B7, key topic 5 - The attempts to find a lasting peace, 1987–2012

First Intifada Pressure

The first Intifada began in December 1987 after a traffic incident in Gaza killed four Palestinian workers. The anger behind it was much deeper than one incident. Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza were frustrated by occupation, settlement growth, land issues, unemployment, restrictions and the weakness of existing diplomacy. The uprising spread through demonstrations, strikes, boycotts, stone-throwing and local organisation.

Its impact was large because it changed how the conflict looked. Earlier Arab-Israeli wars had often been wars between states. The Intifada put occupied Palestinian society at the centre of world attention. Television images of young Palestinians confronting Israeli soldiers made Israel's control of the occupied territories look costly politically, morally and financially.

The Intifada also changed Palestinian politics. Local activists in the occupied territories became more important, and the PLO leadership in Tunis could not ignore them. They also faced competition from Hamas, founded during the Intifada, which rejected compromise with Israel. In 1988 the PLO moved towards a more pragmatic position by accepting the idea of negotiations based on UN Resolutions 242 and 338 and recognising Israel's right to exist.

For Israel, the uprising created a security and political problem. Repression alone did not end it, and many Israelis wanted a way to reduce the burden of ruling over Palestinians. In 1992, a Labour government under Yitzhak Rabin came to power with a stronger mandate to negotiate than the previous Likud government.

By the early 1990s, Arafat and the PLO also faced weakened Arab financial support after the Gulf War, adding pressure to regain a political role. For the USA, the end of the Cold War and the 1991 Gulf War created a chance to sponsor diplomacy. The Madrid Conference of 1991 did not solve the conflict, but it helped make direct and indirect negotiation more normal.

The first Intifada therefore did not create peace by itself. It created pressure. It showed that the status quo was unstable and helped push both Israeli and Palestinian leaders towards the Oslo process.

Motives And Opponents

Attempts at peace depended on what each actor wanted. A useful answer does not treat "Israel", "the Palestinians" or "the USA" as if each side had one simple view.

These motives help explain why the peace process was fragile. Oslo depended on mutual recognition, but important groups on both sides rejected the price of recognition. Israeli opponents feared terrorism and territorial withdrawal. Palestinian opponents feared that Oslo gave Israel recognition without guaranteeing a full end to occupation, settlements or refugee grievances.

The USA's role was also double-edged. American sponsorship gave talks prestige and resources, but many Palestinians saw the USA as too close to Israel, while many Israelis expected the USA to protect Israeli security needs. That made the USA powerful but not always trusted as a neutral enforcer.

Misconception check: opposition to Oslo did not come from one side only. Hamas and Hezbollah opposed compromise with Israel; Netanyahu and much of the Israeli right opposed or distrusted the Oslo framework; some Palestinians also criticised Arafat for accepting limited self-rule before final issues were settled.

Oslo Terms And Results

The Oslo Peace Accords began with secret talks in Norway and were publicly signed in Washington on 13 September 1993. The famous handshake between Rabin and Arafat mattered symbolically because Israel and the PLO had treated each other as enemies for decades.

The breakthrough was mutual recognition. The PLO recognised Israel's right to exist and renounced terrorism. Israel recognised the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people and agreed to negotiate with it.

The 1993 Declaration of Principles created an interim framework:

The results were important but incomplete. Arafat returned to Gaza in 1994, and the Palestinian Authority was established. Oslo II in 1995 expanded Palestinian self-rule in parts of the West Bank and created elections for Palestinian institutions. The peace process also created international aid, new security arrangements and a sense that two-state diplomacy was possible.

However, the deferred issues were exactly the hardest ones. Oslo did not decide the status of Jerusalem. It did not settle refugees' claims. It did not create agreed borders. It did not stop disputes about settlements. It did not end the occupation in all of the West Bank and Gaza. For many Palestinians, this meant self-rule without real sovereignty. For many Israelis, it meant taking security risks before terrorism had ended.

That is why "terms" and "results" must be separated. The terms created a process. The results created limited self-rule and international hope. They did not create lasting peace.

Model mini-paragraph:

The Oslo Accords were significant because they produced mutual recognition and created the Palestinian Authority, giving Palestinians limited self-rule in Gaza, Jericho and later parts of the West Bank. However, they were only interim agreements. By postponing Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, borders and final security arrangements, Oslo left the deepest causes of conflict unresolved.