6, key topic 4 - Three crises: Berlin, Cuba and Czechoslovakia

U-2 and Paris

By 1960, the USA and USSR were publicly talking about reducing tension, but privately they were still trying to measure each other's military strength. The U.S. used high-altitude U-2 reconnaissance planes to photograph Soviet military sites. American leaders believed this was necessary because Soviet missile claims were hard to verify and because Khrushchev had rejected open inspection of military facilities.

On 1 May 1960, a U-2 plane flown by Francis Gary Powers was shot down over Soviet territory near Sverdlovsk. The timing was explosive: a Paris Summit Conference was due to bring Eisenhower, Khrushchev, Macmillan, and de Gaulle together to discuss issues including Berlin, disarmament, nuclear testing, and the general easing of tension.

At first, the U.S. claimed that the aircraft was a weather plane that had drifted off course after the pilot became ill. That cover story collapsed when Khrushchev revealed that Powers was alive and that Soviet forces had recovered parts of the aircraft and its camera equipment. The incident was no longer just a secret intelligence failure; it was a public embarrassment.

The key effect on the Paris Summit was trust. Khrushchev demanded that Eisenhower apologise, punish those responsible, and promise to stop U-2 overflights. Eisenhower accepted responsibility for the programme but refused a formal apology. Khrushchev then withdrew from meaningful negotiation at Paris.

That mattered for two reasons. First, it ended hopes that the summit would reduce tension over Berlin or arms control. Second, it showed that peaceful coexistence was fragile: one exposed act of spying could destroy months of diplomatic preparation.

A strong explanation links event to consequence:

Misconception check: the U-2 incident did not start the Cold War, and spying was not unusual in the Cold War. Its significance was that it became visible at exactly the wrong moment, just before a summit where both sides needed trust and prestige.

Why the Wall was built

Berlin was a problem because West Berlin sat deep inside East Germany but remained under Western control. It was not just a city; it was a permanent comparison. West Berlin displayed Western prosperity and political freedom inside the Soviet sphere, while East Germany struggled to keep people from leaving.

The most important immediate reason for building the Berlin Wall was the refugee problem. Before August 1961, many East Germans could travel into East Berlin and then cross into West Berlin. From there they could move to West Germany. This created several connected problems for the East German government and the Soviet Union:

The refugee problem also interacted with superpower tension. Khrushchev had already pressured the West over Berlin, demanding that Western powers leave West Berlin. Kennedy refused to abandon the city. At Vienna in June 1961, Kennedy and Khrushchev failed to solve the Berlin question. Khrushchev then faced a choice: keep threatening Western access to Berlin, which risked war, or allow East Germany to seal the border inside Berlin, which would stop the refugee flow without directly attacking Western rights in West Berlin.

On 13 August 1961, East German forces closed the border between East and West Berlin. At first the barrier was barbed wire and street obstructions. It was later developed into concrete walls, guard towers, checkpoints, and a heavily controlled border system.

The Wall therefore had several causes, but they were not equal. The refugee problem was the direct trigger. Soviet and East German prestige gave that trigger political urgency. The superpower standoff over Berlin shaped the method: a wall through Berlin was less risky than a blockade of West Berlin, but still a dramatic act of Cold War division.

Judge causal importance by distinguishing the immediate problem, the political stakes and the reason a particular solution was chosen.

Effects of the Wall

The Berlin Wall had different effects depending on who experienced it. For East Germans and West Germans, it was a human and national division. For the superpowers, it was both a provocation and a strange kind of stabiliser.

For Germany, the Wall deepened division. Families, friends, and workplaces were split. East Germans who had expected to leave could no longer do so legally. The Wall also helped the East German state survive because it stopped the most visible route of escape and slowed the loss of skilled workers. In that sense, it was both a symbol of communist weakness and a tool of communist control.

For West Berliners, the Wall was frightening because it showed how vulnerable the city was. Yet the Western powers did not abandon West Berlin. Kennedy sent Vice President Lyndon Johnson and General Lucius Clay to show support, and U.S. troops were mobilised. Western governments condemned the Wall, but they did not try to tear it down by force.

This is important for judging superpower relations. The Wall worsened relations because it made the division of Europe physical and brutal. It led to flashpoints such as the Checkpoint Charlie tank standoff in October 1961, when U.S. and Soviet tanks faced each other across the crossing point. A mistake could have escalated dangerously.

At the same time, the Wall reduced one immediate cause of crisis: the refugee flow through Berlin. Kennedy's reported attitude was that a wall was a bad outcome, but less dangerous than war. The West could condemn the Wall while accepting that it did not block Western access to West Berlin in the way a Soviet blockade would have done.

So the effect was double-edged:

Exam-answer thinking: if asked for effects, do not only describe the Wall itself. Explain consequences. "The Wall was built from concrete" is a feature. "It stopped many East Germans leaving, which stabilised the GDR but made the division of Germany harsher" is an effect.

Bay of Pigs

The Cuban crisis began before missiles were discovered. In 1959, Fidel Castro overthrew Batista and came to power in Cuba. The U.S. distrusted Castro because he nationalised or took over U.S.-linked economic assets, moved closer to the Soviet Union, and created a communist-aligned state close to the United States.

Under Eisenhower, the CIA developed a plan to train Cuban exiles to invade Cuba and overthrow Castro. Kennedy inherited the plan and allowed it to go ahead in April 1961. The invading force was Brigade 2506, made up of anti-Castro Cuban exiles.

The plan had a major weakness: it depended on things happening quickly and secretly. U.S. support was supposed to be deniable. Cuban air power was supposed to be weakened. The exiles were expected to create a foothold and encourage a wider uprising against Castro. In practice, each of those assumptions failed.