Meta-ethical theories - Naturalism and moral facts

Meaning before moral decisions

Normative ethics asks how we ought to act: for example, whether deception is wrong. Meta-ethics asks what 'wrong' means, whether that judgement states a fact and how it could be justified. Agreeing on an action does not prove agreement about the meaning or basis of the judgement.

Consider the original claim 'Improving factory safety is good.' A utilitarian may defend it because it increases welfare, while a Kantian may defend it because it respects people. The meta-ethical question is different: does 'good' name a real property, and if so what kind? Or does the sentence perform some other function? These are questions about ethical language rather than further calculations about the factory.

For G. E. Moore, asking what good means is fundamental because evaluating anything depends on knowing what we are attributing to it. He distinguishes defining good from identifying which things are good. Giving examples of good conduct does not necessarily explain the property they supposedly share. His Principia Ethica, section 13 develops this distinction.

A critic can question whether this is the defining question of all ethics. People can reason about duties, harms and conflicting interests while disagreeing about a definition of good; urgent practical guidance also matters. Moore can reply that unclear meanings weaken those arguments. The meaning question is therefore foundational for assessing claims, but that does not prove that every ethical investigation must begin by settling it or that it exhausts ethics.

Moral claims can also be cognitive, presenting something as true or false, or non-cognitive, performing another primary function such as expressing an attitude. A false factual claim is still truth-apt: it makes sense to ask whether it is true. Therefore, calling a judgement cognitive does not prove it correct or prove that we can readily discover its truth.

Natural properties and objectivity

In the specification's definitional account, ethical naturalism defines moral values in terms of a natural property. Such properties belong to the world studied through ordinary experience and investigation, rather than a special supernatural moral realm. An illustrative definition might identify goodness with pleasure or welfare. It then treats moral judgements as factual claims about whether that property is present.

If 'good' means 'promotes welfare', evidence about factory injuries, wages and health becomes relevant to whether safer production is good. The naturalist's claim is stronger than 'safety makes me feel approving': it can be true even when an owner dislikes the cost. Moral facts are objective in that their truth does not depend merely on this speaker's approval.

The specification connects this with absolutism. Here the important contrast is with making truth depend on each individual's attitude: there is a standard against which attitudes can be mistaken. Do not infer that every objective theory says the same physical action is always right regardless of circumstances. If welfare depends on circumstances, applying an objective welfare standard can yield different verdicts. Objectivity concerns what makes the verdict true, not whether context matters.

Ethical naturalism is also different from Aquinas' natural law. Natural law derives moral guidance from rational human purposes and basic goods within an account of creation. Meta-ethical naturalism concerns the status and definition of moral properties. The shared word 'natural' does not make the theories identical. Contemporary naturalisms include accounts more complex than a simple definition; the scholarly overview explains this wider debate.

Moore's open question challenge

Moore challenges the claim that good can be defined as any natural property. Suppose someone proposes that good simply means pleasant. We can still ask intelligibly whether every pleasant experience is good: pleasure in another person's suffering provides an obvious occasion for doubt. The question appears open in a way that 'Is a pleasant experience pleasant?' does not.

The argument is about meaning. If 'good' and 'pleasant' had exactly the same meaning, the proposed question would seem to reduce to a repetition. Its continuing significance suggests that listing a natural property has not defined good. Moore calls the attempted reduction the naturalistic fallacy. His use concerns identifying good with another property; it is not simply a name for claiming that whatever occurs in nature ought to occur.

This challenge does not show that pleasure is never good. It distinguishes 'pleasure is one good thing' from 'good means pleasure'. Nor does finding one bad pleasure refute every possible naturalist theory of welfare: a refined theory can distinguish kinds of benefit and harm.

A naturalist can challenge Moore's inference from an open conceptual question to distinct properties. People can discover that differently understood concepts refer to the same feature of reality. Thus, our ability to ask whether welfare is good may show that the words are not obvious synonyms without proving that goodness cannot be a natural property. Moore puts pressure on simple definitions; defeating every contemporary naturalism requires more argument.

Facts, reasons and moral knowledge

Naturalism makes moral knowledge appear continuous with knowledge of the world. We can correct inaccurate beliefs about injuries or needs, compare consequences and use shared evidence rather than appeal solely to private feelings. That gives it a practical strength in public disagreement.

However, an agreed description does not by itself settle a moral standard. From 'this product is profitable' we cannot simply infer 'selling it is good' without a further connection between profit and goodness. A naturalist definition supplies such a connection, but a critic can ask why that property should count as good. Scientific evidence may establish effects while leaving disagreement about their moral significance.

In the factory case, both parties might agree that safer conditions improve workers' welfare. One still questions whether total welfare can justify overriding an individual's rights. This disputes the proposed moral property or its adequacy, rather than denying the injury data. An effective reply must defend the welfare account, not merely repeat the facts.

Naturalism therefore offers a strong explanation of how moral claims can be factual, objective and investigated. Its unresolved task is to justify the identification of goodness with the chosen natural property. Moore's challenge makes that task explicit; it does not force the conclusion that all moral language is meaningless or that values exist only as feelings in the mind.