge unemployment and the Bonus Army episode damaging Hoover's
authority, many Americans concluded that the old balance between individualism,
business confidence and limited federal action had failed.

That is why 1932-33 is a major turning point in this topic. Franklin Roosevelt's
election did not just replace a Republican with a Democrat. It changed the
argument about what national government was for. Republicanism had risen because
it seemed to promise peace, prosperity and normality after World War I. It
declined because the Depression made normality look like drift.

Roosevelt, New Deal and War Shift, 1933-41

Roosevelt's influence was so important because he changed both policy and
political expectations. In March 1933 he inherited a banking collapse and used
emergency powers, a special session of Congress and radio "fireside chats" to
create a sense of action. The Hundred Days produced a rush of legislation for
banking, relief, agriculture and industry. The Emergency Banking Act and bank
holiday helped restore confidence; later measures such as the Works Progress
Administration, Wagner Act and Social Security Act made federal government a
permanent actor in employment, labour relations and welfare.

This was the shift from rugged individualism to New Deal ideas. The New Deal
did not abolish capitalism and it was often experimental, inconsistent and
pragmatic. Its central political message was different from the 1920s: when
markets failed on a national scale, national government had a responsibility to
intervene.

Roosevelt's political genius was to occupy the centre ground of crisis politics.
To conservatives, he could look dangerously collectivist. To socialists and some
populists, he did not go far enough. To many voters, however, he offered action
without revolution. The result was a durable Democratic coalition, helped by
urban voters, many workers, many immigrants, sections of the South and increasing
support from African American voters. Do not turn this into a civil-rights
lesson, but do recognise the political point: the party system was being
reshaped.

There were limits. The Supreme Court struck down some early New Deal measures;
Roosevelt's court-packing plan in 1937 damaged him; the 1937-38 recession
weakened claims of complete recovery; and a conservative coalition of Republicans
and southern Democrats restricted further reform by the late 1930s. The New Deal
therefore created a new political settlement, but it also created a new
conservative target: "big government".

War then altered domestic politics again. In the 1930s, Congress passed
Neutrality Acts because many Americans believed involvement in World War I had
been a costly mistake encouraged by bankers, arms manufacturers and Wilsonian
idealism. Roosevelt was more internationalist than Congress, but he moved
carefully because he needed political support for the New Deal. The 1939
"cash-and-carry" revision and the Lend-Lease Act of March 1941 marked a shift
away from strict neutrality before Pearl Harbor. They showed how the presidency
could use national security arguments to stretch the domestic boundaries of what
was politically possible.

By 1941, then, the political environment had changed twice: first through
Depression and New Deal, then through the approach of world war. A strong exam
answer should see the interaction. Roosevelt's domestic authority helped him
lead opinion towards aid to the Allies; the war then strengthened the
presidency, federal administration and economic planning even beyond the New
Deal.

Cold War Presidency and Anti-Communism, 1941-60

The specification says the United States emerged as a Cold War superpower from
1941. This does not mean the Cold War began in 1941. It means the process that
made the United States a permanent global power began with World War II
mobilisation. The war expanded federal spending, scientific research, military
planning, executive authority and public acceptance that American security could
depend on events far beyond the western hemisphere.

After 1945, this became a Cold War political system. Truman accepted the United
Nations, supported reconstruction, and by 1947 announced the Truman Doctrine.
That doctrine committed the United States to political, military and economic
aid for states threatened by authoritarian or communist pressure. The Marshall
Plan, Berlin Airlift and NATO followed. The National Security Act of 1947
created the National Security Council, the CIA and a more unified defence
structure. These institutions mattered domestically because they gave presidents
new permanent machinery for foreign and defence policy.

The Cold War also reshaped the language of domestic politics. Anti-communism
became a test of patriotism, competence and party loyalty: