AQA A-Level Philosophy
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Epistemology
3.1.1 Knowledge and definition
3.1.1 - Knowledge types and the nature of definition"Know" can mean being familiar with something, being able to do something, or knowing that something is true. You will separate acquaintance, ability and propositional knowledge, see why philosophers analyse propositional knowledge, and learn how a definition works as a set of individually necess...
3.1.1 - The tripartite view - justified true beliefThe tripartite view says that propositional knowledge is justified true belief. You will learn what justification, truth and belief each mean, why they are claimed to be individually necessary and jointly sufficient, and which issues press on each claim, ready for Gettier's counterexamples in the...
3.1.1 - Gettier and lucky true beliefEdmund Gettier's two short counterexamples challenge the tripartite view of knowledge. You will see how each case meets all three JTB conditions, why the belief still seems not to be knowledge, and how epistemic luck shows that justified true belief is not sufficient for knowledge.
3.1.1 - Post-Gettier analyses of knowledgeAfter Gettier, philosophers tried to repair the definition of knowledge. You will study four repairs, infallibilism, no false lemmas, reliabilism and virtue epistemology, and ask of each whether it removes epistemic luck without making knowledge too demanding or too easy.
3.1.2 Perception as a source of knowledge
3.1.2 - Direct realism and the immediate objects of perceptionWhen you look at a table, are you aware of the table itself or of something in your mind? Direct realism says the immediate objects of perception are mind-independent objects and their properties. You will define the view precisely, see why it is initially plausible, and meet the four problem cas...
3.1.2 - Problems for direct realismIllusion, perceptual variation, hallucination and time lag each seem to show that we are not directly aware of the world. You will reconstruct each argument, see exactly which part of direct realism it targets, and weigh the direct realist replies to decide which problem is hardest to answer.
3.1.2 - Indirect realism, sense-data and LockeIndirect realism keeps the external world but says we are immediately aware only of sense-data in our own minds. You will see how sense-data are caused by and represent mind-independent objects, how Locke's primary/secondary quality distinction explains which features of experience match the worl...
3.1.2 - Indirect realism and scepticism about the external worldIf all we immediately perceive are sense-data, how can we know there is a world beyond them? You will reconstruct the sceptical objection to indirect realism and weigh three responses: Locke's argument from involuntary experience, the coherence argument of Locke and Catharine Trotter Cockburn, an...
3.1.2 - Berkeley against indirect realismBerkeley argues that if we only ever perceive ideas, we can never know what mind-independent objects are like, because an idea can be like nothing but another idea. You will reconstruct this attack on indirect realism's representational bridge, see why it is sharpest against Locke, and weigh the...
3.1.2 - Berkeley's idealism and its problemsBerkeley asks you to reconsider what an ordinary object is when every feature you encounter appears in perception. You will trace how his idealism tries to preserve a stable, shared world without matter, then test it against illusion, hallucination, solipsism and the role of God. Indirect realism...
3.1.3 Reason as a source of knowledge
3.1.3 - Innatism - Plato and LeibnizCan reason give us knowledge that experience never supplied? You will reconstruct two arguments for innatism, Plato's slave-boy argument in the Meno and Leibniz's argument from necessary truths in the New Essays, and test where each is under pressure, ready for Locke's empiricist reply in the nex...
3.1.3 - Empiricist responses to innatismEmpiricists argue that experience can supply every concept we have, so innate ideas are unnecessary. You will study Locke's attack on innate principles and his tabula rasa, Hume's impressions and ideas and his distinction between relations of ideas and matters of fact, and the issues these respon...
3.1.3 - Intuition, deduction and DescartesDescartes tries to build certain knowledge from a directly grasped first truth. You will distinguish intuition from deduction and follow the cogito, the arguments for God and the proof of material things, identifying how each stage supports the next.
3.1.3 - Empiricist challenges to DescartesCan reason move from the contents of thought to claims about what exists? You will examine empiricist challenges to the cogito, God and the external world, using Hume’s account of ideas and his distinction between relations of ideas and matters of fact.
3.1.4 Philosophical scepticism
3.1.4 - Philosophical scepticism and waves of doubtDescartes' doubts become interesting when they stop targeting one mistake and begin threatening whole sources of belief. You will see how three widening waves move from unreliable senses to dreams and then to possible deception of reason itself, creating the prospect of global scepticism. This le...
