3.1.1 - Responses to evil and suffering: theodicy framework
A theodicy must do more than say that suffering has a reason: it must reconcile evil with divine power, knowledge, and goodness without trivialising victims' pain. You will distinguish a defence from a full theodicy, map Hick's soul-making account, Plantinga's free will defence, and Griffin's process approach, then evaluate them through coherence, moral plausibility, and explanatory reach.
Why responses are needed
The problem of evil and suffering becomes a philosophical problem when it is placed beside the God of classical theism: a God who is normally described as omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent.
If God is all-knowing, God knows about suffering. If God is all-powerful, God appears able to prevent it. If God is perfectly good, God appears to want to prevent pointless suffering. The existence of evil and suffering therefore creates pressure on belief in such a God.
Response to evil and suffering
A reasoned answer to the challenge that evil and suffering count against belief in a perfectly good, all-powerful and all-knowing God.
A response does not have to make suffering easy to accept. In philosophy of religion, the task is more precise: to show whether belief in God can still be coherent, plausible or reasonable when evil and suffering are real features of the world.
This means a response must begin with honesty about the problem. A weak response treats suffering as a small puzzle. A serious response accepts that suffering can be intense, unevenly distributed and morally disturbing, then asks whether there is still a defensible way to understand God and the world together.
What a theodicy is
A theodicy is a response that tries to defend the justice and goodness of God in the light of evil. The word comes from ideas of God and justice: a theodicy asks how God can be just, good or worthy of worship if the world contains suffering.
In AQA vocabulary, theodicy is treated broadly as a defence of God's justice and goodness. In wider philosophy, there is a useful technical distinction:
| Term | Main aim | Standard of success |
|---|---|---|
| Defence | Show that God and evil are not logically inconsistent | The response only needs to be possible |
| Theodicy | Give an account of why God permits evil | The response needs to be plausible and morally serious |
This distinction matters because the AQA topic includes both "theodicy" language and "the free will defence." A defence may be enough against the logical problem of evil, because it can show that God and evil could coexist without contradiction. A theodicy has a harder job: it tries to explain why God would actually permit evil and suffering.
Do not confuse theodicy with proving that God exists. A theodicy is usually defensive. It answers an objection to belief in God; it does not by itself establish God's existence.
| Framework card | Content |
|---|---|
| Key concept | Theodicy |
| Core claim | Evil and suffering do not automatically defeat belief in a good and powerful God if God has a justifying reason for permitting them |
| Why it matters | It gives the structure for later AQA responses: soul-making, free will and process theodicy |
| Possible challenge | The explanation may seem morally inadequate if it appears to excuse, minimise or instrumentalise suffering |
A theodicy does not say that suffering is good. It says that God might be justified in permitting suffering for some further reason.
The target of a response
A good response identifies the exact problem it is answering. The AQA topic has already separated natural and moral evil, and logical and evidential forms of the problem. Theodicy works best when those distinctions stay visible.
| Target | Question being answered | What a response must show |
|---|---|---|
| Logical problem | Is the existence of God logically incompatible with the existence of evil? | That God and evil can coexist without contradiction |
| Evidential problem | Does the amount, intensity or distribution of evil make God's existence unlikely? | That there may be a plausible reason why God permits such evil |
| Moral evil | How can God permit suffering caused by human action or inaction? | That human agency, responsibility or freedom can matter enough to explain some permitted evil |
| Natural evil | How can God permit suffering caused by disease, disaster, decay or natural processes? | That non-human or non-chosen suffering has some possible explanation |
The same response can succeed against one target and struggle against another. For example, a response centred on human choice may explain moral evil more easily than earthquakes, childhood illness or animal suffering. A response that offers a possible explanation may weaken the logical problem but still leave the evidential problem pressing.
That is why A-level evaluation should avoid blunt claims such as "this solves the problem of evil." A more accurate judgement asks: which form of the problem is answered, how far, and at what cost?
The basic theodicy move
Most theodicies use the same basic structure even when their content differs.
| Step | The move | What to check |
|---|---|---|
| 1. Accept the pressure | Evil and suffering appear to count against belief in God | Does the response take suffering seriously? |
| 2. Identify a possible good, value or limit | The response claims there is some reason God permits evil | Is the reason clear and relevant? |
| 3. Connect permission to justification | God may permit evil because preventing it would lose, damage or block something important | Does this connection actually follow? |
| 4. Preserve or reinterpret divine attributes | The response protects God's goodness, power or knowledge, or revises how one of them should be understood | Is the result still recognisably the God being defended? |
| 5. Face the cost | The response must explain why the permitted suffering is not excessive, pointless or morally unacceptable | Does the explanation become too costly? |
The key idea is "permission." A theodicy normally does not claim that God directly wills every evil act or every painful event. It claims that God may permit evil because stopping it would prevent some greater good, remove a significant kind of freedom, undermine a stable world, or require a different understanding of divine power.
