6.1 - Realism, anarchy and the security dilemma

States, survival and sovereignty

A state can lose markets and recover, but losing control of its territory can threaten its continued existence. Realism therefore starts with survival: governments must protect their state in a world where other states can possess the means to harm it.

Sovereignty means supreme authority within a state's territory and independence from an external superior. Legal independence does not mean unlimited practical freedom. A small state may be formally sovereign while depending on a stronger neighbour for energy or protection. Realists ask how such dependence affects its capacity to act.

States are the key actors because governments command armed forces, make binding public decisions and negotiate agreements in their states' names. Corporations, campaigners and international organisations matter, but realists expect their influence to be constrained when a government considers its security at stake. This is a claim about relative importance, not a claim that non-state actors do nothing.

Power is the ability to influence outcomes. Military capabilities are particularly important to realism because force can threaten survival, but economic resources help finance those capabilities and create bargaining influence. National interest identifies the goals a government treats as necessary for its state, especially security. Identifying an interest does not establish that every action claimed to defend it is lawful or wise.

On 25 February 2022, Russia vetoed a Security Council draft condemning its military offensive against Ukraine despite eleven votes in favour. The UN meeting record confirms the vote. A realist inference is that an institution's ability to restrain a powerful member depends on its power structure. This one decision cannot establish that every UN activity is ineffective; it identifies a specific limit when a permanent member's interests and collective action clash.

Anarchy, self-help and the possibility of war

Domestic and international politics differ in who can enforce a decision. A domestic government can normally enforce law against individuals; there is no equivalent authority standing above all sovereign states.

Because there is no guaranteed protector, a state must consider self-help: arranging the resources and relationships needed to defend itself. Self-help can include an alliance. It does not mean acting alone; it means that a government cannot assume an external institution will always rescue it.

Uncertainty matters as much as present intentions. Another government may promise peace today, but its leadership, aims or capabilities may change. A state may therefore prepare for danger without believing that an attack is imminent. The reasoning runs from anarchy to uncertainty, from uncertainty to caution, and from caution to the accumulation of power.

The specification's realist claim about the inevitability of war concerns the recurring possibility and persistence of war in the states system. Realists doubt that goodwill or institutions can permanently eliminate it while rival states remain able to use force. It does not follow that every pair of states must fight, that peace never lasts, or that an arms increase automatically causes a war. Deterrence and a favourable balance may preserve peace precisely because governments take the risk of conflict seriously.

Nor is explaining a war the same as endorsing it. A realist explanation investigates security interests, capabilities and calculations. It does not remove a state's responsibility for its choices or convert aggression into legitimate self-defence.

The balance of power and deterrence

Anarchy does not leave states with only the choice of surrender or immediate war. They can try to prevent a rival from becoming strong enough to dominate them.

The balance of power is a distribution of capabilities that restrains domination by a state or group. A state can balance internally by improving its own resources, or externally by cooperating with others. Equality in every weapon or economic indicator is unnecessary: the question is whether the opposing capabilities make domination difficult or costly.

Deterrence seeks to prevent an action by making its expected costs unacceptable. A military commitment must be credible to influence an opponent's calculation. Resources without a believable willingness to use them may deter little; threats without sufficient resources may also fail. The balance therefore involves perceptions as well as inventories.