3.1.4 - Responses to scepticismA response to scepticism succeeds only relative to a standard: certainty, good evidence, explanatory power or reliable belief formation. You will compare how Descartes, Locke, Berkeley, Russell and reliabilism try to recover external-world knowledge, and why they offer different kinds of success....
Moral philosophy
3.2.1 Normative ethical theories
3.2.1 - Utilitarianism - utility and happinessUtilitarianism needs an account of what is valuable before it can tell us what to maximise. You will compare Bentham’s quantity of pleasure, Mill’s quality of happiness and proof, and preference satisfaction as a non-hedonistic alternative.
3.2.1 - Act, rule and problems for utilitarianismThe difference between judging each act and following utility-maximising rules changes how utilitarianism handles rights, relationships and personal commitments. You will test whether the rule version genuinely answers the harshest objections or merely postpones them. This lesson assumes Bentham,...
3.2.1 - Kantian ethics - good will, duty and imperativesTwo people can do the same outwardly right thing for very different reasons, and Kant thinks that difference matters to moral worth. You will connect good will, duty and the two kinds of imperative to the meanings of good, bad, right and wrong in Kantian ethics. The detailed first and second form...
3.2.1 - Kantian ethics - categorical imperative formulationsKant's two formulations turn the categorical imperative from a general demand into tests for an agent's maxim. You will see how universalisation and respect for rational agency can diagnose the same action in different ways, and where each test needs careful judgement. The lesson assumes the earl...
3.2.1 - Issues for Kantian ethicsKantian ethics promises principled action even when outcomes and feelings pull in another direction. You will test whether that strength survives clashing duties, awkward universalisation results, foreseeable consequences, humane motives and Foot's challenge to categorical authority. The lesson a...
3.2.1 - Aristotle - eudaimonia, function and virtueAristotle asks what makes a whole human life go well. You will connect eudaimonia and pleasure with the human function, stable virtues and vices, habituation and the doctrine of the mean.
3.2.1 - Aristotle - responsibility, practical wisdom and issuesVirtue ethics must connect good character to responsible choice and right action. You will examine voluntary action and practical wisdom, then test whether the approach can guide action, resolve virtue conflicts and avoid circular explanations of flourishing.
3.2.2 Applied ethics
3.2.2 - Applied ethics - stealing and lyingStealing and lying test how moral theories move from principles to concrete judgements. You will apply utility, Kantian duty and virtue ethics to ordinary and emergency cases, then ask what those judgements mean under different metaethical views.
3.2.2 - Applied ethics - simulated killing and eating animalsSimulated killing has no literal victim, while eating animals raises direct questions about which beings count morally. You will use utilitarian, Kantian, virtue-ethical and metaethical tools to see why those two cases turn on different kinds of moral relevance. Cora Diamond's discussion of eatin...
3.2.3 Meta-ethics
3.2.3 - Moral realism, naturalism and non-naturalismWhen we say that cruelty is wrong, are we stating a fact? You will distinguish cognitivism from non-cognitivism, see what moral realism claims, and compare naturalist realism (including naturalist readings of utilitarianism and virtue ethics) with non-naturalism and intuitionism, ending with Moor...
3.2.3 - Challenges to moral realismIf moral facts exist, how do we know them, why do they move us, and why do cultures disagree so deeply about them? You will reconstruct the main challenges to moral realism, Hume's Fork, Ayer's verification principle, Hume's motivation argument and is-ought gap, and Mackie's arguments from relati...
3.2.3 - Anti-realism - error theory, emotivism and prescriptivismIf there are no mind-independent moral facts, what are we doing when we call something wrong? You will compare three answers, Mackie's error theory, Ayer's emotivism and Hare's prescriptivism, and test whether they can explain moral reasoning, persuasion, disagreement and progress without collaps...
Metaphysics of God
3.3.1 The nature of God
3.3.1 - Divine attributes and timeBefore asking whether God exists, we need to know what "God" means. You will define omniscience, omnipotence and omnibenevolence, use Aquinas to clarify omnipotence, distinguish a timeless (eternal) God from an everlasting God, and see how Stump and Kretzmann relate a timeless God to events in time.
3.3.1 - Incoherence challenges to GodCould the concept of God be incoherent? You will reconstruct three challenges, the paradox of the stone, the Euthyphro dilemma and the problem of an omniscient God and free human beings, identify exactly which attribute each targets, and weigh the replies, including Aquinas' account of omnipotence.
