3.4.1 - Mental states, qualia and intentionality
What makes a state mental? You will learn the two features philosophers use to answer: phenomenal properties, including qualia, and intentionality, then see how Chalmers separates phenomenal and psychological concepts of mind and why these features put pressure on every later theory of mind.
The Starting Question
The first question in the Metaphysics of mind topic is not yet whether dualism or physicalism is true. It is more basic: what are we trying to explain when we talk about the mind?
Mental state
A state, event or condition of a mind, such as a pain, a perception, a belief, a desire or an emotion.
Examples include feeling pain, seeing a red traffic light, believing that an exam is tomorrow, wanting water, imagining a tune, feeling anxious, remembering a birthday, or intending to revise. These examples are ordinary, but they pull in different directions. Pain seems mental because it feels a certain way. Belief seems mental because it is about something. Anxiety may have both a felt quality and an object, but it can also feel objectless.
AQA asks for the features of mental states, not a complete theory of what mental states really are. The two features in this lesson are:
| Feature | Basic question | Clean example |
|---|---|---|
| Phenomenal properties | What is it like for the subject? | The painfulness of pain; the visual character of seeing red |
| Intentional properties | What is the state about, directed at, or representing? | Believing that Paris is in France; wanting a drink |
The difficult thought is that neither feature obviously covers every case. That is why the specification uses the cautious wording "all or at least some" mental states.
Phenomenal Properties And Qualia
Phenomenal property
A property of a mental state that concerns its subjective character: what it is like to undergo that state from the inside.
The ache of a headache, the bitterness of coffee, the visual brightness of a screen, and the unpleasant edge of panic are all candidate phenomenal properties.
Some, but not all, philosophers use the term qualia for these properties.
Qualia
Intrinsic and non-intentional phenomenal properties that are introspectively accessible (the specification's definition).
That definition contains three important constraints:
| Term in the definition | What it means here | Why it matters |
|---|---|---|
| Intrinsic | The property belongs to the experience as experienced, not merely to its external cause or behavioural effect. | The painful feel of pain is not just the tissue damage, the wince, or the report "I am in pain". |
| Non-intentional | The property is not being defined by what the state is about or represents. | The reddish feel of a visual experience is distinguished from the fact that the experience may represent a red object. |
| Introspectively accessible | The subject can become aware of it by attending to their own experience. | Qualia are approached from the first-person point of view, even if reports about them can be mistaken or incomplete. |
This definition does not say that qualia are non-physical. It says how the term is being used by those philosophers: for the subjective, first-person, non-intentional character of experience. Later arguments may use qualia to challenge physicalist theories, but the definition itself is not yet an argument for dualism.
Intentionality And Content
Intentionality
The aboutness or directedness of a mental state: a state has intentionality when it has content, representing or being directed at something.
Do not confuse intentionality with intending to perform an action. An intention to open the door is intentional in the philosopher's sense, but so is a belief that the door is locked, a fear of failing, a memory of yesterday, a hope for rain, or a perception of a table.
Intentionality answers questions such as:
| Mental state | Intentional content |
|---|---|
| Belief | That the train is late |
| Desire | For a glass of water |
| Fear | Of the interview |
| Perception | Of a blue book on the desk |
| Memory | Of missing the bus |
| Imagination | Of a city that does not exist |
Intentionality is philosophically puzzling because a mental state can be about something absent, future, false, fictional or general. I can believe that the train is late when it is not late. I can fear a future event. I can imagine a city that does not exist. A later theory of mind must explain how a mental state can have this kind of content.
All Or Some Mental States
AQA's wording matters: all or at least some mental states have phenomenal properties, and all or at least some mental states have intentional properties. This leaves room for debate.
| Mental state | Phenomenal properties? | Intentional properties? | What is disputed? |
|---|---|---|---|
| Visual experience of a red apple | Yes, there is a visual character. | Usually yes, because the experience represents an apple or a red surface. | Whether the phenomenal character can be separated from the representational content. |
| Sharp pain | Yes, there is painfulness. | Disputed: it might be about bodily damage, or it might be a non-intentional sensation. | Whether pains represent anything. |
| Belief that the lesson starts at 10 | Disputed: some deny a distinctive feel of belief. | Yes, it has propositional content. | Whether there is cognitive phenomenology. |
| Desire for water | Sometimes, if the desire is felt as thirst or longing. | Yes, it is directed at water or drinking. | Whether all desires have a felt character. |
| Unconscious belief | No current phenomenal character, if it is genuinely unconscious. | Yes, if it still has content. | Whether unconscious states count as mental in the same way as conscious ones. |
| Objectless anxiety | Yes, there may be a distinctive anxious feel. | Disputed, if it has no clear object. | Whether all emotions must be about something. |
Three broad positions are available:
- Phenomenal-first: a state is genuinely mental only if there is something it is like for the subject.
- Intentional-first: intentionality is the mark of the mental, so mental states are mental because they are about or represent things.
- Mixed: the mental includes phenomenal states, intentional states, and hybrid states that have both.
Continue this lesson.
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