Motives For Intervention

Garibaldi intervened in Naples and Sicily because he believed Italy should become one nation. He had been influenced by republican nationalism, especially Mazzini's ideas, but by 1860 he was willing to work with Victor Emmanuel II, the king of Piedmont-Sardinia, if that was the fastest way to unite Italy. That is the first important point: Garibaldi was radical in style, but not so rigid that he refused monarchical unification.

The immediate opportunity came from Sicily. In April 1860, revolt broke out against Bourbon rule. Sicily was part of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, ruled from Naples by Francis II. Many Sicilians disliked Bourbon government, and nationalist activists hoped a local rising could become part of the wider Italian cause. Garibaldi saw the revolt as both a patriotic duty and a military opportunity.

His motives overlapped:

Cavour's motives were different. He wanted Italian expansion under Piedmontese leadership, not a nationalist revolution that might alarm Europe. Victor Emmanuel II occupied a middle position. He benefited from Garibaldi's victories and admired his popularity, but he also needed to preserve the authority of the monarchy and avoid a war with France over the Papal States.

The key exam point is therefore not "Garibaldi versus Cavour" as a simple clash. It is more subtle: Garibaldi's bold action created opportunities that Cavour could not create by diplomacy alone, but Garibaldi's independence also created risks that Cavour had to contain.

Sicily And Naples, 1860

Garibaldi's expedition began in May 1860. He sailed from near Genoa with a little over 1,000 volunteers, the famous "Thousand", and landed at Marsala in western Sicily on 11 May. The force was small, poorly equipped, and risky. On paper, the Bourbon army should have crushed it. In practice, Garibaldi had several advantages: local unrest in Sicily, Bourbon indecision, his own reputation, and the speed of his campaign.

The chronology matters because it shows how a daring raid became a political turning point:

Garibaldi's success was not just military. It was political theatre. He presented himself as liberator rather than conqueror, and he repeatedly connected his actions to Victor Emmanuel II. In Sicily he declared that he ruled in the king's name. That mattered because it reduced the chance that his campaign would be seen only as a republican revolution.

Yet his victories also made him more dangerous to moderates. By September 1860 he controlled Naples and Sicily, had a volunteer army, and had the prestige of a national hero. If he marched on Rome, he could provoke France, offend Catholics across Europe, and perhaps create a southern revolutionary government that Cavour could not control.

Misconception check: Garibaldi did not simply "unify Italy by himself". His campaign made southern union possible, but the final result depended on Piedmontese diplomacy, plebiscites, Victor Emmanuel's monarchy, and Cavour's intervention in central Italy.

Relationships With Leaders

Garibaldi's relationship with Victor Emmanuel II was easier than his relationship with Cavour. Garibaldi respected the king as a possible symbol of national unity. Victor Emmanuel could accept Garibaldi's victories because they enlarged the future kingdom and increased the prestige of the House of Savoy.

The relationship with Cavour was much more strained. Cavour was a constitutional monarchist and a diplomatic realist. He wanted unification to look orderly and legitimate to the great powers. Garibaldi represented popular nationalism, volunteers, and direct action. Cavour feared that if Garibaldi kept the initiative, unification might become:

• too republican, because Garibaldi's supporters included democrats and Mazzinians
• too anti-clerical, if Garibaldi attacked Rome and the Pope
• too provocative internationally, especially for France
• too independent of Piedmont, if the south developed its own revolutionary government before annexation

Cavour therefore tried to convert Garibaldi's southern conquests into annexation by Piedmont-Sardinia. Plebiscites were central to this strategy. If voters in Sicily and Naples approved union with Victor Emmanuel, then Cavour could claim that annexation was based on national consent rather than on revolutionary seizure.

The symbolic climax came at Teano on 26 October 1860, when Garibaldi met Victor Emmanuel II and greeted him as king of Italy. Garibaldi then handed over control of the south. This moment showed both his patriotism and his limits. He had won extraordinary victories, but he accepted that the new Italy would be a monarchy led by Victor Emmanuel rather than a republic led by volunteers.

A useful way to judge Garibaldi's relationship with the two leaders is to separate "aim" from "method":

Model mini-paragraph:

Garibaldi's relationship with Cavour was important because it turned military success into a political problem. Garibaldi's conquest of Sicily and Naples gave Cavour the chance to build a larger Italian kingdom, but it also threatened to shift leadership of unification away from Piedmont. Cavour's response was to absorb Garibaldi's victories through plebiscites and through Victor Emmanuel's personal authority, so the south joined a monarchy rather than becoming a separate revolutionary state.