3.3.2 Arguments relating to the existence of God
3.3.2 - Ontological argumentsCan God's existence follow from the very concept of God? You will reconstruct the ontological arguments of Anselm, Descartes and Malcolm, comparing their a priori deductive form, the strength of their conclusions and the nature of the God each defends. The objections follow in the next lesson.
3.3.2 - Objections to ontological argumentsCan a definition ever guarantee that something exists? You will test the ontological arguments of Anselm, Descartes and Malcolm against Gaunilo's perfect island, empiricist objections to a priori existence claims and Kant's claim that existence is not a predicate, and ask whether the necessary-ex...
3.3.2 - Teleological and design argumentsDoes the order in nature point to a designer? You will reconstruct three design arguments, the argument from analogy as presented by Hume, Paley's argument from spatial order and purpose, and Swinburne's argument from temporal order, classify their inferences and ask what kind of God, if any, the...
3.3.2 - Problems for design argumentsDoes the order in the world really point to God? You will test design arguments against Hume's objections to the analogy, the problem of spatial disorder, the unique case objection and the question of whether God is the best, or only, explanation of order, using Paley and Swinburne to see how far...
3.3.2 - Cosmological argumentsWhy is there a changing, caused, contingent universe at all? You will reconstruct the Kalam argument, Aquinas' First, Second and Third Ways, Descartes' argument from his continuing existence and Leibniz's argument from sufficient reason, comparing their logical forms and the strength of their con...
3.3.2 - Problems for cosmological argumentsDo cosmological arguments overstretch causal reasoning? You will test them, especially Leibniz's argument from sufficient reason, against the possibility of an infinite series, Hume's objection to the causal principle, Russell's fallacy of composition, and Hume's and Russell's doubts about whethe...
3.3.2 - The problem of evilIf God is all-powerful, all-knowing and perfectly good, why is there evil? You will distinguish moral from natural evil, use Mary Midgley to think about the human sources of wickedness, and reconstruct the logical and evidential forms of the problem of evil. The responses of Plantinga and Hick fo...
3.3.2 - Free will defence and soul-makingCan God and evil coexist? You will reconstruct Plantinga's free will defence and Hick's soul-making theodicy, see what each is trying to achieve, and test how well each deals with moral evil, natural evil and the evidential problem.
3.3.3 Religious language
3.3.3 - Religious language - verification and Hick's responseWhen a believer says "God exists", is that a factual claim at all? You will distinguish cognitivist and non-cognitivist views of religious language, reconstruct Ayer's verification challenge, and assess John Hick's reply that some religious claims could be verified after death. The University Deb...
3.3.3 - University Debate - falsification, Partisan and bliksIf nothing could ever count against "God loves us", does it say anything at all? You will follow the University Debate: Antony Flew's falsification challenge using Wisdom's Gardener, Basil Mitchell's Partisan reply and R M Hare's bliks, and weigh the issues each response raises.
Metaphysics of mind
3.4.2 Dualist theories
3.4.2 - Substance dualism - indivisibility and conceivabilityIs your mind the same thing as your body or brain? You will reconstruct Descartes' two arguments that it is not, the indivisibility argument and the conceivability argument, and examine the responses that target each premise.
3.4.2 - Property dualism - zombies and MaryWhy might a complete scientific description of the brain still seem to leave consciousness out? In this lesson, you will examine property dualism through Chalmers' zombie argument and Jackson's Mary argument, then compare the main physicalist responses. The contrast between an epistemic gap and a...
3.4.2 - Issues for dualismIf the mind is distinct from the body, how do we know other minds exist, and how can mind and body affect each other? You will examine the problem of other minds and two responses, Ryle's category-mistake objection, the conceptual and empirical interaction problems, and the challenges facing epip...
3.4.3 Physicalist theories
3.4.3 - Philosophical behaviourismCan mental states be understood through what people do, or are experience and behaviour separable? This lesson compares hard and soft philosophical behaviourism before testing them with Super-Spartans, perfect actors, circularity, multiple realisability, and self-knowledge. These objections revea...
3.4.3 - Mind-brain type identity theoryCould a pain or belief be nothing more than a type of brain state, even though mental and neural language mean different things? This lesson develops mind-brain type identity theory, distinguishes ontological from analytic reduction, and examines dualist and multiple realisability objections. The...
3.4.3 - Eliminative materialismWhat if beliefs and desires are useful parts of common sense but not categories that a mature science of mind will keep? This lesson develops the Churchlands' case that folk psychology may be radically mistaken, then tests it against certainty, predictive success, and self-refutation. The debate...