1.2 - Constitutional reform since 2010

Fixed terms and their reversal

The rules governing election timing affect the balance of power between a prime minister and the Commons.

The Conservative–Liberal Democrat Coalition's Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011 set a default five-year election cycle and limited the ordinary route to an early election. An early election could be triggered by a motion supported by two-thirds of all Commons seats, or following the specified no-confidence process if confidence was not restored within 14 days. This was intended to make timing more predictable and reduce the prime minister's unilateral electoral advantage. It also helped provide stability for the coalition agreement. The Commons Library describes the supermajority mechanism and its use.

The restriction could be bypassed through a new Act. The Early Parliamentary General Election Act 2019 authorised the December 2019 election after attempts to obtain the 2011 Act's two-thirds majority had failed. An ordinary majority could change the legal route: this demonstrates the difference between a demanding procedure inside an Act and full entrenchment against later legislation.

The Dissolution and Calling of Parliament Act 2022 repealed the 2011 Act and revived the relevant prerogative powers. The monarch now dissolves Parliament at the prime minister's request within the constitutional framework, and an undissolved Parliament automatically ends after five years. It is incorrect to say that the repeal removed every maximum duration or that the 2011 Act is still the current rule. The enacted 2022 Act establishes the reversal.

The political evaluation cuts both ways. Predictable timing can restrain executive opportunism, but restrictive early-election rules can prolong deadlock when government lacks effective support. Restoring flexibility can resolve that problem while returning an advantage over timing to the executive. Which benefit carries more weight depends on whether the criterion is stability, accountability or the ability to escape a parliamentary impasse.

If you sit in 2027: Issue 3 specifically separates Coalition reforms in 2010–15, including the Fixed-term Parliaments Act and further Welsh devolution, from major post-2015 reforms, including Scottish devolution after the independence referendum. Issue 4 groups major post-2010 changes under the Lords, devolution, electoral reform and human rights. Learn the dated stages below, including the repeal of the 2011 Act; the older scope never requires stating repealed law as current.

Incremental and hereditary Lords reform

Lords reform shows why a proposal, an Act and its implementation must be distinguished.

The Coalition's 2012 House of Lords Reform Bill proposed a largely elected second chamber but was abandoned. It did not make the Lords elected. Smaller changes succeeded: the House of Lords Reform Act 2014 allowed retirement and provided for loss of membership in specified circumstances; the House of Lords (Expulsion and Suspension) Act 2015 strengthened the House's disciplinary powers. Parliament's history and Erskine May's account of sanctions explain the different mechanisms.

The House of Lords (Hereditary Peers) Act 2026 received Royal Assent on 18 March 2026. Hereditary membership under the historical 1999 exception ended at the close of the session on 29 April 2026. Some former hereditary members returned through life peerages, but their new membership rests on appointment, not inheritance. Parliament's current account confirms implementation.

This completes removal of hereditary entitlement more than a quarter-century after the 1999 compromise. It addresses one objection to legitimacy, while leaving a predominantly appointed chamber. Retirement and discipline address membership management and standards; they are not the same as democratic election. Nor did the 2026 hereditary reform create equality of power between the Commons and Lords.

Proposals for further changes, including retirement rules or an alternative chamber, must not be described as enacted merely because a government or committee supports them. The secure evidence here establishes the end of hereditary entitlement; it does not establish a fully elected chamber or a comprehensive new retirement regime.

A judgement that reform was significant but incomplete can therefore be precise: significant against the criterion of removing inherited privileges, incomplete against direct electoral accountability. A rival defence of appointment can cite expertise and freedom from immediate electoral pressures, while acknowledging continuing concerns over patronage.

Further national devolution

National devolution has developed through successive laws and referendums rather than one identical settlement for all nations.

Senedd Research explains the Welsh stages; the Wales Act notes explain reservations. The Scotland Act 2012 and 2016 explanatory notes distinguish the Scottish powers.

In a reserved-powers model, matters not reserved to Westminster are generally within devolved competence, subject to other legal limits. This is different from listing only the powers granted. Scotland and Wales can now make more choices about both spending and some revenue, increasing responsibility for policy consequences. Their powers are still not identical: Scotland can vary relevant income-tax bands, whereas Welsh powers concern Welsh rates within UK bands; neither controls every tax.

Scotland voted against independence in 2014. The additional powers that followed were devolution within the UK, not independence or federal sovereignty. Statutory recognition of the Scottish and Welsh institutions' permanence and of the Sewel convention strengthens their constitutional standing, while Westminster's ultimate legislative authority remains. Miller (2017) confirmed the political character of the convention. The judgment is evidence for that legal distinction.