Papal States And Great Powers

The Papal States were the most dangerous part of the crisis. They were territories ruled by the Pope. In 1860 the central Papal territories of Umbria and the Marche separated northern Piedmontese-controlled lands from Garibaldi's southern conquests. Rome and Lazio were still under papal rule and protected by French troops.

Garibaldi wanted complete unity, and for many nationalists that meant Rome. But an attack on Rome could have brought France into war against the Italian national movement. Napoleon III, the French emperor, had Catholic supporters at home and claimed to protect the Pope. Cavour therefore had to solve a geographical and diplomatic problem at the same time:

• Geography: Piedmont needed a land link between the north and the south.
• Politics: Cavour needed to stop Garibaldi becoming the uncontrollable leader of unification.
• Diplomacy: Cavour needed to avoid a full French intervention in defence of the Pope.

Cavour's answer was to act before Garibaldi could. Piedmontese forces invaded the Papal territories of Umbria and the Marche in September 1860. They defeated the papal army at Castelfidardo and occupied much of the central Papal States, while Rome and Lazio remained outside the new kingdom. This was a careful compromise. Cavour could link north and south and contain Garibaldi, but he avoided taking Rome itself.

The reaction of the great powers was serious but not decisive. France was the key power because of its protection of Rome. Cavour persuaded Napoleon III to limit his opposition, so France protested but did not stop the occupation of Umbria and the Marche. Other conservative Catholic powers disliked the attack on papal territory and feared revolution, but they did not combine effectively to reverse it. Austria had been weakened by the 1859 war and was not in a strong position to rescue the Pope. Britain was generally more sympathetic to Italian national self-determination than the conservative powers, though British sympathy did not mean direct military help.

The Pope protested strongly. From his point of view, Victor Emmanuel and Cavour were seizing the temporal power of the Church. From Cavour's point of view, the move was necessary to prevent a worse crisis: if Garibaldi attacked Rome, France might intervene and the whole unification process might collapse.

This is the central causation chain:

Garibaldi's victories in the south made a march on Rome seem possible. That threat alarmed Cavour. Cavour used the threat to justify Piedmontese intervention in Umbria and the Marche. The great powers objected or worried, but France did not fully intervene. As a result, Piedmont linked the north and south while Rome remained unresolved.

Misconception check: the Papal States were not fully absorbed in 1860-61. Rome and Lazio remained under papal rule until the later stage of unification. This lesson's boundary is the 1860 crisis and the establishment of the Kingdom of Italy, not the final capture of Rome.

Establishment Of The Kingdom

Garibaldi's campaign and Cavour's intervention changed the scale of unification. Before 1860, Piedmont-Sardinia had expanded in northern and central Italy. After Garibaldi's victories and the annexation of the south, a much larger Italian state became possible.

The process moved from conquest to political incorporation. Plebiscites in the former Bourbon lands and in the annexed central Papal territories gave overwhelming support for union with Victor Emmanuel's state. These votes were not modern democratic elections in the fullest sense, and pressure from local elites and the political situation mattered. However, they gave Cavour a powerful claim: the new Italy was being created through national consent, not just by force.

On 17 March 1861, the Kingdom of Italy was officially proclaimed at Turin, with Victor Emmanuel II as king. Cavour became the leading statesman of the new kingdom, although he died only a few months later. Garibaldi was not the ruler of the new state, but his role was crucial because he had broken Bourbon control in the south and then handed his conquests to the monarchy.

The establishment of the Kingdom of Italy had several immediate consequences:

For a Paper 1 judgement answer, avoid saying that one person alone "made Italy". A stronger judgement weighs interaction. Garibaldi supplied momentum and mass appeal; Cavour supplied diplomatic calculation and state control; Victor Emmanuel supplied the monarchical symbol that allowed radicals and moderates to unite under one crown.

Final judgement:

Garibaldi's intervention was vital because without his victories in Sicily and Naples, the Kingdom of Italy would not have included the south in 1861. However, his success only became a stable kingdom because Cavour contained the risks around the Papal States and because Victor Emmanuel II provided a monarch whom Garibaldi could accept. The establishment of the Kingdom of Italy was therefore a result of both revolutionary action and conservative state-building.