03 Section B Option 3, Key question 3 - Class and gender patterns of religiosity (part 1)

Compare the same kind of religiosity

A comparison of religious groups is meaningful only when we know what has been measured and who is being compared.

Religiosity means the extent and forms of religious commitment. Affiliation is identifying with a religion; belief concerns ideas such as the existence of God or an afterlife; practice concerns actions such as prayer or attendance. Someone can identify as Christian through family heritage, rarely attend services and remain uncertain about God. A person can also pray without identifying with an organised religion. A ranking on one measure therefore need not hold on another.

Social class concerns people's positions in economic and social relationships, including employment, resources and power. Researchers operationalise it in different ways. An occupational classification such as NS-SEC uses occupation and employment characteristics. Income measures resources received, educational qualifications measure attainment, and subjective class measures how people identify. They are related but cannot be substituted without explanation: a low-paid graduate and a wealthy business owner need not occupy the same position on every measure. Census 2021's NS-SEC documentation explains its occupation-based categories.

Much historical evidence uses only two sex categories. It cannot establish the experiences of all gender identities. Retain the categories a source actually measured instead of silently relabelling them.

Consider this original teaching example, not survey evidence. If 30 of 100 professional workers attend monthly, their attendance rate is 30%. If 40 of 400 routine workers attend monthly, their rate is 10%. Routine workers contribute more attenders in absolute numbers, but professionals have the higher attendance rate. The denominator answers the question: percentage of the class attending differs from percentage of attenders belonging to the class.

To claim a trend, compare dates using sufficiently comparable populations and questions. A single census gives a pattern at one point in time. Two surveys of different people can show population change, but do not demonstrate that the same individuals changed their minds.

Class patterns and competing mechanisms

Class can influence both the appeal of religion and the practical resources needed to participate in religious institutions.

Ben Clements' 2014 original analysis of British Social Attitudes surveys reports the following for British adults in 2012. The question excludes weddings, funerals and baptisms.

These figures concern nonattendance, not unbelief. They do not form a simple ladder: foremen/technicians report more nonattendance than the working-class category. Clements also analyses 1983, but the class classifications differ, preventing a precise comparison of identical class groups across the two dates. Survey answers may overstate attendance.

Affiliation has a different relationship with occupation. In Census 2021, England and Wales, among employed people aged 16–64 identifying as Hindu, 34.3% were in professional occupations; among those identifying as Jewish, 33.4% were. ONS published these figures in 2023. This challenges the idea that religious identity belongs only to the economically disadvantaged. The denominator is each religious group, however: the figures do not tell us what percentage of all professionals identified with either religion. The voluntary census question measures identity, whether or not respondents believe or practise. Nor does a broad label reveal differences between particular congregations or denominations.

One explanation starts with deprivation: lacking valued resources or opportunities. Relative deprivation means feeling disadvantaged compared with a reference group, even when basic needs are met. Insecurity, loss or blocked opportunities may make religious hope, meaning and mutual support attractive. Marx's 1844 discussion of religion treats it as both a response to suffering and a protest against it, while arguing that consolation can divert attention from changing oppressive conditions. This is a theoretical interpretation, not a survey proving that all working-class people believe.

An institutional explanation asks who can convert interest into attendance. Transport costs, unpredictable shifts, caring responsibilities or feeling out of place may obstruct participation. Conversely, professional skills, established networks and predictable free time may help people join committees and sustain attendance. Religious organisations can offer status and contacts as well as consolation. These are mechanisms to investigate, not conclusions already established by the table.

Worked reasoning: suppose an insecure worker seeks reassurance through private prayer but works every Sunday. Deprivation could increase the appeal of belief while work reduces public attendance. A survey of attendance alone would miss that combination. Therefore higher nonattendance cannot, by itself, refute every deprivation explanation; an adequate test also measures insecurity, belief and private practice.

Gender gaps vary by measure and institution

Women have often reported greater religious commitment than men, but the size and direction of the difference depend on the measure and religious context.

The British attendance pattern has changed. Clements' BSA analysis reports nonattendance of 64.6% for men and 48.5% for women in 1983, compared with 69.5% and 63.8% respectively in 2012. Subtracting the female rate from the male rate gives a gap of 16.1 percentage points in 1983 and 5.7 in 2012. Women remained less likely to report nonattendance, while the gap narrowed. These are population comparisons, not a record of the same respondents over their lives. Clements, 2014, Table 2.

Pew Research Center's 2016 international study deliberately separates measures. Its affiliation estimates mainly refer to 2010-era censuses and surveys, covering whole populations in 192 countries and territories. They suggest that women were somewhat more likely to affiliate; the sexes had similar affiliation levels in many societies. Its belief and practice comparisons use adult surveys conducted during 2008–2015, covering up to 84 countries. These are historical findings with different data sources, rather than one worldwide survey conducted in 2016. Pew affiliation chapter.

Public worship shows why generalisations need boundaries. Across 53 countries with Christian attendance data, the average female advantage in weekly attendance was seven percentage points. Across 39 countries with Muslim attendance data, the average male advantage was 28 points. These are averages giving each country equal weight, not percentages calculated from one combined world population. Pew attendance chapter.

Pew connects the latter pattern to institutions: communal Friday worship is expected of Muslim men, while women's religious practice need not take the same public form. Higher male mosque attendance therefore does not establish greater belief or greater private devotion. Christian denominations also differ in worship traditions and gender expectations; a Christian-wide average should not be assigned to every church.