An Incomplete Kingdom

The Kingdom of Italy was proclaimed in 1861, but the map and the politics of Italy still showed serious gaps. Three obstacles mattered most.

First, Austria still controlled Venetia. This mattered geographically because Venetia included Venice and the north-east, leaving a major Italian-speaking region outside the new kingdom. It also mattered symbolically because Austria had long represented foreign domination in northern Italy. If Venetia remained Austrian, nationalists could argue that the Risorgimento had not finished.

Second, Rome remained under papal rule. For nationalists, Rome was not just another city. It was the historic capital of the ancient Roman world and the obvious symbolic capital for a united Italy. Yet Pope Pius IX still held temporal power there: he was not only a religious leader but also a ruler with territory. His position was protected by France, because Napoleon III wanted to keep support from French Catholics and did not want the Pope overthrown by Italian nationalists.

Third, the new state had to govern very different regions. The term "Piedmontisation" describes the extension of Piedmont-Sardinia's laws, institutions, officials and political style across the new kingdom. This helped create a single state quickly: one monarchy, one parliament, one army, one legal framework and one direction of government. But it also made unity feel unequal. To some Italians, especially outside Piedmont, unification looked less like a shared national agreement and more like annexation by the Piedmontese state.

So the problem after 1861 was not simply "two places were missing". Italy faced two connected tasks: completing the territory of the kingdom and making the kingdom feel legitimate to the people inside it.

A useful way to frame the row is:

Misconception check: Italy was not "unified in 1861" in a complete sense. It was proclaimed as a kingdom in 1861, but Venetia and Rome still had to be acquired, and social-political unity remained fragile.

Venetia And 1866

Venetia was gained in 1866, but not because Italy won a straightforward military victory. The key was international diplomacy.

In 1866, Prussia went to war with Austria in the Austro-Prussian War, also called the Seven Weeks' War. The Piedmontese-led Kingdom of Italy allied with Prussia because both states wanted to weaken Austria. Prussia wanted to exclude Austria from German affairs; Italy wanted Venetia. This alliance turned the Italian question into part of a wider European power struggle.

Italy declared war on Austria in June 1866. On paper, this looked like the moment when the young kingdom could prove itself. In practice, the Italian army performed badly. At the second battle of Custozza on 24 June 1866, Austrian forces defeated a larger Italian army. The defeat exposed poor leadership, weak coordination and the difficulty of turning a newly unified state into an effective national army.

Yet the outcome of the war still helped Italy. Prussia defeated Austria decisively in the north, especially at Koniggratz. Austria therefore had to make peace. Under the peace settlement of 1866, Venetia was transferred to Italy, formally through France and then by plebiscite. Italy had lost at Custozza, but Prussia's success forced Austria to give up Venetia.

This is the central causation point: Venetia joined Italy because Italy chose the right diplomatic moment, not because Italy's army defeated Austria by itself. The consequence was double-edged.

On the positive side, union with Venetia brought Venice and the north-east into the kingdom, removed a major Austrian foothold from the peninsula, and made Italian territory more complete.

On the negative side, the manner of success raised doubts about national strength. Italy had benefited from Prussian power. Nationalists could celebrate Venetia, but critics could point out that the new state's army had not proved itself. That mattered because military weakness made unity look dependent on foreign events.

Model explanation:

Italy gained Venetia in 1866 mainly because the Austro-Prussian War changed the balance of power. Although Italian forces were defeated at Custozza, Italy's alliance with Prussia meant that Austria was fighting on two fronts. Prussia's victory forced Austria to surrender Venetia, so Italian unity advanced through diplomacy and international opportunity rather than direct Italian military success.

Rome, Garibaldi And France

Rome was harder than Venetia because the obstacle was not only military. It was religious, diplomatic and political.

For Pope Pius IX, Rome was the centre of papal temporal power. If the Italian state took Rome, the Pope would lose his role as a territorial ruler. Many Catholics across Europe saw this as an attack on the Church. France therefore protected Rome with troops, partly because Napoleon III needed Catholic support at home. The Italian government had to be cautious: attacking Rome while French soldiers were there could mean war with France.

Garibaldi was not cautious in the same way. He saw Rome as the necessary capital of Italy and believed that national enthusiasm could force the issue. His speeches, contacts with supporters and volunteer mobilisation acted as informal nationalist pressure: if enough Italians demanded Rome, he hoped the government and foreign powers would have to accept it. But this pressure failed between 1862 and 1867.

In 1862, Garibaldi gathered volunteers and planned to move north from Calabria towards Rome. The Italian government stopped him at Aspromonte because it feared the international consequences of an unofficial attack on the Pope. Garibaldi was wounded, and the episode showed a painful contradiction: Italian troops had fired on Italian volunteers who wanted to complete Italian unity.

