4.2.5 - Secularisation - Evidence and Arguments For

What secularisation means

For pro-secularisation sociologists, religion matters less in modern industrial societies than it once did. That claim is broader than saying some people stop going to church. It means religion has less power to shape how people think, how they behave, and how major institutions are organised.

Bryan Wilson gives the classic definition: secularisation is the process whereby religious thinking, practice and institutions lose social significance. The key phrase is social significance. A society could still contain religious people, churches and rituals, yet still be becoming more secular if religion no longer organises education, law, welfare, politics or everyday morality in the way it once did.

This is why sociologists usually measure secularisation in three linked dimensions. First, there is decline in religious practice, such as attendance, membership and participation in rites of passage. Second, there is decline in religious belief, such as belief in God, heaven or miracles. Third, there is decline in institutional influence, meaning churches lose authority over public decision-making and over the moral rules of society.

Seen this way, secularisation is really an argument about power. It asks whether religion still has the authority to define truth and morality for whole populations, or whether it has been pushed into the private sphere where it becomes a personal preference rather than a public force.

Evidence from Britain

Steve Bruce is the best-known contemporary defender of the secularisation thesis. He argues that the British case shows a long-term decline across several indicators, not just one. Comparisons need consistent measures and dates. The Church of England’s Statistics for Mission 2024 reported all-age average weekly attendance of 702,000, 19% below 2019 but 1.6% above 2023. This is Anglican October attendance, not a measure of every religion in Britain. Recent recovery and longer-term decline can coexist. Church of England report.

Rites of passage offer another indicator. In the same Church of England report, 2024 baptisms and marriages were approximately 30% below 2019, although individual measures and years vary. These dated Anglican indicators support a decline in routine participation; they cannot establish that all religious groups or every year declined.

Affiliation data points in the same direction. In England and Wales, Christian census identification fell from 59.3% in 2011 to 46.2% in 2021, while “no religion” rose from 25.2% to 37.2%. These are affiliation responses, not direct measures of belief or attendance. ONS Census 2021 religion bulletin. Survey evidence on belief also suggests decline. Bruce therefore argues that Britain is not just "believing without belonging" on a large scale; rather, levels of belonging, belief and practice have all weakened together.

A key part of Bruce's argument is that religion has moved from obligation to consumption. In the past, churchgoing was often socially expected and tied to community membership. In late modern Britain, religion is much more like a consumer choice. People may sample spiritual ideas, but they are less likely to submit to organised religious authority. That means religion survives more as lifestyle and identity than as a binding moral framework.

Why modernity weakens religion

Pro-secularisation theorists do not just list falling numbers. They also explain why modern societies may weaken religion.

Max Weber argued that modern life becomes increasingly rationalised. As science, bureaucracy and technical expertise expand, people rely less on magic, tradition and sacred authority. Weber described this as the disenchantment of the world: events once explained through divine will increasingly receive scientific or practical explanations. For Bruce, the rise of effective technology matters here too. People may still pray, but they normally do so after using medicine, revision, engineering or law rather than instead of them.