This is why the phrase "morally sufficient reason" is useful. A theodicy needs to show that God could have a reason that is good enough to justify permitting evil. But that creates a demanding AO2 question: is the proposed reason actually good enough, given the suffering being explained?
AQA response map
This lesson is the framework for the named AQA responses. The table below maps the later responses without teaching them in full.
| AQA response | Framework question | Main pressure it usually faces |
|---|---|---|
| Hick's soul-making theodicy | Could suffering be part of an environment in which persons develop morally or spiritually? | Whether the amount and intensity of suffering are necessary or acceptable for growth |
| The free will defence | Could genuine moral freedom justify God's permission of wrongdoing? | Whether it explains natural evil as well as moral evil, and whether freedom is worth the cost |
| Process theodicy as presented by Griffin | Does the problem change if divine power is not understood as unilateral control over every event? | Whether revising omnipotence protects God at the cost of classical theism |
| Strengths and weaknesses of each response | How well does each response answer the logical and evidential problems, and moral and natural evil? | Whether any response gives a full enough answer or only a partial defence |
The framework also helps you avoid a common mistake. The responses should not be treated as interchangeable slogans. Each one changes a different part of the problem:
- soul-making focuses on development through challenge
- free will focuses on the value and risk of moral agency
- process theodicy focuses on the nature of divine power and persuasion
Once the target is clear, later evaluation becomes sharper. You can ask whether the response answers the logical problem only, whether it also reduces the evidential force of suffering, and whether it handles both moral and natural evil.
AQA names separate responses because they do different philosophical work. A strong answer keeps those differences visible.
AO2 pressure points
AO2 evaluation is not a bolt-on sentence saying a response is "strong" or "weak." It tests the response against the exact pressure created by evil and suffering.
| Pressure point | AO2 question | Why it matters |
|---|---|---|
| Scope | Does the response address both moral and natural evil? | A narrow response may solve less than it claims |
| Proportion | Is the permitted suffering proportionate to the good being defended? | Some suffering may appear excessive or pointless |
| Innocent suffering | Can the response explain suffering experienced by children, vulnerable people or non-human animals? | These cases make it harder to appeal only to guilt, desert or personal growth |
| Divine attributes | Does the response preserve omnipotence, omniscience and omnibenevolence? | A response may defend God by changing the idea of God |
| Plausibility | Is the explanation merely possible, or actually persuasive? | A possible defence may answer the logical problem but leave the evidential problem strong |
| Moral sensitivity | Does the explanation avoid trivialising suffering? | A response can be logically neat but morally troubling |
This gives you a clean AO1-to-AO2 movement. AO1 explains what the response says. AO2 asks whether that response succeeds against the problem it is meant to answer.
For example, a free-will response has an obvious AO1 strength: it gives moral responsibility to human agents rather than blaming God for human cruelty. But the AO2 pressure point is scope: it may explain moral evil more readily than natural evil.
Essay-ready judgement
This framework is useful because it turns a broad topic into precise paragraph work.
| AO1 content | AO2 move it supports | Careful judgement |
|---|---|---|
| A theodicy defends divine justice and goodness in light of evil | A response can preserve belief in God by offering a justifying reason for divine permission | This is strongest when the reason is clear and morally serious |
| A defence may only need to show logical compatibility | A response might defeat the logical problem without fully answering the evidential problem | Possibility is not the same as probability |
| Moral and natural evil create different pressures | A response must be judged by its scope | A response can be successful but limited |
| AQA names Hick, free will and Griffin separately | The responses should be compared by their different central moves | A strong essay does not blur them into one general "religious answer" |
A paragraph using this lesson should do four things:
- Name the target: logical problem, evidential problem, moral evil or natural evil.
- Explain the response's central move.
- Test that move against a pressure point.
- Reach a limited judgement about how far it succeeds.
For example, rather than writing, "The free will defence is strong because people choose evil," a sharper paragraph move would be: "The free will defence has force against moral evil because it links wrongdoing to human agency rather than divine intention. However, that same focus limits its scope unless it can also explain natural suffering."
This lesson links forward to the AQA evil-and-suffering sequence: Hick's soul-making theodicy, the free will defence, process theodicy as presented by Griffin, and the later strengths-and-weaknesses comparison. The framework question stays the same throughout: what kind of evil is being answered, what reason is offered for divine permission, and how far is that reason persuasive?
The best use of this lesson is not to memorise a list of responses. It is to learn the test every response must pass: target, reason, justification, cost and judgement.