The government then tried formal diplomacy. The September Convention of 1864 with France promised that French troops would eventually leave Rome, while Italy would protect the remaining Papal territory from attack. Italy also moved its capital from Turin to Florence, a gesture meant to reassure France that Rome was not about to be seized. This was diplomacy, but it did not solve the problem. Rome still remained outside the kingdom.

In 1867, Garibaldi tried again. His volunteers hoped that action near Rome might encourage revolt and force the issue. Instead, French and papal forces defeated them at Mentana on 3 November 1867. The result strengthened the lesson of 1862: volunteer pressure could embarrass the Italian government, but it could not overcome France and the papacy.

Garibaldi's failure mattered because it showed that Rome could not be taken simply by nationalist will. The Italian government needed the right international opening. Until France stopped protecting the Pope, Rome remained beyond reach.

Misconception check: Garibaldi was not failing because Rome was unimportant. He failed because Rome was too important internationally. Any attack on the Pope risked French intervention and Catholic opposition.

Rome Acquired

The opening came in 1870. France went to war with Prussia in the Franco-Prussian War. Napoleon III needed troops for France's own survival, so the French garrison protecting Rome was withdrawn. This changed the calculation for the Piedmontese-led Italian government.

Without French protection, the Pope was isolated. The Italian government could now act against Rome without facing the same risk of a major war with France. Italian troops under General Raffaele Cadorna entered papal territory and advanced on Rome. On 20 September 1870, Italian forces breached the city wall at Porta Pia. Papal resistance was deliberately limited: it was enough to show protest, not enough to fight a long war.

Rome was then annexed to the Kingdom of Italy after a plebiscite. This completed the main territorial programme of unification within the specification period. Venetia had joined in 1866; Rome joined in 1870. The Italian state now controlled the two most important missing areas named in this row.

But the acquisition of Rome also created a new problem. The Pope did not accept the legitimacy of the Italian seizure. The "Roman Question" survived after 1870 as a dispute between the Italian state and the papacy. This meant that Rome could be the capital of Italy in a political sense, while still being a source of religious and diplomatic tension.

The causation pattern is similar to Venetia:

The pattern matters for judgement. Italy's final territorial gains were promoted by Italian ambition and readiness, but they depended heavily on wars fought by other powers. Italy acted, but it acted when foreign obstacles had been weakened by events outside Italy.

Extent Of Unity By 1870

By 1870 Italy was much more unified than it had been in 1861. The kingdom had gained Venetia and Rome, removed the two clearest territorial gaps in the official row, and placed nearly all the peninsula under one monarch and one government. That was a major achievement.

Several factors promoted unity.

The first was the monarchy and central state. Piedmontisation created common institutions quickly. It gave Italy a single constitutional monarchy, a parliament, a national army, common laws and a central administration. These were practical tools for building a nation-state.

The second was nationalism. Venetia and Rome both had strong symbolic value. Gaining them helped nationalists tell a story of completion: Austria had retreated from Venetia, and Rome had become Italian. The new kingdom could now claim to be more than a northern-led state with missing pieces.

The third was international opportunity. Italy's leaders used European wars to advance Italian aims. The Austro-Prussian War helped Italy gain Venetia; the Franco-Prussian War helped Italy gain Rome. In both cases, foreign crises broke obstacles that Italy alone struggled to overcome.

However, several factors worked against unity.

Piedmontisation was both a strength and a weakness. It promoted administrative unity, but it could also feel imposed. Local traditions, economies and political expectations differed widely. A single legal and political system did not automatically create shared national identity.

Military weakness also damaged unity. Custozza in 1866 showed that the new army was not yet a confident national force. The fact that Venetia was gained despite defeat made the kingdom look diplomatically lucky rather than militarily strong.

The papacy remained a serious problem. Rome was acquired in 1870, but the Pope did not accept the loss of temporal power. This left many Catholics uncertain or hostile towards the Italian state. The capital could be taken by troops, but religious loyalty could not be annexed by decree.

Finally, political unity did not mean social unity. Many Italians had limited involvement in the new state. Voting was restricted, regional inequalities remained, and the north and south often experienced the new kingdom differently. These issues go beyond the territorial story, but they are essential for judging the "extent" of unity by 1870.

A balanced judgement might read:

By 1870 Italy was territorially and politically much more united, because Venetia and Rome had been acquired and the kingdom had a single central government. However, unity remained incomplete in a deeper sense. Piedmontisation created common institutions but also resentment; the army's poor performance at Custozza suggested weakness; and the Pope's refusal to accept the loss of Rome meant the Roman Question survived. Therefore, 1870 completed the main map of unification, but it did not complete the creation of a fully united Italian nation.