B7, key topic 3 - Tension and conflict, 1956–73

Nasser And Arab Aims

The 1967 war cannot be understood without the legacy of the Suez Crisis of 1956. The details of Suez belong to the previous key topic, but its aftermath matters here. After Suez, Israel withdrew from Sinai and Gaza, and the United Nations Emergency Force, usually called UNEF, helped keep Egyptian and Israeli forces apart. That reduced immediate danger, but it did not solve the deeper issues: Arab rejection of Israel, Israeli security fears, Palestinian displacement, disputed borders and rivalry between Arab states.

Gamal Abdel Nasser, the president of Egypt, was the most important Arab leader in the years before 1967. He presented himself as the voice of Arab nationalism and anti-imperialism. He wanted Egypt to lead the Arab world, resist Western influence, support the Palestinian cause and stand up to Israel. These aims gave him huge prestige, but they also created pressure. If Syria, Jordan or Palestinians accused him of weakness, Nasser risked losing his claim to Arab leadership.

Arab aims were not perfectly united. Egypt, Syria and Jordan all opposed Israel, but their interests differed:

The immediate crisis came in May 1967. Soviet officials wrongly warned Egypt that Israel was massing troops against Syria. Nasser responded by moving Egyptian forces into Sinai. He then demanded the withdrawal of UNEF. Most dangerously, he closed the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping. For Israel, this threatened access to the Red Sea and looked like a return to blockade.

Nasser may not have wanted a full war at that exact moment. But he created a crisis in which backing down would damage his prestige and holding firm increased the chance of an Israeli attack. Jordan then joined the Arab coalition, and Arab public rhetoric became more confident. Israel saw a narrowing window: if Arab forces kept mobilising, Israel might face a harder war later.

Misconception check: the Six-Day War was not caused by one speech or one decision alone. It grew from long-term hostility after 1956, Palestinian raids and Israeli reprisals, Arab rivalry, Nasser's prestige politics, the UNEF withdrawal, the closure of the Straits of Tiran and Israeli fear of a worsening military position.

Model mini-paragraph:

Nasser's aims increased tension because he wanted Egypt to lead Arab resistance to Israel and could not easily appear weak. His decision to move troops into Sinai, remove UNEF and close the Straits of Tiran showed strength to Arab audiences, but it also convinced Israel that its security and trade routes were under threat. This made war more likely even if not every leader wanted a full-scale conflict.

Six-Day War Events

On 5 June 1967 Israel launched a pre-emptive attack against its Arab neighbours, beginning the Six-Day War. "Pre-emptive" means Israel struck first because its leaders believed an Arab attack or blockade threat was becoming intolerable. That does not make the war simple. Arab states saw Israel as the aggressor, while Israel argued it was acting before a larger threat formed.

The first Israeli move was an air attack. Israeli aircraft struck Egyptian air bases and destroyed much of Egypt's air force on the ground. Air superiority mattered because armies without air cover were much more vulnerable. Israel also attacked Syrian and Jordanian air forces. This early success gave Israeli ground forces a major advantage.

The fighting then moved quickly on three main fronts:

By 10 June, Israel had defeated Egypt, Jordan and Syria. The speed of the victory was extraordinary. Israel had not only survived a crisis; it had changed the map of the Middle East.

Israel's success had several connected causes. The first was air superiority. By destroying much of the Egyptian air force early, Israel reduced the danger to its own troops and could attack Arab ground forces more freely. The second was surprise and timing. Israel chose the moment of attack, while Arab forces were not equally prepared for coordinated war. The third was mobilisation and command. Israel's armed forces were smaller than the combined Arab forces, but they were highly mobilised, trained for rapid movement and able to concentrate force quickly.

Arab weaknesses also mattered. Egypt, Syria and Jordan had common hostility to Israel but did not operate as one smooth military machine. Jordan had only just entered the coalition. Egyptian forces in Sinai suffered from poor command, confusion and exposed positions. Arab rhetoric sounded strong, but battlefield coordination was weaker than Israel's ability to strike quickly on chosen fronts.

Misconception check: Israel did not win simply because Arab soldiers were unwilling to fight. The outcome depended on command, air power, timing, training, mobilisation and coordination. A strong answer explains military systems, not stereotypes.

Impact Of 1967

The Six-Day War had a huge impact because it changed both territory and confidence. Israel gained control of Sinai, Gaza, the West Bank, East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights. These gains gave Israel more strategic depth, but they also created new problems. Israel now controlled large Arab populations and territories claimed by Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Palestinians. The question of land became even more central to peace and war.

For Israel, the war created a sense of military strength. The country had defeated three neighbouring Arab states in less than a week. Control of Sinai meant Egyptian forces were pushed far from Israel's southern border. Control of the Golan Heights reduced Syrian shelling from above northern Israel. Control of East Jerusalem had enormous religious, political and symbolic significance.

But victory also brought risk:

For Arab states, 1967 was a humiliation. Nasser's claim to lead the Arab world was badly damaged. Egypt lost Sinai and Gaza. Jordan lost the West Bank and East Jerusalem. Syria lost the Golan Heights. Arab governments had promised resistance and unity, but the war exposed their military and political weaknesses.

The defeat did not end Arab opposition to Israel. Instead, it changed its form. Egypt and Syria began the long task of rebuilding their armed forces, often with Soviet support. Arab leaders also had to explain defeat to their own populations. The desire to recover lost land became a major cause of the 1973 war.

The impact on Palestinians was especially important. Before 1967, Arab states often claimed to speak for the Palestinian cause. After 1967, those states looked weaker. The PLO and other Palestinian groups argued that Palestinians needed to take a more independent role in their own struggle. This is why the Six-Day War helped make Palestinian resistance more central to the conflict.

For Paper 2, Section B, this is a classic change point. Before 1967, the Arab-Israeli conflict was mainly fought between Israel and neighbouring Arab states. After 1967, it was still a state conflict, but it also became more sharply about occupation, Palestinian nationalism, guerrilla activity and the future of the territories captured by Israel.

Model mini-paragraph:

The 1967 war strengthened Israel militarily but made the conflict harder to solve politically. Israel gained strategic depth by capturing Sinai and the Golan Heights, and it controlled East Jerusalem, Gaza and the West Bank. However, these gains created disputes over occupied territory and intensified Palestinian resistance. As a result, Israeli victory did not bring lasting security; it created new causes of future conflict.