B5, key topic 5 - The UN at bay, 1990–2011

New Hopes, New Conflicts

The end of the Cold War changed the UN's role. During the Cold War, the Security Council had often been blocked by rivalry between the USA and USSR. After 1990, there was more room for agreement, especially when Iraq invaded Kuwait. Some people hoped the UN could now act as the central guardian of international peace.

The problem was that the conflicts of the 1990s were often hard for traditional peacekeeping. Classic UN peacekeeping worked best when there was a ceasefire, identifiable sides, consent from the parties and a limited job: observe, separate forces, report and reduce tension. By contrast, Somalia and Bosnia involved collapsing authority, armed factions, ethnic cleansing, humanitarian crisis and civilians trapped inside war zones.

UN peacekeeping is usually built around three principles:

This is why "the UN at bay" is a useful phrase. The UN was not absent. It was stretched. It faced urgent demands that exceeded its resources and sometimes its clear mandate, while member states were reluctant to provide enough support.

Misconception check: the UN does not own a permanent world army. It depends on member states for troops, money, equipment, political backing and Security Council decisions.

Somalia: State Collapse

Somalia showed how difficult it was to keep peace where there was no stable state and no reliable peace agreement. In 1991, Somalia's government collapsed after the fall of Siad Barre. Rival clan-based factions fought for power, especially in and around Mogadishu. Civil war and drought helped create famine, while armed groups looted aid and attacked relief efforts.

The UN first tried a limited mission, UNOSOM I, from 1992 to 1993. Its task was linked to monitoring a ceasefire and helping humanitarian work. This was not enough because the security situation was too dangerous. Aid agencies needed protection, but the UN had too few troops and too little control over the armed factions.

The United States then led UNITAF, a multinational force authorised by the UN, to secure humanitarian relief. This had some short-term success in opening routes for aid. UNOSOM II was established in March 1993 and took over from UNITAF in May with a stronger mandate. It aimed not only to protect aid but also to support law and order, disarmament and national reconciliation.

That wider aim proved too ambitious. The mission moved from relief protection towards trying to shape Somalia's political and security future. Fighting with forces linked to Mohamed Farah Aidid made the UN and US presence look like a party to the conflict rather than a neutral helper. The deaths of US troops in Mogadishu in October 1993, often remembered through the "Black Hawk Down" episode, damaged American willingness to stay. Other member states also became less willing to bear the risks.

UNOSOM II withdrew in March 1995. The key lesson was not that humanitarian action was pointless. It was that relief, peace enforcement and state-building could not be joined together successfully without local cooperation, credible force, and sustained member-state support.

Bosnia And The Balkans

The break-up of Yugoslavia created a second major test. From 1991, wars spread across the Balkans as republics declared independence and nationalist leaders fought over borders, territory and populations. Bosnia was the sharpest example for the UN because Bosnian Muslims, Serbs and Croats were caught in a brutal war between 1992 and 1995.

UNPROFOR had first been created for Croatia, then its role was extended. In Bosnia, it helped deliver humanitarian relief, supported Sarajevo airport operations, monitored no-fly zones and became linked to UN "safe areas". The aim was to reduce suffering and create space for diplomacy. The problem was that the UN was being asked to protect civilians in a war that had not stopped.

The safe areas showed the weakness of unclear protection. Places such as Srebrenica were declared safe, but UN forces did not have the strength, rules of engagement or political backing to guarantee their defence against determined attack. In July 1995, Bosnian Serb forces captured Srebrenica and killed thousands of Bosniak men and boys. This became one of the defining failures in UN history.

Bosnia also showed the relationship between the UN and NATO. UNPROFOR could provide relief and monitoring, but decisive military pressure increasingly came through NATO air power and later through the NATO-led Implementation Force after the Dayton Peace Agreement. The peace settlement of 1995 therefore was not simply a UN victory or failure. It was a mixed result: UN humanitarian work mattered, but the final settlement relied on US diplomacy, NATO force and Security Council authority.

The wider Balkans also included Kosovo in 1998-99. NATO intervened militarily against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia without the same clear prior Security Council authorisation as in the 1990-91 Gulf War. After Yugoslavia accepted peace principles, Security Council Resolution 1244 in June 1999 established an international civil and security presence in Kosovo, including UNMIK, the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo. This again showed the UN as central to post-conflict administration, but not always as the body that delivered decisive military action.

A strong explanation paragraph might say:

The UN struggled in Bosnia because it was asked to protect civilians without enough power to impose peace. UNPROFOR delivered humanitarian aid and monitored safe areas, but the warring parties were still pursuing military aims. When Bosnian Serb forces attacked Srebrenica, the UN presence could not prevent genocide. This showed that a peacekeeping label was not enough where there was no peace to keep and where member states would not provide the force needed for civilian protection.

Mozambique And Sudan

Mozambique and Sudan show that UN work could be more successful when there was a political agreement for it to support. These cases do not mean the UN solved every problem, but they show a different pattern from Somalia and Bosnia.

In Mozambique, civil war had been fought between the FRELIMO government and RENAMO. A General Peace Agreement was signed in 1992 after negotiations in Rome. ONUMOZ, the United Nations Operation in Mozambique, was created to help implement the agreement. Its work included monitoring the ceasefire, supporting demobilisation, helping humanitarian assistance, assisting the return of refugees and displaced people, and supporting elections.